Kerch-Feodosia naval landing. Kerch-Eltigen landing operation

Kerch-Feodosia landing operation

The Kerch-Feodosia operation is the most significant landing operation in the Great Patriotic War. Despite the fact that our troops were not able to completely solve the tasks assigned to them, this landing operation was one of heroic pages in the chronicle of the Great Patriotic War, a symbol of the courage of the soldiers of the Transcaucasian Front, who stormed the rocky shores of Crimea in the cold December of 1941, without having special landing craft or any experience in carrying out such operations.

The landing in Crimea was dictated by the situation that developed on the Soviet-German front at the end of 1941, and, in particular, on its left wing, after the defeat of the Germans near Rostov. The main goal of the planned operation was to capture the bridgehead from which actions to liberate Crimea were to begin. In addition, the landing was supposed to pull enemy forces away from Sevastopol and thereby ease the position of the city’s defenders, and then completely release it. Successful actions would eliminate the threat of an invasion of German troops into the North Caucasus through the Kerch Strait.

In total, the enemy had forces in Crimea equivalent to 10 divisions. At the same time, he concentrated two-thirds of his troops near Sevastopol, and one-third was allocated for the counter-defense of the Kerch Peninsula (the 42nd Army Corps, consisting of the 46th and 73rd infantry divisions, the 8th Romanian cavalry brigade and two tank battalions). The total number of enemy troops on the Kerch Peninsula was about 25 thousand people, about 300 guns and mortars, 118 tanks. The capabilities of the Kerch group increased significantly due to the dominance of enemy aviation, which numbered over 500 bombers and about 200 fighters in Crimea.

When planning the Kerch operation, the command of the Transcaucasian Front initially set a very narrow task for the troops, which essentially boiled down to occupying only the eastern coast of the Kerch Peninsula with a subsequent methodical attack to the west with the goal of reaching the Jantara and Seitdzheut fronts.

Then this operation was conceived in the form of a sea and parachute landing on the eastern coast of the Kerch Peninsula (Cape Khorni, Kizaulsky lighthouse) with the subsequent transfer of the main forces to the peninsula to develop a general offensive on the Tulumchak, Feodosiya front. Its (operation's) development began on December 3, 1941.

The operation was supposed to be carried out by the forces of the 56th and 51st armies (7–8 rifle divisions, 3–4 artillery regiments of the reserve of the High Command, 3–4 tank battalions, aviation of both armies and 2 air divisions long range).

The navy was supposed to facilitate the landing and provide the flanks of the advancing armies.

Subsequently, the operation plan underwent some changes. The final course of action was developed by December 13 by the command of the Transcaucasian Front after agreement with the command of the Black Sea Fleet. It was envisaged simultaneously with the forcing Kerch Strait carry out the landing of several landing forces - a naval landing (2 divisions and a brigade with reinforcements) in the Feodosia area, an airborne landing in the Vladislavovka area, an auxiliary amphibious landing in the Arabat and Ak-Monai area. The task of the landing force is to capture the Ak-Monai Isthmus and strike at the rear of the enemy’s Kerch group.

The implementation of this plan was supposed to lead to the operational encirclement of the enemy in the western part of the Kerch Peninsula.

The operation was to involve the 51st and 44th armies (consisting of 9 rifle divisions and 3 rifle brigades) and reinforcements - 5 artillery regiments, motorized pontoon and engineer battalions, 2 long-range air divisions and 2 air regiments.

Before the start of the operation, the 51st Army included the 224th, 396th, 302nd, 390th Rifle Divisions, the 12th and 83rd Rifle Brigades, the Azov Military Flotilla Marine Battalion, the 265th, 457th, 456th, 25th Corps Artillery regiments, 1st division of the 7th Guards Mortar Regiment, 7th separate flamethrower company, 75th, 132nd, 205th engineering battalions, 6th and 54th motorized pontoon battalions of the Azov military flotilla, Kerch naval base.

The army was commanded by Lieutenant General V.N. Lvov.

Before the start of the operation, the 44th Army included the 236th, 157th Rifle Divisions, 63rd Mountain Rifle Division, 251st Mountain Rifle Regiment, 105th Mountain Rifle Regiment with a light artillery regiment division, 1st Division of the 239th Artillery Regiment , 547th Howitzer Artillery Regiment, 61st Engineer Battalion.

The army was commanded by Major General A. N. Pervushin.

In reserve were the 400th, 398th rifle divisions and the 126th separate tank battalion, which at the end of December 1941 participated in the landing in separate units.

The 156th Rifle Division from the Transcaucasian Front was allocated for coastal defense Sea of ​​Azov.

The general leadership of the operation was carried out by the commander of the Transcaucasian Front (from December 30 - the Caucasian Front), Major General D. T. Kozlov. The landing of troops was entrusted to the Black Sea Fleet under the command of Vice Admiral F. S. Oktyabrsky and the Azov Military Flotilla, which was part of it, led by Rear Admiral S. G. Gorshkov.

The landing was entrusted to the Azov military flotilla, the Kerch naval base and the Black Sea Fleet.

On December 1, 1941, the 46th Wehrmacht Infantry Division and the 8th Cavalry Brigade of the Romanians were in defense on the Kerch Peninsula. Between December 11 and December 13, the German command transferred the 73rd Infantry Division and assault gun divisions here.

The total number of enemy field troops on the Kerch Peninsula was 10–11 thousand people. They were part of the 11th German Army (headquarters in the city of Simferopol).

The enemy's defense consisted of field and long-term fortifications. The depth of the defensive zone was 3–4 km. The city of Feodosia and the surrounding area were equipped as a strong resistance center.

Anti-landing defense was created in places convenient for landings and was built according to a system of strong points. It was echeloned to a considerable depth and consisted of field and long-term type fortifications with fire communications between them. The fortifications were covered with wire fences. The main strongholds were created in the northeastern part of the peninsula from Cape Khroni to Aleksandrovka, as well as in the areas of Cape Takyl and Mount Opuk. Feodosia, with a garrison of more than 2 thousand people, was turned into an antilanding defense hub. A significant amount of ground and anti-aircraft artillery was stationed in populated areas, which were turned into strong centers of resistance with all-round defense. The approaches to Feodosia from the sea were mined.

The most strongly fortified areas were Yenikale, Kapkany, and Kerch. It was here maximum amount infantry and fire weapons.

From December 3 to December 25, the troops of the 51st and 44th armies, reinforcements and air forces intended to participate in the upcoming operation regrouped and concentrated in loading areas, on ships and vessels.

Poor meteorological conditions of this period complicated the regrouping, and especially the relocation of aviation from the airfields of the Caucasus.

The supporting air forces (132nd, 134th Long-Range Aviation Divisions, 367th SB Bomber Regiment, 792nd Pe-2 Dive Bomber Regiment, 9 Fighter Aviation Regiments) were insufficiently equipped with materiel. The aircraft in service were outdated types (TB, SB, I-153, I-16). There were no more than 15% of high-speed fighters and bombers in the air force, and some of them were located in the rear at the airfields of long-range divisions (132nd and 134th), organically part of the latter, and independently participating in operations didn't accept it.

The 702nd Pe-2 dive bomber regiment was not trained in dive bombing and was used as a reconnaissance force.

The airfield network of the Krasnodar region was absolutely unprepared to receive a large number of aircraft. The command of the air forces of the Transcaucasian Front, which arrived at this theater, did not know local conditions well. The huge apparatus of the air force of the North Caucasus District was not used to assist the command and often even interfered with the work of the front headquarters.

The Air Force of the Black Sea Fleet was not immediately subordinated to the front operationally and basically continued to provide the defense of Sevastopol. They took an active part in the actions on the Kerch Peninsula only from time to time. Due to poor organization and difficult meteorological conditions, the relocation was accompanied by numerous accidents and forced landings. IN initial stage In fact, only 50% of the air units intended for its implementation were able to take part in the operation. The remaining 50% continued to remain at rear airfields and on the highway. The front did not receive the necessary vehicles for landing troops in Vladislavovka at the start of the operation.

