History of the Russian-Finnish War. The Forgotten War

The Russian-Finnish War began in November 1939 and lasted 105 days until March 1940. The war did not end with the final defeat of any of the armies and was concluded on terms favorable to Russia (then Soviet Union). Since the war took place during the cold season, many Russian soldiers suffered from severe frosts, but did not retreat.

All this is known to any schoolchild; all this is studied in history lessons. But how the war began and what it was like for the Finns is less often discussed. This is not surprising - who needs to know the enemy’s point of view? And our guys did well, they beat their opponents.

It is precisely because of this worldview that the percentage of Russians who know the truth about this war and accept it is so insignificant.

The Russian-Finnish War of 1939 did not break out suddenly, like a bolt from the blue. The conflict between the Soviet Union and Finland had been brewing for almost two decades. Finland did not trust the great leader of that time - Stalin, who, in turn, was dissatisfied with Finland's alliance with England, Germany and France.

Russia, to ensure its own security, tried to conclude an agreement with Finland on terms beneficial to the Soviet Union. And after another refusal, Finland decided to try to force it, and on November 30, Russian troops opened fire on Finland.

Initially, the Russian-Finnish war was not successful for Russia - the winter was cold, soldiers received frostbite, some froze to death, and the Finns firmly held the defense on the Mannerheim Line. But the troops of the Soviet Union won, gathering together all the remaining forces and launching a general offensive. As a result, peace was concluded between the countries on terms favorable to Russia: a significant part of the Finnish territories (including the Karelian Isthmus, part of the northern and western coasts of Lake Ladoga) became Russian possessions, and the Hanko Peninsula was leased to Russia for 30 years.

In history, the Russian-Finnish war was called “Unnecessary”, since it gave almost nothing to either Russia or Finland. Both sides were to blame for its beginning, and both sides suffered huge losses. Thus, during the war, 48,745 people were lost, 158,863 soldiers were wounded or frostbitten. The Finns also lost a huge number of people.

If not everyone, then at least many are familiar with the course of the war described above. But there is also information about the Russian-Finnish war that is not usually discussed out loud or is simply unknown. Moreover, there is such unpleasant, in some ways even indecent information about both participants in the battle: both about Russia and about Finland.

Thus, it is not customary to say that the war with Finland was launched basely and unlawfully: the Soviet Union attacked it without warning, violating the peace treaty concluded in 1920 and the non-aggression treaty of 1934. Moreover, by starting this war, the Soviet Union violated its own convention, which stipulated that an attack on a participating state (which was Finland), as well as its blockade or threats against it, could not be justified by any considerations. By the way, according to the same convention, Finland had the right to attack, but did not use it.

If we talk about the Finnish army, then there were some unsightly moments. The government, taken by surprise by the unexpected attack of the Russians, herded not only all able-bodied men, but also boys, schoolchildren, and 8th-9th grade students into military schools, and then into the troops.

Children somehow trained in shooting were sent to a real, adult war. Moreover, in many detachments there were no tents, not all soldiers had weapons - they were issued one rifle for four. They were not issued with draggers for machine guns, and the guys hardly knew how to handle the machine guns themselves. But what can we say about weapons - the Finnish government could not even provide its soldiers with warm clothes and shoes, and young boys, lying in the snow in the forty-degree frost, in light clothes and low shoes, froze their hands and feet and froze to death.

According to official data, during severe frosts the Finnish army lost more than 70% of its soldiers, while the company sergeant major warmed their feet in good felt boots. Thus, by sending hundreds of young people to certain death, Finland itself ensured its defeat in the Russian-Finnish war.

friend of your enemy

Today, wise and calm Finns can only attack someone in an anecdote. But three quarters of a century ago, when, on the wings of independence gained much later than other European nations, accelerated national building continued in Suomi, you would have had no time for jokes.

In 1918, Carl Gustav Emil Mannerheim uttered the well-known “oath of the sword,” publicly promising to annex Eastern (Russian) Karelia. At the end of the thirties, Gustav Karlovich (as he was called during his service in the Russian Imperial Army, where the path of the future field marshal began) is the most influential person in the country.