The landing force was planned to have over 40 thousand people, about 770 guns and mortars and several tanks. Thus, the balance of forces was assumed to be in favor of the Transcaucasian Front: for infantry - 2 times, for artillery and mortars - 2.5 times. In tanks and aviation, the advantage remained on the enemy's side. Before the landing, the numbers changed somewhat.

The Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Military Flotilla were many times superior to the enemy in terms of ship composition, but our sailors almost completely lacked special landing and landing equipment, which in turn affected the speed of landing (landing) on ​​the shore. It turned out that ferries, barges and boats here are not able to replace any battleships and cruisers.

The balance of forces and means of the parties before the start of the landing operation

* thousands of people.

The training of troops for upcoming actions (loading, unloading, landing operations) was carried out hastily and insufficiently organized. In addition, the effect of special training sessions was greatly reduced, since some of the formations that underwent this special training were then removed from participation in the operation (345th Infantry Division, 79th Infantry Brigade, which were redeployed to reinforce the Sevastopol garrison) and replaced by units that did not have time to undergo special training.

The engineering units did a tremendous job of constructing tracks, repairing piers, finding resources and preparing floating facilities, as well as means of loading and unloading troops (gangways, ladders, boats, rafts, etc.). The troops received a large number of obstacles: mines, subtle obstacles, explosives - to secure occupied landing lines. To strengthen the ice of the Kerch Strait, local means (reeds) were collected and prepared, the Temryuk, Kuchugury, Peresyp piers, on the Chushka spit, Taman, Komsomolskaya and others were repaired.

Scheme of landings and operations of the Red Army, Black Sea Fleet and Azov Flotilla from December 25, 1941 to January 2, 1942

The first and subsequent echelons of troops necessarily included sapper units.

However, when determining the balance of forces in an amphibious operation, one should proceed from how many troops the crossing means in the first echelon allow to be landed. In this case, a lot also depended on the weather.

Preparations for the landing operation, as already noted, began on December 3. The commander of the 51st Army decided to land advanced troops from the Sea of ​​Azov at the following points: at Ak-Monaya - 1340 people, at Cape Zyuk - 2900 people, at Cape Tarkhan - 400 people, at Cape Khroni - 1876 people, at Cape Yenikale - 1000 people. In total, it was planned to land 7,616 people, 14 guns, 9 120 mm mortars, 6 T-26 tanks.

According to the “Calculation of forces and means for the landing of amphibious assault forces by the Azov military flotilla,” 530 people were intended for landing in the Kazantip Bay area, for landing on Cape Zyuk in the western group - 2216 people, two 45-mm cannons, two 76-mm cannons, four 37-mm cannons, nine 120-mm mortars, three T-26 tanks, as well as 18 horses and one radio station (the tanks were transported on the Khoper barge, which was towed by the Nikopol steamship. - Note auto), for landing in the eastern group - 667 people and two 76-mm guns. 1209 people, two 45-mm cannons, two 76-mm cannons, three T-26 tanks (delivered by the Dofinovka tugboat and the Taganrog barge) landed in the area of ​​​​Cape Khroni. Note auto) and one vehicle as part of the western group, 989 people, two 76-mm cannons and two 45-mm cannons as part of the eastern group. It was planned to land 1000 people in Yenikal. Units of the 244th Infantry Division and the 83rd Infantry Brigade were loaded onto the ships of the Azov Military Flotilla.

The landing was to take place at night, and the landing was to take place 2 hours before dawn. Each detachment was assigned warships, which were supposed to support the landing with the fire of their guns.

The loading area for the formations of the 51st Army was Temryuk and, partially, Kuchugury. The Kerch naval base, with 10 groups of three detachments, was supposed to land troops from the 302nd Infantry Division (3327 people, 29 guns, 3 mortars) in the area of ​​the Nizhne-Burunsky lighthouse, Karantin station, Kamysh-Burun, Eltigen and the Initiative commune "

The first attack included 1,300 people. The landing was to be carried out suddenly, without artillery preparation, under the cover of a smoke screen from torpedo boats.

Troops were loaded onto ships in Taman and Komsomolskaya.

On December 10, the commander of the Black Sea Fleet arrived in Novorossiysk with a task force to lead the preparations and the immediate course of the operation. The landing itself was planned for December 21.

At the same time, the German command was preparing its troops for a second assault on the Sevastopol defensive region, and at dawn on December 17, they launched an attack on Sevastopol. During fierce battles, despite the stubborn resistance of our troops, the enemy, who had a great superiority in forces in the direction of the main attack, managed to advance 4–6 km in four days, wedging in the direction of the Northern Bay.

For the small territory held by the defenders of Sevastopol, this was extremely dangerous. Our troops immediately launched a counterattack and stopped the enemy offensive, but it was necessary to turn the situation around. Under these conditions, the Supreme High Command Headquarters subordinated the Sevastopol defensive region to the commander of the Transcaucasian Front and demanded that he immediately send a capable combined arms commander to Sevastopol to lead ground operations, as well as one rifle division or two rifle brigades and at least 3 thousand marching reinforcements. In addition, the WCF was supposed to strengthen the aviation support for the defense of Sevastopol, allocating for this at least 5 air regiments, and establish an uninterrupted supply of ammunition and everything necessary for the battle to the defensive area.

At the direction of Headquarters, the 345th Infantry Division from Poti, the 79th Marine Cadet Brigade from Novorossiysk, a tank battalion, an armed marching battalion, and a division of the 8th Guards Mortar Regiment were sent to Sevastopol on warships. During December, 5,000 tons of ammunition, 4,000 tons of food, 5,500 tons of other cargo, 26 tanks, 346 guns and mortars were delivered to Sevastopol. The ships of the Black Sea Fleet increased their support for the defenders of Sevastopol with their fire. True, this was done with varying degrees of success.

After a “thrashing” from the Supreme Command Headquarters, the command of the Black Sea Fleet, and then the Transcaucasian Front, began to quickly strengthen the Sevastopol defensive region. They received instructions in this regard on December 20, and on December 22, units of the 345th Infantry Division and the 79th Marine Brigade counterattacked the group of German troops that had resumed the offensive on the flank and restored the situation.

The commander of the 345th Infantry Division, Lieutenant Colonel O.N. Guz, addressing the Transcaucasian soldiers heading into battle, said: “Everyone - we will lie here, we will litter these hills and valleys with bones, but we will not retreat. There will be no such order from me or the commander.” The division commander's call expressed the mood of all the defenders of the hero city.

The enemy's second attempt to break through to Sevastopol, made on December 28, was also unsuccessful.

In connection with the transfer of part of the troops of the Transcaucasian Front and the forces of the Black Sea Fleet to strengthen the defense of Sevastopol, it was necessary to clarify the plan for the landing operation. The landing of troops was no longer planned simultaneously, but sequentially: on the northern and eastern coasts of the Kerch Peninsula - at dawn on December 26, and in Feodosia - on December 29. According to the changed plan, the tasks of the front troops were clarified.

51 And now the task was set: to simultaneously land troops on the northern and eastern coasts of the peninsula, and then capture the city of Kerch with attacks from the north and south. In the future, take possession of the Turkish Wall and advance in the direction of Art. Ak-Monay. The landing of troops was entrusted to the Azov military flotilla and the Kerch naval base, which for the duration of the operation were subordinate to the commander of the 51st Army.

44 And received the task, in cooperation with the Black Sea Fleet, with the main forces to land in the Feodosia area, capture the city and port, destroy the enemy’s Feodosia group and, having intercepted the Ak-Monai Isthmus, cut off its path to the west. Part of the army's forces was to advance to the east with the task of destroying the encircled group of Germans in cooperation with 51 A with cutting blows. With the arrival of units of the 51st Army at the Ak-Monai position of the 44th Army, the task was set to be ready to develop success in the direction of Karasubazar. In addition, the 44th Army was ordered to land troops in the area of ​​Mount Opuk with the task of striking to the north to assist the 51st Army in crossing the Kerch Strait and in the Koktebel area in order to prevent the approach of enemy reserves from Sudak.

Due to the impossibility of covering the troops landing in the Feodosia area with fighter aircraft from distant Caucasian airfields, it was decided to land in the Vladislavovka area on the night of December 30 airborne assault as part of a parachute battalion with the task of capturing the airfield and ensuring landing and further actions from this airfield of front-line aviation. However, already during the hostilities, the plan was abandoned - our command had almost no serviceable transport aircraft at its disposal.

By the decision of the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, the available fleet forces were divided into 2 groups. Group “A” was intended for landing troops in Feodosia and group “B” - at Mount Opuk. There were also covering forces.

Group “A” included a naval support detachment: the cruiser “Red Caucasus”, the cruiser “Red Crimea”, the destroyers “Nezamozhnik”, “Shaumyan”, “Zheleznyakov”. These ships were loaded with 5,419 people, 15 guns, six 107 mm mortars, 30 vehicles and 100 tons of ammunition. This material part belonged to the 251st Infantry Regiment of the 9th Mountain Rifle Division, the 633rd Infantry Regiment of the 157th Infantry Division, a Marine battalion, two battalions of the 716th Infantry Regiment of the 157th Infantry Division, and the 256th Artillery Regiment. The remaining ships of group “A” were combined into 2 transport detachments and 2 security detachments.

The 1st transport detachment transported the 236th Infantry Division. These ships (8 transports) loaded: 11,270 people, 572 horses, 26 45 mm guns, 18 76 mm guns, 7 122 mm guns, 199 vehicles, 20 T-37/T-38 tanks, 18 tractors , 43 carts, 6 gigs and 313 tons of ammunition.

The 2nd transport detachment (7 ships) transported the 63rd Mountain Rifle Division (without the 246th Mountain Rifle Regiment).

To organize the landing itself, Group “A” was assigned a detachment of landing craft: 2 minesweepers, 2 towing steamers, 15 MO-type boats, 6–10 self-propelled longboats.

Group B included landing ships and covering forces.

The landing ships (gunboats “Red Adjaristan”, “Red Abkhazia”, “Red Georgia”, one tugboat, one bolinder, several MO boats) loaded 2493 people, 42 horses, 14 guns, 6 120 mm mortars, 8 vehicles , 230 tons of ammunition and food from the 105th Mountain Infantry Regiment and the 1st Division of the 239th Artillery Regiment.

The transport "Kuban", which transferred from group "A" to detachment "B", loaded 627 people, 72 horses, 9 guns of the 814th regiment.

The landing ships were supported by covering forces: the cruiser Molotov, the leader Tashkent and the destroyer Smyshlyny.

Loading points are Novorossiysk, Anapa and Tuapse. Loading was to be carried out only at night, the landing of the first throw was to be done before dawn, after a powerful barrage of naval artillery fire on the port and city of Feodosia.

The unloading of three divisions (236th, 63rd and 157th) in the Feodosia area was supposed to be carried out within two days.

The command and headquarters of the Transcaucasian Front, the Black Sea Fleet and the armies maintained extreme secrecy in preparation for the operation. In addition to limiting the circle of people involved in developing the operation plan, it was strictly forbidden to announce landing points to units before going to sea, and landing on the northern and eastern coasts was planned simultaneously 2 hours before dawn without artillery and aviation preparation.

Due to the fact that the landing of troops 51 A was planned without artillery preparation, the transports were armed with their own artillery, which was installed on the decks and intended to immediately suppress all enemy firing points that could interfere with the landing. Each ship also had devices for firing anti-tank rifles, light and small machine guns, and well-trained crews who were supposed to cover and ensure the landing of the first echelons with their fire.

The actions of the divisional artillery (infantry support group), reinforcement artillery and coastal artillery of the Kerch naval base (long-range artillery group) were coordinated. The actions of the naval artillery were coordinated with the actions of the paratroopers on the shore.

Additional funds were sought. The engineering troops prepared 176 canoes, 58 longboats, 17 oak boats, and 64 fishing boats.

The assault detachments were staffed only by volunteers, which made it possible to display the most courageous, daring and enterprising fighters in them.

Preparations for the operation have been completed. But on the eve of the landing the weather deteriorated sharply. Additional difficulties were created. And yet, due to the difficult situation of our troops near Sevastopol and in the interests of achieving surprise, it was decided not to postpone the landing.

On the night of December 25, troops of the 51st Army (224th Infantry Division and 83rd Marine Brigade) began loading onto ships. Strong winds and waves prevented the ships from accepting soldiers and cargo, which was already disrupting the ships' schedule for going to sea.

On December 25, 5 detachments, boarded on ships of the Azov military flotilla in the Kuchugury and Temryuk areas, from 13 hours to 16 hours 40 minutes, one after another towards the northern coast of the Kerch Peninsula, went to sea to complete the assigned task. Despite a strong storm when approaching the shore and opposition from the enemy, the detachments managed to land on December 26 in the area of ​​​​Cape Zyuk and in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bCape Khroni.

The landing was very difficult, as the storm at sea reached force seven. Because of this, the predetermined formation of detachments was constantly scattered. The seiners carrying the troops, in conditions of heavy seas, could not independently cope with the bad weather. Most of the small vessels, canoes and boats were simply broken. The tugs were looking for the surviving barges and stubbornly dragged them to the Crimean coast. Near it, the soldiers jumped into the water, and carried equipment, ammunition and light guns in their arms for 10 meters or more. And the elements succumbed.

At Cape Zyuk, 1,378 people, 3 T-26 tanks, 4 guns and nine 120-mm mortars were landed from the 1st and 2nd detachments. 1,452 people, 3 T-26 tanks, 4 guns, the headquarters of the 143rd Infantry Regiment and the 83rd Marine Brigade from the fourth detachment were landed on the captured bridgehead at Cape Chroni.

Detachment No. 3 was unable to land troops at Cape Tarkhan due to heavy losses in ships and troops. The same fate befell the fifth detachment, which, due to a strong storm, did not reach Yenikale and turned back.

The next day, the enemy desperately bombed the ships of the 1st and 2nd landing detachments and destroyed several of them, including the Penay transport.

The main landing force on the northern coast of the Kerch Peninsula landed at Cape Khroni. During December 27 and 28, the landing of second echelons and part of those forces and equipment that could not be landed at Cape Zyuk and Cape Tarkhan continued here.

In the following days, due to a storm, no landing was made. Only on December 31 did mass landings begin. On December 26 and 31, a total of about 6 thousand people, 9 T-26 tanks, 9 guns and 10 mortars and 204 tons of ammunition were landed here.

The Germans quickly recovered from the shock and, with the support of their aviation dominating the skies, launched a counteroffensive. As a result, the landing sites at Cape Zyuk and Cape Khroni were quickly captured by them, and our landing forces, which advanced to the southwest from the coast, found themselves cut off from supply channels. There were fierce battles. Red Army soldier Georgy Vorontsov distinguished himself in one of them. The T-26 tank, on which he was moving as part of the landing force, was blown up by enemy mines and stopped. The Germans decided to capture the crew of the combat vehicle. But attempts to get close to the tank were invariably thwarted by Vorontsov’s machine gun fire. Then the German soldiers lay down and began throwing bunches of grenades at the T-26. Risking his life, Vorontsov quickly picked them up and threw them aside. Not a single grenade exploded on the tank. The courageous soldier of the 132nd separate motorized engineering battalion reliably guarded the tank until reinforcements arrived, for which he was subsequently punished awarded the order Lenin. Despite the courage of individual fighters, the landings of the “northern coast” did not complete the tasks assigned to them, but attracted significant enemy forces and thereby facilitated the actions of other landings.