Of course, Finland did not intend to attack the USSR. I mean, she wasn't going to do this alone. The young state's ties with Germany were, perhaps, even stronger than with the countries of its native Scandinavia. In 1918, when the newly independent country was in intense debate about the form government system, by decision of the Finnish Senate, Emperor Wilhelm's brother-in-law, Prince Frederick Charles of Hesse, was declared King of Finland; For various reasons, nothing came of the Suoma monarchist project, but the choice of personnel is very indicative. Further, the very victory of the “Finnish White Guard” (as the northern neighbors were called in Soviet newspapers) in the inner civil war 1918 was also largely, if not completely, due to the participation of the expeditionary force sent by the Kaiser (numbering up to 15 thousand people, despite the fact that the total number of local “reds” and “whites”, significantly inferior to the Germans in fighting qualities, did not exceed 100 thousand people).

Cooperation with the Third Reich developed no less successfully than with the Second. Kriegsmarine ships freely entered Finnish skerries; German stations in the area of Turku, Helsinki and Rovaniemi were engaged in radio reconnaissance; from the second half of the thirties, the airfields of the “Land of a Thousand Lakes” were modernized to accept heavy bombers, which Mannerheim did not even have in the project... It should be said that subsequently Germany, already in the first hours of the war with the USSR (which Finland officially joined only on June 25, 1941 ) actually used the territory and waters of Suomi to lay mines in the Gulf of Finland and bombard Leningrad.

Yes, at that time the idea of attacking the Russians did not seem so crazy. The Soviet Union of 1939 did not look like a formidable adversary at all. The asset includes the successful (for Helsinki) First Soviet-Finnish War. The brutal defeat of the Red Army soldiers from Poland during the Western Campaign in 1920. Of course, one can recall the successful repulsion of Japanese aggression on Khasan and Khalkhin Gol, but, firstly, these were local clashes far from the European theater, and, secondly, the qualities of the Japanese infantry were assessed very low. And thirdly, the Red Army, as Western analysts believed, was weakened by the repressions of 1937. Of course, the human and economic resources of the empire and its former province are incomparable. But Mannerheim, unlike Hitler, did not intend to go to the Volga to bomb the Urals. Karelia alone was enough for the field marshal.

Another old entry of mine made it to the top after 4 whole years. Today, of course, I would correct some of the statements from that time. But, alas, there is absolutely no time.

gusev_a_v in the Soviet-Finnish War. Losses Part 2

The Soviet-Finnish War and Finland's participation in World War II are extremely mythologized. A special place in this mythology is occupied by the losses of the parties. Very small in Finland and huge in the USSR. Mannerheim wrote that the Russians walked through minefields, in dense rows and holding hands. Every Russian person who recognizes the incomparability of losses must at the same time admit that our grandfathers were idiots.

I’ll quote Finnish Commander-in-Chief Mannerheim again:
« It happened that in the battles of early December, Russians marched singing in tight ranks - and even holding hands - into Finnish minefields, not paying attention to explosions and accurate fire from the defenders.”

Can you imagine these cretins?

After such statements, the loss figures cited by Mannerheim are not surprising. He counted 24,923 Finns killed and dying from wounds. Russians, in his opinion, killed 200 thousand people.

Why feel sorry for these Russians?

Finnish soldier in a coffin...

Engle, E. Paanenen L. in the book “The Soviet-Finnish War. Breakthrough of the Mannerheim Line 1939 - 1940.” with reference to Nikita Khrushchev they give the following data:

“Of the total number of 1.5 million people sent to fight in Finland, the USSR’s losses in killed (according to Khrushchev) amounted to 1 million people. The Russians lost about 1000 aircraft, 2300 tanks and armored vehicles, as well as a huge amount of various military equipment... "

Thus, the Russians won, filling the Finns with “meat”.

Finnish military cemetery...

Mannerheim writes about the reasons for the defeat as follows:
“In the final stages of the war, the weakest point was not the lack of materials, but the lack of manpower.”

Why?
According to Mannerheim, the Finns lost only 24 thousand killed and 43 thousand wounded. And after such scanty losses, Finland began to lack manpower?

Something doesn't add up!

But let's see what other researchers write and have written about the losses of the parties.

For example, Pykhalov in “The Great Slandered War” states:
« Of course, during the fighting, the Soviet Armed forces suffered significantly big losses, than the enemy. According to the name lists, in the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. 126,875 Red Army soldiers were killed, died or went missing. Losses Finnish troops According to official data, there were 21,396 killed and 1,434 missing. However, in Russian literature Another figure for Finnish losses is often found - 48,243 killed, 43 thousand wounded. The primary source of this figure is a translation of an article by Lieutenant Colonel of the Finnish General Staff Helge Seppälä published in the newspaper “Abroad” No. 48 for 1989, originally published in the Finnish publication “Maailma ya me”. Regarding the Finnish losses, Seppälä writes the following:
“Finland lost more than 23,000 people killed in the “winter war”; more than 43,000 people were injured. 25,243 people were killed in the bombings, including on merchant ships.”