Landing detachments from the 302nd Infantry Division, intended for landing on the eastern coast of the Kerch Peninsula and loading in Taman and Komsomolskaya Bay, mostly completed their landing on time. But due to a strong storm, the ships of the Kerch naval base were unable to go to sea in a timely manner. The landings began shortly before dawn on December 26. Here, the crews of patrol and torpedo boats especially distinguished themselves with their courage and combat skill. Operating in pairs, they provided each other with mutual fire support: while one of them was landing, the other was covering him with fire. Suppressing and destroying enemy firing points and covering the landing with smoke screens, the boats helped the paratroopers gain a foothold and expand the captured bridgehead. The artillery of the 51st Army and the Kerch naval base provided great assistance to the landing groups, which with powerful blows suppressed enemy firing points in Kamysh-Burun, Yenikal, Kerch and other points.

Overcoming strong enemy fire resistance, detachments of the 302nd Infantry Division landed and entrenched themselves in the Kamysh-Burun area. On the first day, half of the planned landing was landed. The build-up of forces became possible only a day later - December 28, when the storm subsided somewhat. By the end of December 29, almost all the main landing forces had landed in the Kamysh-Burun area (11,225 people, 47 guns, 198 mortars, 229 machine guns, 12 vehicles, 210 horses). Here, on December 28, a landing force came ashore, intended for operations in the area of ​​​​Mount Opuk, where landing detachment “B” was sent from Anapa twice, but a storm and some other reasons related to the organization of the transition prevented it from landing.

The landing operation in the Kamysh-Burun area is also full of examples of courage and mass heroism in the name of the Motherland. Here's one of them. The sailors from the gunboat “Red Adzharistan” behaved courageously at sea; they were the first to go into the chilly water and help the paratroopers cross to the shore. The residents of the fishing village on the Kamysh-Burun Spit also showed themselves to be real patriots. Delighted to be back native army, they, without fear of enemy fire, rushed to the aid of the paratroopers and together with them unloaded weapons and ammunition from approaching ships. Women and orderlies picked up the wounded soldiers and took them to their homes, where they cared for them like mothers.

The landing forces landed on the northern and eastern coasts of the Kerch Peninsula, occupied bridgeheads and launched battles to expand them. However, not having enough tanks and artillery, they were soon forced to go on the defensive. They were forced to do this by the insufficient support of our aviation. Even on the most crucial - the first - day of the operation, she made only 125 sorties.

The significance of the heroic actions of the paratroopers on the northern and eastern coasts of the Kerch Peninsula cannot be diminished. They pinned down significant enemy forces and reserves and created conditions for a successful landing in Feodosia. By the end of December 28, the loading of the troops of the 44th Army, intended for landing, was completed, hidden from the enemy in Novorossiysk and Tuapse. The first landing force - two rifle regiments - was landed on the ships of the naval support detachment, and an assault detachment consisting of 300 sailors was landed on 12 boats of the landing craft detachment. At 3 o’clock on February 29, the Black Sea Fleet ships from group “A” with the landing force were at the target.

At about 4 a.m. on December 29, a naval support detachment opened fire on the port of Feodosia. At the same time, a detachment of landing craft headed to the entrance to the port. Rushing into the passage between the lighthouse and the booms, the patrol boats broke into the port and landed an assault group of sailors to seize the berths. Stunned by the audacity of the Soviet sailors, the Nazis rushed about. The Red Navy took advantage of this. They destroyed the enemy on the piers and on the port pier. During this period, the crew of the patrol boat under the command of Junior Lieutenant Chernyak, who, under enemy fire, landed an assault group and captured the lighthouse, especially distinguished themselves. Another patrol boat, led by the commander of the landing craft detachment, Senior Lieutenant A.F. Aidinov, burst into the harbor, combed all the berths with fire and gave the signal “Entry into the harbor is free.” At this signal, the ships headed for the piers with the first landing force.

The boats of the landing craft detachment began transferring from the cruiser parts of the advance detachment (663rd Infantry Regiment of the 157th Infantry Division, 251st Mountain Rifle Regiment of the 9th Mountain Rifle Division), led by Major G.I. Andreev. The enemy concentrated artillery fire on the harbor. The commanders of the longboats, under hurricane fire and an incessant storm, transferred paratroopers from the ships to the port piers. Petty Officer 1st Class Ivan Dibrov, who had great strength, carried the paratroopers in his arms into the boat, and then landed them on the pier. When the longboat's rudder was knocked off by an enemy shell, Dibrov steered the longboat with a piece of board instead of a rudder for four hours.

Despite heavy enemy fire and a force-six storm, which made it difficult for ships to moor to the wall, by 5 o'clock three destroyers broke through into the port and began landing troops with their military equipment on a wide pier. Soon the cruiser "Red Caucasus" moored here, and in less than an hour it landed troops directly on the pier without the help of boats. Following him, the Kuban transport entered the harbor and by 11:30 am completed the landing directly on the pier. By this time, 1,700 people had already landed. The landing of the first landing party from warships directly onto the port piers made it possible to sharply reduce the landing time and contributed to the achievement of success. At 9:15 a.m., the cruiser “Red Crimea” also finished unloading.

The ships had to moor and land troops under fire and bomb attacks from enemy aircraft and at the same time fire themselves in order to suppress batteries and other firing points. During the landing, the cruiser "Red Caucasus" received several holes. When an enemy shell pierced the tower, the warheads caught fire. There was a threat of explosion and destruction of the ship. The tower personnel began a selfless fight against this fire. Sailor Pushkarev, risking his life, grabbed the burning charges and threw them overboard. Thanks to the dedication of our sailors, the cruiser was saved. However, increased enemy fire forced him and other warships to move away from the pier and berths. Maneuvering in the bay, they fired artillery, supporting the actions airborne troops. All this happened during the day under the continuous influence of enemy aircraft. The cruiser and destroyers alone were attacked from the air thirteen times.

There were street battles all day in Feodosia. Advance detachment, without waiting complete cleansing city, attacked the enemy on the adjacent heights, captured them and cut off the Germans’ escape route. Meanwhile, the sailors from the assault group continued to clear the city of the remnants of enemy troops. By the end of December 29, not a single occupier remained in the city.

On the night of December 30, the first detachment of transports arrived in Feodosia. During the day, he landed the 236th and part of the forces of the 157th Infantry Division. The second echelon of the landing force - the 63rd Mountain Rifle Division - landed on December 31. From December 29 to 31, 23,000 people, 34 tanks, 133 guns and mortars, 334 vehicles and transporters, 1,550 horses and about 1,000 tons of ammunition and other cargo were landed and unloaded in the Feodosia area.

In order to clarify the situation, let us once again touch upon the fate of the 2,000-strong landing party, which Group “B” from the ships of the Black Sea Fleet was supposed to land at Mount Opuk. Due to the disorganization and vicissitudes of the weather, the landing, but at Kamysh-Burun, was carried out only on December 28.

As a result of the heroic efforts of the soldiers of the Transcaucasian Front and the sailors of the Black Sea Fleet, as well as a carefully organized and well-executed landing in Feodosia, Soviet troops gained a foothold on the Kerch Peninsula and created a threat of encirclement and destruction of the entire Kerch enemy group. Commander of the 11th German army General Manstein assessed the situation that developed after the Soviet landing: “It was a mortal danger for the army at a time when all its forces, with the exception of one German division and two Romanian brigades, were fighting for Sevastopol.” To prevent encirclement, the German command was forced to hastily withdraw its troops from Kerch and at the same time strengthen them in the Feodosia direction. At the beginning of January, in addition to the 46th Infantry Division, units of the 73rd Infantry Division and the Romanian Mountain Infantry Corps operated here. The 132nd and 170th infantry divisions, transferred from near Sevastopol, were also approaching this area.