The last figure - 25,243 killed in bombings - is questionable. Perhaps there is a newspaper typo here. Unfortunately, I did not have the opportunity to familiarize myself with the Finnish original of Seppälä’s article.”

Mannerheim, as you know, assessed the losses from the bombing:
“More than seven hundred civilians were killed and twice that number were wounded.”

The largest figures for Finnish losses are given by Military Historical Journal No. 4, 1993:
“So, according to far from complete data, the losses of the Red Army amounted to 285,510 people (72,408 killed, 17,520 missing, 13,213 frostbitten and 240 shell-shocked). The losses of the Finnish side, according to official data, amounted to 95 thousand killed and 45 thousand wounded.”

And finally, Finnish losses on Wikipedia:
According to Finnish data:
25,904 killed
43,557 wounded
1000 prisoners
According to Russian sources:
up to 95 thousand soldiers killed
45 thousand wounded
806 prisoners

As for the calculation of Soviet losses, the mechanism of these calculations is given in detail in the book “Russia in the Wars of the 20th Century. The Book of Loss." The number of irretrievable losses of the Red Army and the fleet includes even those with whom their relatives broke off contact in 1939-1940.
That is, there is no evidence that they died in the Soviet-Finnish war. And our researchers counted these among the losses of more than 25 thousand people.

Red Army soldiers examine captured Boffors anti-tank guns

Who and how counted the Finnish losses is absolutely unclear. It is known that by the end of the Soviet-Finnish war the total number of Finnish armed forces reached 300 thousand people. The loss of 25 thousand fighters is less than 10% of the armed forces.
But Mannerheim writes that by the end of the war Finland was experiencing a shortage of manpower. However, there is another version. There are few Finns in general, and even minor losses for such a small country are a threat to the gene pool.
However, in the book “Results of the Second World War. Conclusions of the Vanquished,” Professor Helmut Aritz estimates the population of Finland in 1938 at 3 million 697 thousand people.
The irretrievable loss of 25 thousand people does not pose any threat to the gene pool of the nation.
According to Aritz's calculations, the Finns lost in 1941 - 1945. more than 84 thousand people. And after that, the population of Finland by 1947 grew by 238 thousand people!!!

At the same time, Mannerheim, describing the year 1944, again cries in his memoirs about the lack of people:
“Finland was gradually forced to mobilize its trained reserves down to people aged 45, something that had never happened in any country, not even Germany.”

Funeral of Finnish skiers

What kind of cunning manipulations the Finns are doing with their losses - I don’t know. On Wikipedia, Finnish losses in the period 1941 - 1945 are indicated as 58 thousand 715 people. Losses during the war of 1939 - 1940 - 25 thousand 904 people.
A total of 84 thousand 619 people.
But the Finnish website http://kronos.narc.fi/menehtyneet/ contains data on 95 thousand Finns who died between 1939 and 1945. Even if we add here the victims of the “Lapland War” (according to Wikipedia, about 1000 people), the numbers still do not add up.

Vladimir Medinsky in his book “War. Myths of the USSR” claims that ardent Finnish historians pulled off a simple trick: they counted only army losses. And the losses of numerous paramilitary formations, such as the Shutskor, were not included in the general loss statistics. And they had many paramilitary forces.
How much - Medinsky does not explain.

"Fighters" of the "Lotta" formations

Be that as it may, two explanations arise:
First, if the Finnish data about their losses is correct, then the Finns are the most cowardly people in the world, because they “raised their paws” without suffering almost any losses.
Secondly, if we assume that the Finns are a brave and courageous people, then Finnish historians simply vastly underestimated their own losses.

1939-1940 (Soviet-Finnish War, known in Finland as Winter War) - an armed conflict between the USSR and Finland in the period from November 30, 1939 to March 12, 1940.

Its reason was the desire of the Soviet leadership to move the Finnish border away from Leningrad (now St. Petersburg) in order to strengthen the security of the northwestern borders of the USSR, and the refusal of the Finnish side to do this. The Soviet government asked to lease parts of the Hanko Peninsula and some islands in the Gulf of Finland in exchange for a larger area of Soviet territory in Karelia, with the subsequent conclusion of a mutual assistance agreement.

The Finnish government believed that accepting Soviet demands would weaken the strategic position of the state and lead to Finland losing its neutrality and its subordination to the USSR. The Soviet leadership, in turn, did not want to give up its demands, which, in its opinion, were necessary to ensure the security of Leningrad.

The Soviet-Finnish border on the Karelian Isthmus (Western Karelia) was only 32 kilometers from Leningrad - largest center Soviet industry and the second largest city in the country.

The reason for the start of the Soviet-Finnish war was the so-called Maynila incident. According to the Soviet version, on November 26, 1939 at 15.45 Finnish artillery in the Mainila area fired seven shells at the positions of the 68th Infantry Regiment on Soviet territory. Three Red Army soldiers and one junior commander were allegedly killed. On the same day, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR addressed a note of protest to the Finnish government and demanded the withdrawal of Finnish troops from the border by 20-25 kilometers.

The Finnish government denied the shelling of Soviet territory and proposed that not only Finnish, but also Soviet troops be withdrawn 25 kilometers from the border. This formally equal demand was impossible to fulfill, because then Soviet troops would have to be withdrawn from Leningrad.

On November 29, 1939, the Finnish envoy in Moscow was handed a note about the severance of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Finland. On November 30 at 8 a.m., troops of the Leningrad Front received orders to cross the border with Finland. On the same day, Finnish President Kyusti Kallio declared war on the USSR.

During "perestroika" several versions of the Maynila incident became known. According to one of them, the shelling of the positions of the 68th regiment was carried out by a secret unit of the NKVD. According to another, there was no shooting at all, and in the 68th regiment on November 26 there were neither killed nor wounded. There were other versions that did not receive documentary confirmation.

From the very beginning of the war, the superiority of forces was on the side of the USSR. The Soviet command concentrated 21 rifle divisions, one tank corps, three separate tank brigades (a total of 425 thousand people, about 1.6 thousand guns, 1,476 tanks and about 1,200 aircraft) near the border with Finland. To support ground troops, it was planned to attract about 500 aircraft and more than 200 ships of the Northern and Baltic Fleet. 40 % Soviet forces was deployed on the Karelian Isthmus.

The group of Finnish troops had about 300 thousand people, 768 guns, 26 tanks, 114 aircraft and 14 warships. The Finnish command concentrated 42% of its forces on the Karelian Isthmus, deploying the Isthmus Army there. The remaining troops covered separate directions from the Barents Sea to Lake Ladoga.

The main line of defense of Finland was the “Mannerheim Line” - unique, impregnable fortifications. The main architect of Mannerheim's line was nature itself. Its flanks rested on the Gulf of Finland and Lake Ladoga. The shore of the Gulf of Finland was covered by large-caliber coastal batteries, and in the Taipale area on the shore of Lake Ladoga, reinforced concrete forts with eight 120- and 152-mm coastal guns were created.

The "Mannerheim Line" had a front width of 135 kilometers, a depth of up to 95 kilometers and consisted of a support strip (depth 15-60 kilometers), a main strip (depth 7-10 kilometers), a second strip 2-15 kilometers from the main one, and rear (Vyborg) defense line. Over two thousand long-term fire structures (DOS) and wood-earth fire structures (DZOS) were erected, which were united into strong points of 2-3 DOS and 3-5 DZOS in each, and the latter - into resistance nodes (3-4 strong points point). The main line of defense consisted of 25 resistance units, numbering 280 DOS and 800 DZOS. Strong points were defended by permanent garrisons (from a company to a battalion in each). In the gaps between the strong points and the nodes of resistance there were positions for field troops. Strongholds and positions of field troops were covered by anti-tank and anti-personnel barriers. In the support zone alone, 220 kilometers of wire barriers in 15-45 rows, 200 kilometers of forest debris, 80 kilometers of granite obstacles up to 12 rows, anti-tank ditches, scarps (anti-tank walls) and numerous minefields were created.

All fortifications were connected by a system of trenches and underground passages and were supplied with food and ammunition necessary for long-term independent combat.

On November 30, 1939, after a lengthy artillery preparation, Soviet troops crossed the border with Finland and began an offensive on the front from the Barents Sea to the Gulf of Finland. In 10-13 days, in separate directions they overcame the zone of operational obstacles and reached the main strip of the “Mannerheim Line”. Unsuccessful attempts to break through it continued for more than two weeks.