With these forces, the enemy managed to organize a strong defense in the Feodosia region. Meanwhile, our 44th Army, which could have played a decisive role in cutting off the Kerch group of Germans, advanced only 10–15 km, which allowed the main enemy forces to slip out of the Kerch Peninsula. This was also facilitated by the indecisive actions of the command of the 51st Army, which did not use the previously landed units of the 224th Infantry Division and the 83rd Marine Brigade to immediately pursue the retreating enemy.

There were other serious reasons that did not allow the enemy to cut off the escape route. One of them is the failed attempt to land an amphibious assault in the Ak-Monaya area on January 1, 1942. The winter was cold, and ships with landing forces, trapped by ice, were unable to reach the landing area. The airborne assault on the Arabat Spit did not reach its target either, as it was launched late and away from the enemy’s main escape routes.

During the fighting, the 44th Army managed, overcoming desperate enemy resistance, to expand the bridgehead in the northern and western directions. By January 2, the front of its actions ran along the line Kulepa-Mosque, Karagoz, Koktebel. To the north - at the Kiet, St. Asan line - units of the 302nd Infantry Division of the 51st Army reached the line.

The largest landing operation in the history of the Great Patriotic War was carried out at a high price. Irreversible losses amounted to 32,453 people, of which the Transcaucasian Front had 30,547 dead, and the Black Sea Fleet and Azov Military Flotilla - 1,906 people.

Fight to the death! Moshchansky Ilya Borisovich

Kerch-Feodosia landing operation (December 25, 1941 - January 2, 1942)

Kerch-Feodosia landing operation

The Kerch-Feodosia operation is the most significant landing operation in the Great Patriotic War. Despite the fact that our troops did not manage to completely solve the tasks assigned to them, this landing operation was one of the heroic pages in the annals of the Great Patriotic War, a symbol of the courage of the soldiers of the Transcaucasian Front, who stormed the rocky shores of the Crimea in the December cold of 1941, without special landing craft. and any experience in carrying out similar operations.

The landing in Crimea was dictated by the situation that developed on the Soviet-German front at the end of 1941, and, in particular, on its left wing, after the defeat of the Germans near Rostov. The main goal of the planned operation was to capture the bridgehead from which actions to liberate Crimea were to begin. In addition, the landing was supposed to pull enemy forces away from Sevastopol and thereby ease the position of the city’s defenders, and then completely release it. Successful actions would eliminate the threat of an invasion of German troops into the North Caucasus through the Kerch Strait.

In total, the enemy had forces in Crimea equivalent to 10 divisions. At the same time, he concentrated two-thirds of his troops near Sevastopol, and one-third was allocated for the counter-defense of the Kerch Peninsula (the 42nd Army Corps, consisting of the 46th and 73rd infantry divisions, the 8th Romanian cavalry brigade and two tank battalions). The total number of enemy troops on the Kerch Peninsula was about 25 thousand people, about 300 guns and mortars, 118 tanks. The capabilities of the Kerch group increased significantly due to the dominance of enemy aviation, which numbered over 500 bombers and about 200 fighters in Crimea.

When planning the Kerch operation, the command of the Transcaucasian Front initially set a very narrow task for the troops, which essentially boiled down to occupying only the eastern coast of the Kerch Peninsula with a subsequent methodical attack to the west with the goal of reaching the Jantara and Seitdzheut fronts.

Then this operation was conceived in the form of a sea and parachute landing on the eastern coast of the Kerch Peninsula (Cape Khorni, Kizaulsky lighthouse) with the subsequent transfer of the main forces to the peninsula to develop a general offensive on the Tulumchak, Feodosiya front. Its (operation's) development began on December 3, 1941.

The operation was supposed to be carried out by the forces of the 56th and 51st armies (7–8 rifle divisions, 3–4 artillery regiments of the reserve of the High Command, 3–4 tank battalions, aviation of both armies and 2 long-range air divisions).

The navy was supposed to facilitate the landing and provide the flanks of the advancing armies.

Subsequently, the operation plan underwent some changes. The final course of action was developed by December 13 by the command of the Transcaucasian Front after agreement with the command of the Black Sea Fleet. It was planned, simultaneously with the crossing of the Kerch Strait, to land several landing forces - a naval landing (2 divisions and a brigade with reinforcements) in the Feodosia area, an airborne landing in the Vladislavovka area, and an auxiliary amphibious landing in the Arabat and Ak-Monay area. The task of the landing force is to capture the Ak-Monai Isthmus and strike at the rear of the enemy’s Kerch group.

The implementation of this plan was supposed to lead to the operational encirclement of the enemy in the western part of the Kerch Peninsula.

The operation was to involve the 51st and 44th armies (consisting of 9 rifle divisions and 3 rifle brigades) and reinforcements - 5 artillery regiments, motorized pontoon and engineer battalions, 2 long-range air divisions and 2 air regiments.

Before the start of the operation, the 51st Army included the 224th, 396th, 302nd, 390th Rifle Divisions, the 12th and 83rd Rifle Brigades, the Azov Military Flotilla Marine Battalion, the 265th, 457th, 456th, 25th Corps Artillery regiments, 1st division of the 7th Guards Mortar Regiment, 7th separate flamethrower company, 75th, 132nd, 205th engineering battalions, 6th and 54th motorized pontoon battalions of the Azov military flotilla, Kerch naval base.

The army was commanded by Lieutenant General V.N. Lvov.

Before the start of the operation, the 44th Army included the 236th, 157th Rifle Divisions, 63rd Mountain Rifle Division, 251st Mountain Rifle Regiment, 105th Mountain Rifle Regiment with a light artillery regiment division, 1st Division of the 239th Artillery Regiment , 547th Howitzer Artillery Regiment, 61st Engineer Battalion.

The army was commanded by Major General A. N. Pervushin.

In reserve were the 400th, 398th rifle divisions and the 126th separate tank battalion, which at the end of December 1941 participated in the landing in separate units.

The 156th Rifle Division from the Transcaucasian Front was allocated to defend the coast of the Azov Sea.

The general leadership of the operation was carried out by the commander of the Transcaucasian Front (from December 30 - the Caucasian Front), Major General D. T. Kozlov. The landing of troops was entrusted to the Black Sea Fleet under the command of Vice Admiral F. S. Oktyabrsky and the Azov Military Flotilla, which was part of it, led by Rear Admiral S. G. Gorshkov.

The landing was entrusted to the Azov military flotilla, the Kerch naval base and the Black Sea Fleet.

On December 1, 1941, the 46th Wehrmacht Infantry Division and the 8th Cavalry Brigade of the Romanians were in defense on the Kerch Peninsula. Between December 11 and December 13, the German command transferred the 73rd Infantry Division and assault gun divisions here.

The total number of enemy field troops on the Kerch Peninsula was 10–11 thousand people. They were part of the 11th German Army (headquarters in the city of Simferopol).

The enemy's defense consisted of field and long-term fortifications. The depth of the defensive zone was 3–4 km. The city of Feodosia and the surrounding area were equipped as a strong resistance center.

Anti-landing defense was created in places convenient for landings and was built according to a system of strong points. It was echeloned to a considerable depth and consisted of field and long-term type fortifications with fire communications between them. The fortifications were covered with wire fences. The main strongholds were created in the northeastern part of the peninsula from Cape Khroni to Aleksandrovka, as well as in the areas of Cape Takyl and Mount Opuk. Feodosia, with a garrison of more than 2 thousand people, was turned into an antilanding defense hub. A significant amount of ground and anti-aircraft artillery was stationed in populated areas, which were turned into strong centers of resistance with all-round defense. The approaches to Feodosia from the sea were mined.

The most strongly fortified areas were Yenikale, Kapkany, and Kerch. There was the maximum amount of infantry and firepower here.

From December 3 to December 25, the troops of the 51st and 44th armies, reinforcements and air forces intended to participate in the upcoming operation regrouped and concentrated in loading areas, on ships and vessels.

Poor meteorological conditions of this period complicated the regrouping, and especially the relocation of aviation from the airfields of the Caucasus.

The supporting air forces (132nd, 134th Long-Range Aviation Divisions, 367th SB Bomber Regiment, 792nd Pe-2 Dive Bomber Regiment, 9 Fighter Aviation Regiments) were insufficiently equipped with materiel. The aircraft in service were outdated types (TB, SB, I-153, I-16). There were no more than 15% of high-speed fighters and bombers in the air force, and some of them were located in the rear at the airfields of long-range divisions (132nd and 134th), organically part of the latter, and independently participating in operations didn't accept it.

The 702nd Pe-2 dive bomber regiment was not trained in dive bombing and was used as a reconnaissance force.

The airfield network of the Krasnodar region was absolutely unprepared to receive a large number of aircraft. The command of the air forces of the Transcaucasian Front, which arrived at this theater, did not know local conditions well. The huge apparatus of the air force of the North Caucasus District was not used to assist the command and often even interfered with the work of the front headquarters.

The Air Force of the Black Sea Fleet was not immediately subordinated to the front operationally and basically continued to provide the defense of Sevastopol. They took an active part in the actions on the Kerch Peninsula only from time to time. Due to poor organization and difficult meteorological conditions, the relocation was accompanied by numerous accidents and forced landings. In fact, only 50% of the air units intended to carry it out were able to take part in the initial stage of the operation. The remaining 50% continued to remain at rear airfields and on the highway. The front did not receive the necessary vehicles for landing troops in Vladislavovka at the start of the operation.

The landing force was planned to have over 40 thousand people, about 770 guns and mortars and several tanks. Thus, the balance of forces was assumed to be in favor of the Transcaucasian Front: for infantry - 2 times, for artillery and mortars - 2.5 times. In tanks and aviation, the advantage remained on the enemy's side. Before the landing, the numbers changed somewhat.

The Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Military Flotilla were many times superior to the enemy in terms of ship composition, but our sailors almost completely lacked special landing and landing equipment, which in turn affected the speed of landing (landing) on ​​the shore. It turned out that ferries, barges and boats here are not able to replace any battleships and cruisers.

The balance of forces and means of the parties before the start of the landing operation

* thousands of people.

The training of troops for upcoming actions (loading, unloading, landing operations) was carried out hastily and insufficiently organized. In addition, the effect of special training sessions was greatly reduced, since some of the formations that underwent this special training were then removed from participation in the operation (345th Infantry Division, 79th Infantry Brigade, which were redeployed to reinforce the Sevastopol garrison) and replaced by units that did not have time to undergo special training.

The engineering units did a tremendous job of constructing tracks, repairing piers, finding resources and preparing floating facilities, as well as means of loading and unloading troops (gangways, ladders, boats, rafts, etc.). The troops received a large number of obstacles: mines, subtle obstacles, explosives - to secure occupied landing lines. To strengthen the ice of the Kerch Strait, local means (reeds) were collected and prepared, the Temryuk, Kuchugury, Peresyp piers, on the Chushka spit, Taman, Komsomolskaya and others were repaired.

Scheme of landings and operations of the Red Army, Black Sea Fleet and Azov Flotilla from December 25, 1941 to January 2, 1942

The first and subsequent echelons of troops necessarily included sapper units.

However, when determining the balance of forces in an amphibious operation, one should proceed from how many troops the crossing means in the first echelon allow to be landed. In this case, a lot also depended on the weather.

Preparations for the landing operation, as already noted, began on December 3. The commander of the 51st Army decided to land advanced troops from the Sea of ​​Azov at the following points: at Ak-Monaya - 1340 people, at Cape Zyuk - 2900 people, at Cape Tarkhan - 400 people, at Cape Khroni - 1876 people, at Cape Yenikale - 1000 people. In total, it was planned to land 7,616 people, 14 guns, 9 120 mm mortars, 6 T-26 tanks.

According to the “Calculation of forces and means for the landing of amphibious assault forces by the Azov military flotilla,” 530 people were intended for landing in the Kazantip Bay area, for landing on Cape Zyuk in the western group - 2216 people, two 45-mm cannons, two 76-mm cannons, four 37-mm cannons, nine 120-mm mortars, three T-26 tanks, as well as 18 horses and one radio station (the tanks were transported on the Khoper barge, which was towed by the Nikopol steamship. - Note auto), for landing in the eastern group - 667 people and two 76-mm guns. 1209 people, two 45-mm cannons, two 76-mm cannons, three T-26 tanks (delivered by the Dofinovka tugboat and the Taganrog barge) landed in the area of ​​​​Cape Khroni. Note auto) and one vehicle as part of the western group, 989 people, two 76-mm cannons and two 45-mm cannons as part of the eastern group. It was planned to land 1000 people in Yenikal. Units of the 244th Infantry Division and the 83rd Infantry Brigade were loaded onto the ships of the Azov Military Flotilla.

The landing was to take place at night, and the landing was to take place 2 hours before dawn. Each detachment was assigned warships, which were supposed to support the landing with the fire of their guns.

The loading area for the formations of the 51st Army was Temryuk and, partially, Kuchugury. The Kerch naval base, with 10 groups of three detachments, was supposed to land troops from the 302nd Infantry Division (3327 people, 29 guns, 3 mortars) in the area of ​​the Nizhne-Burunsky lighthouse, Karantin station, Kamysh-Burun, Eltigen and the Initiative commune "

The first attack included 1,300 people. The landing was to be carried out suddenly, without artillery preparation, under the cover of a smoke screen from torpedo boats.

Troops were loaded onto ships in Taman and Komsomolskaya.

On December 10, the commander of the Black Sea Fleet arrived in Novorossiysk with a task force to lead the preparations and the immediate course of the operation. The landing itself was planned for December 21.

At the same time, the German command was preparing its troops for a second assault on the Sevastopol defensive region, and at dawn on December 17, they launched an attack on Sevastopol. During fierce battles, despite the stubborn resistance of our troops, the enemy, who had a great superiority in forces in the direction of the main attack, managed to advance 4–6 km in four days, wedging in the direction of the Northern Bay.

For the small territory held by the defenders of Sevastopol, this was extremely dangerous. Our troops immediately launched a counterattack and stopped the enemy offensive, but it was necessary to turn the situation around. Under these conditions, the Supreme High Command Headquarters subordinated the Sevastopol defensive region to the commander of the Transcaucasian Front and demanded that he immediately send a capable combined arms commander to Sevastopol to lead ground operations, as well as one rifle division or two rifle brigades and at least 3 thousand marching reinforcements. In addition, the WCF was supposed to strengthen the aviation support for the defense of Sevastopol, allocating for this at least 5 air regiments, and establish an uninterrupted supply of ammunition and everything necessary for the battle to the defensive area.

At the direction of Headquarters, the 345th Infantry Division from Poti, the 79th Marine Cadet Brigade from Novorossiysk, a tank battalion, an armed marching battalion, and a division of the 8th Guards Mortar Regiment were sent to Sevastopol on warships. During December, 5,000 tons of ammunition, 4,000 tons of food, 5,500 tons of other cargo, 26 tanks, 346 guns and mortars were delivered to Sevastopol. The ships of the Black Sea Fleet increased their support for the defenders of Sevastopol with their fire. True, this was done with varying degrees of success.

After a “thrashing” from the Supreme Command Headquarters, the command of the Black Sea Fleet, and then the Transcaucasian Front, began to quickly strengthen the Sevastopol defensive region. They received instructions in this regard on December 20, and on December 22, units of the 345th Infantry Division and the 79th Marine Brigade counterattacked the group of German troops that had resumed the offensive on the flank and restored the situation.

The commander of the 345th Infantry Division, Lieutenant Colonel O.N. Guz, addressing the Transcaucasian soldiers heading into battle, said: “Everyone - we will lie here, we will litter these hills and valleys with bones, but we will not retreat. There will be no such order from me or the commander.” The division commander's call expressed the mood of all the defenders of the hero city.