At the end of December, the Soviet command decided to stop further offensive on the Karelian Isthmus and begin systematic preparations for breaking through the Mannerheim Line.

The front went on the defensive. The troops were regrouped. The North-Western Front was created on the Karelian Isthmus. The troops received reinforcements. As a result, Soviet troops deployed against Finland numbered more than 1.3 million people, 1.5 thousand tanks, 3.5 thousand guns, and three thousand aircraft. By the beginning of February 1940, the Finnish side had 600 thousand people, 600 guns and 350 aircraft.

On February 11, 1940, the assault on the fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus resumed - troops Northwestern Front after 2-3 hours of artillery preparation they went on the offensive.

Having broken through two lines of defense, Soviet troops reached the third on February 28. They broke the enemy's resistance, forced him to begin a retreat along the entire front and, developing an offensive, enveloped the Vyborg group of Finnish troops from the northeast, captured most of Vyborg, crossed the Vyborg Bay, bypassed the Vyborg fortified area from the northwest, and cut the highway to Helsinki.

The fall of the Mannerheim Line and the defeat of the main group of Finnish troops put the enemy in a difficult situation. Under these conditions, Finland turned to the Soviet government asking for peace.

On the night of March 13, 1940, a peace treaty was signed in Moscow, according to which Finland ceded about a tenth of its territory to the USSR and pledged not to participate in coalitions hostile to the USSR. March 13 fighting stopped.

In accordance with the agreement, the border on the Karelian Isthmus was moved away from Leningrad by 120-130 kilometers. The entire Karelian Isthmus with Vyborg, the Vyborg Bay with islands, the western and northern coasts of Lake Ladoga, a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland, and part of the Rybachy and Sredniy peninsulas went to the Soviet Union. The Hanko Peninsula and the maritime territory around it were leased to the USSR for 30 years. This improved the position of the Baltic Fleet.

As a result of the Soviet-Finnish war, the main strategic goal pursued by the Soviet leadership was achieved - to secure the northwestern border. However, the international position of the Soviet Union worsened: it was expelled from the League of Nations, relations with England and France worsened, and an anti-Soviet campaign unfolded in the West.

Losses Soviet troops in the war were: irrevocable - about 130 thousand people, sanitary - about 265 thousand people. Irreversible losses of Finnish troops are about 23 thousand people, sanitary losses are over 43 thousand people.

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1939-1940 (Soviet-Finnish War, in Finland known as the Winter War) - an armed conflict between the USSR and Finland from November 30, 1939 to March 12, 1940.

The Soviet-Finnish border on the Karelian Isthmus (Western Karelia) ran just 32 kilometers from Leningrad, the largest center of Soviet industry and the second largest city in the country.

The reason for the start of the Soviet-Finnish war was the so-called Maynila incident. According to the Soviet version, on November 26, 1939, at 15.45, Finnish artillery in the Mainila area fired seven shells at the positions of the 68th Infantry Regiment on Soviet territory. Three Red Army soldiers and one junior commander were allegedly killed. On the same day, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR addressed a note of protest to the Finnish government and demanded the withdrawal of Finnish troops from the border by 20-25 kilometers.

From the very beginning of the war, the superiority of forces was on the side of the USSR. The Soviet command concentrated 21 rifle divisions, one tank corps, three separate tank brigades (a total of 425 thousand people, about 1.6 thousand guns, 1,476 tanks and about 1,200 aircraft) near the border with Finland. To support the ground forces, it was planned to attract about 500 aircraft and more than 200 ships of the Northern and Baltic fleets. 40% of Soviet forces were deployed on the Karelian Isthmus.

All fortifications were connected by a system of trenches and underground passages and were supplied with food and ammunition necessary for long-term independent combat.

At the end of December, the Soviet command decided to stop further offensive on the Karelian Isthmus and begin systematic preparations for breaking through the Mannerheim Line.

On February 11, 1940, the assault on the fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus resumed - the troops of the North-Western Front, after 2-3 hours of artillery preparation, went on the offensive.

The losses of Soviet troops in the war were: irrevocable - about 130 thousand people, sanitary - about 265 thousand people. Irreversible losses of Finnish troops are about 23 thousand people, sanitary losses are over 43 thousand people.

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