The enemy's second attempt to break through to Sevastopol, made on December 28, was also unsuccessful.

In connection with the transfer of part of the troops of the Transcaucasian Front and the forces of the Black Sea Fleet to strengthen the defense of Sevastopol, it was necessary to clarify the plan for the landing operation. The landing of troops was no longer planned simultaneously, but sequentially: on the northern and eastern coasts of the Kerch Peninsula - at dawn on December 26, and in Feodosia - on December 29. According to the changed plan, the tasks of the front troops were clarified.

51 And now the task was set: to simultaneously land troops on the northern and eastern coasts of the peninsula, and then capture the city of Kerch with attacks from the north and south. In the future, take possession of the Turkish Wall and advance in the direction of Art. Ak-Monay. The landing of troops was entrusted to the Azov military flotilla and the Kerch naval base, which for the duration of the operation were subordinate to the commander of the 51st Army.

44 And received the task, in cooperation with the Black Sea Fleet, with the main forces to land in the Feodosia area, capture the city and port, destroy the enemy’s Feodosia group and, having intercepted the Ak-Monai Isthmus, cut off its path to the west. Part of the army's forces was to advance to the east with the task of destroying the encircled group of Germans in cooperation with 51 A with cutting blows. With the arrival of units of the 51st Army at the Ak-Monai position of the 44th Army, the task was set to be ready to develop success in the direction of Karasubazar. In addition, the 44th Army was ordered to land troops in the area of ​​Mount Opuk with the task of striking to the north to assist the 51st Army in crossing the Kerch Strait and in the Koktebel area in order to prevent the approach of enemy reserves from Sudak.

Due to the impossibility of covering the troops landing in the Feodosia area with fighter aircraft from distant Caucasian airfields, it was decided to land an airborne assault force as part of a parachute battalion in the Vladislavovka area on the night of December 30 with the task of capturing the airfield and ensuring landing and further actions from this airfield of front-line aviation . However, already during the hostilities, the plan was abandoned - our command had almost no serviceable transport aircraft at its disposal.

By the decision of the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, the available fleet forces were divided into 2 groups. Group “A” was intended for landing troops in Feodosia and group “B” - at Mount Opuk. There were also covering forces.

Group “A” included a naval support detachment: the cruiser “Red Caucasus”, the cruiser “Red Crimea”, the destroyers “Nezamozhnik”, “Shaumyan”, “Zheleznyakov”. These ships were loaded with 5,419 people, 15 guns, six 107 mm mortars, 30 vehicles and 100 tons of ammunition. This material part belonged to the 251st Infantry Regiment of the 9th Mountain Rifle Division, the 633rd Infantry Regiment of the 157th Infantry Division, a Marine battalion, two battalions of the 716th Infantry Regiment of the 157th Infantry Division, and the 256th Artillery Regiment. The remaining ships of group “A” were combined into 2 transport detachments and 2 security detachments.

The 1st transport detachment transported the 236th Infantry Division. These ships (8 transports) loaded: 11,270 people, 572 horses, 26 45 mm guns, 18 76 mm guns, 7 122 mm guns, 199 vehicles, 20 T-37/T-38 tanks, 18 tractors , 43 carts, 6 gigs and 313 tons of ammunition.

The 2nd transport detachment (7 ships) transported the 63rd Mountain Rifle Division (without the 246th Mountain Rifle Regiment).

To organize the landing itself, Group “A” was assigned a detachment of landing craft: 2 minesweepers, 2 towing steamers, 15 MO-type boats, 6–10 self-propelled longboats.

Group B included landing ships and covering forces.

The landing ships (gunboats “Red Adjaristan”, “Red Abkhazia”, “Red Georgia”, one tugboat, one bolinder, several MO boats) loaded 2493 people, 42 horses, 14 guns, 6 120 mm mortars, 8 vehicles , 230 tons of ammunition and food from the 105th Mountain Infantry Regiment and the 1st Division of the 239th Artillery Regiment.

The transport "Kuban", which transferred from group "A" to detachment "B", loaded 627 people, 72 horses, 9 guns of the 814th regiment.

The landing ships were supported by covering forces: the cruiser Molotov, the leader Tashkent and the destroyer Smyshlyny.

Loading points are Novorossiysk, Anapa and Tuapse. Loading was to be carried out only at night, the landing of the first throw was to be done before dawn, after a powerful barrage of naval artillery fire on the port and city of Feodosia.

The unloading of three divisions (236th, 63rd and 157th) in the Feodosia area was supposed to be carried out within two days.

The command and headquarters of the Transcaucasian Front, the Black Sea Fleet and the armies maintained extreme secrecy in preparation for the operation. In addition to limiting the circle of people involved in developing the operation plan, it was strictly forbidden to announce landing points to units before going to sea, and landing on the northern and eastern coasts was planned simultaneously 2 hours before dawn without artillery and aviation preparation.

Due to the fact that the landing of troops 51 A was planned without artillery preparation, the transports were armed with their own artillery, which was installed on the decks and intended to immediately suppress all enemy firing points that could interfere with the landing. Each ship also had devices for firing anti-tank rifles, light and small machine guns, and well-trained crews who were supposed to cover and ensure the landing of the first echelons with their fire.

The actions of the divisional artillery (infantry support group), reinforcement artillery and coastal artillery of the Kerch naval base (long-range artillery group) were coordinated. The actions of the naval artillery were coordinated with the actions of the paratroopers on the shore.

Additional funds were sought. The engineering troops prepared 176 canoes, 58 longboats, 17 oak boats, and 64 fishing boats.

The assault detachments were staffed only by volunteers, which made it possible to display the most courageous, daring and enterprising fighters in them.

Preparations for the operation have been completed. But on the eve of the landing the weather deteriorated sharply. Additional difficulties were created. And yet, due to the difficult situation of our troops near Sevastopol and in the interests of achieving surprise, it was decided not to postpone the landing.

On the night of December 25, troops of the 51st Army (224th Infantry Division and 83rd Marine Brigade) began loading onto ships. Strong winds and waves prevented the ships from accepting soldiers and cargo, which was already disrupting the ships' schedule for going to sea.

On December 25, 5 detachments, boarded on ships of the Azov military flotilla in the Kuchugury and Temryuk areas, from 13 hours to 16 hours 40 minutes, one after another towards the northern coast of the Kerch Peninsula, went to sea to complete the assigned task. Despite a strong storm when approaching the shore and opposition from the enemy, the detachments managed to land on December 26 in the area of ​​​​Cape Zyuk and in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bCape Khroni.

The landing was very difficult, as the storm at sea reached force seven. Because of this, the predetermined formation of detachments was constantly scattered. The seiners carrying the troops, in conditions of heavy seas, could not independently cope with the bad weather. Most of the small vessels, canoes and boats were simply broken. The tugs were looking for the surviving barges and stubbornly dragged them to the Crimean coast. Near it, the soldiers jumped into the water, and carried equipment, ammunition and light guns in their arms for 10 meters or more. And the elements succumbed.

At Cape Zyuk, 1,378 people, 3 T-26 tanks, 4 guns and nine 120-mm mortars were landed from the 1st and 2nd detachments. 1,452 people, 3 T-26 tanks, 4 guns, the headquarters of the 143rd Infantry Regiment and the 83rd Marine Brigade from the fourth detachment were landed on the captured bridgehead at Cape Chroni.

Detachment No. 3 was unable to land troops at Cape Tarkhan due to heavy losses in ships and troops. The same fate befell the fifth detachment, which, due to a strong storm, did not reach Yenikale and turned back.

The next day, the enemy desperately bombed the ships of the 1st and 2nd landing detachments and destroyed several of them, including the Penay transport.

The main landing force on the northern coast of the Kerch Peninsula landed at Cape Khroni. During December 27 and 28, the landing of second echelons and part of those forces and equipment that could not be landed at Cape Zyuk and Cape Tarkhan continued here.

In the following days, due to a storm, no landing was made. Only on December 31 did mass landings begin. On December 26 and 31, a total of about 6 thousand people, 9 T-26 tanks, 9 guns and 10 mortars and 204 tons of ammunition were landed here.

The Germans quickly recovered from the shock and, with the support of their aviation dominating the skies, launched a counteroffensive. As a result, the landing sites at Cape Zyuk and Cape Khroni were quickly captured by them, and our landing forces, which advanced to the southwest from the coast, found themselves cut off from supply channels. There were fierce battles. Red Army soldier Georgy Vorontsov distinguished himself in one of them. The T-26 tank, on which he was moving as part of the landing force, was blown up by enemy mines and stopped. The Germans decided to capture the crew of the combat vehicle. But attempts to get close to the tank were invariably thwarted by Vorontsov’s machine gun fire. Then the German soldiers lay down and began throwing bunches of grenades at the T-26. Risking his life, Vorontsov quickly picked them up and threw them aside. Not a single grenade exploded on the tank. The courageous soldier of the 132nd separate motorized engineering battalion reliably guarded the tank until reinforcements arrived, for which he was subsequently awarded the Order of Lenin. Despite the courage of individual fighters, the landings of the “northern coast” did not complete the tasks assigned to them, but attracted significant enemy forces and thereby facilitated the actions of other landings.

Landing detachments from the 302nd Infantry Division, intended for landing on the eastern coast of the Kerch Peninsula and loading in Taman and Komsomolskaya Bay, mostly completed their landing on time. But due to a strong storm, the ships of the Kerch naval base were unable to go to sea in a timely manner. The landings began on December 26 shortly before dawn. Here, the crews of patrol and torpedo boats especially distinguished themselves with their courage and combat skill. Operating in pairs, they provided each other with mutual fire support: while one of them was landing, the other was covering him with fire. Suppressing and destroying enemy firing points and covering the landing with smoke screens, the boats helped the paratroopers gain a foothold and expand the captured bridgehead. The artillery of the 51st Army and the Kerch naval base provided great assistance to the landing groups, which with powerful blows suppressed enemy firing points in Kamysh-Burun, Yenikal, Kerch and other points.

Overcoming strong enemy fire resistance, detachments of the 302nd Infantry Division landed and entrenched themselves in the Kamysh-Burun area. On the first day, half of the planned landing was landed. The build-up of forces became possible only a day later - December 28, when the storm subsided somewhat. By the end of December 29, almost all the main landing forces had landed in the Kamysh-Burun area (11,225 people, 47 guns, 198 mortars, 229 machine guns, 12 vehicles, 210 horses). Here, on December 28, a landing force came ashore, intended for operations in the area of ​​​​Mount Opuk, where landing detachment “B” was sent from Anapa twice, but a storm and some other reasons related to the organization of the transition prevented it from landing.

The landing operation in the Kamysh-Burun area is also full of examples of courage and mass heroism in the name of the Motherland. Here's one of them. The sailors from the gunboat “Red Adzharistan” behaved courageously at sea; they were the first to go into the chilly water and help the paratroopers cross to the shore. The residents of the fishing village on the Kamysh-Burun Spit also showed themselves to be real patriots. Delighted by the return of their native army, they, without fear of enemy fire, rushed to the aid of the paratroopers and, together with them, unloaded weapons and ammunition from approaching ships. Women and orderlies picked up the wounded soldiers and took them to their homes, where they cared for them like mothers.

The landing forces landed on the northern and eastern coasts of the Kerch Peninsula, occupied bridgeheads and launched battles to expand them. However, not having enough tanks and artillery, they were soon forced to go on the defensive. They were forced to do this by the insufficient support of our aviation. Even on the most crucial - the first - day of the operation, she made only 125 sorties.

The significance of the heroic actions of the paratroopers on the northern and eastern coasts of the Kerch Peninsula cannot be diminished. They pinned down significant enemy forces and reserves and created conditions for a successful landing in Feodosia. By the end of December 28, the loading of the troops of the 44th Army, intended for landing, was completed, hidden from the enemy in Novorossiysk and Tuapse. The first landing force - two rifle regiments - was landed on the ships of the naval support detachment, and an assault detachment consisting of 300 sailors was landed on 12 boats of the landing craft detachment. At 3 o’clock on February 29, the Black Sea Fleet ships from group “A” with the landing force were at the target.

At about 4 a.m. on December 29, a naval support detachment opened fire on the port of Feodosia. At the same time, a detachment of landing craft headed to the entrance to the port. Rushing into the passage between the lighthouse and the booms, the patrol boats broke into the port and landed an assault group of sailors to seize the berths. Stunned by the audacity of the Soviet sailors, the Nazis rushed about. The Red Navy took advantage of this. They destroyed the enemy on the piers and on the port pier. During this period, the crew of the patrol boat under the command of Junior Lieutenant Chernyak, who, under enemy fire, landed an assault group and captured the lighthouse, especially distinguished themselves. Another patrol boat, led by the commander of the landing craft detachment, Senior Lieutenant A.F. Aidinov, burst into the harbor, combed all the berths with fire and gave the signal “Entry into the harbor is free.” At this signal, the ships headed for the piers with the first landing force.

The boats of the landing craft detachment began transferring from the cruiser parts of the advance detachment (663rd Infantry Regiment of the 157th Infantry Division, 251st Mountain Rifle Regiment of the 9th Mountain Rifle Division), led by Major G.I. Andreev. The enemy concentrated artillery fire on the harbor. The commanders of the longboats, under hurricane fire and an incessant storm, transferred paratroopers from the ships to the port piers. Petty Officer 1st Class Ivan Dibrov, who had great strength, carried the paratroopers in his arms into the boat, and then landed them on the pier. When the longboat's rudder was knocked off by an enemy shell, Dibrov steered the longboat with a piece of board instead of a rudder for four hours.

Despite heavy enemy fire and a force-six storm, which made it difficult for ships to moor to the wall, by 5 o'clock three destroyers broke through into the port and began landing troops with their military equipment on a wide pier. Soon the cruiser "Red Caucasus" moored here, and in less than an hour it landed troops directly on the pier without the help of boats. Following him, the Kuban transport entered the harbor and by 11:30 am completed the landing directly on the pier. By this time, 1,700 people had already landed. The landing of the first landing party from warships directly onto the port piers made it possible to sharply reduce the landing time and contributed to the achievement of success. At 9:15 a.m., the cruiser “Red Crimea” also finished unloading.

The ships had to moor and land troops under fire and bomb attacks from enemy aircraft and at the same time fire themselves in order to suppress batteries and other firing points. During the landing, the cruiser "Red Caucasus" received several holes. When an enemy shell pierced the tower, the warheads caught fire. There was a threat of explosion and destruction of the ship. The tower personnel began a selfless fight against this fire. Sailor Pushkarev, risking his life, grabbed the burning charges and threw them overboard. Thanks to the dedication of our sailors, the cruiser was saved. However, increased enemy fire forced him and other warships to move away from the pier and berths. Maneuvering in the bay, they fired artillery, supporting the actions of the landing troops. All this happened during the day under the continuous influence of enemy aircraft. The cruiser and destroyers alone were attacked from the air thirteen times.

There were street battles all day in Feodosia. The advance detachment, without waiting for the city to be completely cleared, attacked the enemy on the adjacent heights, captured them and cut off the Germans’ escape route. Meanwhile, the sailors from the assault group continued to clear the city of the remnants of enemy troops. By the end of December 29, not a single occupier remained in the city.

On the night of December 30, the first detachment of transports arrived in Feodosia. During the day, he landed the 236th and part of the forces of the 157th Infantry Division. The second echelon of the landing force - the 63rd Mountain Rifle Division - landed on December 31. From December 29 to 31, 23,000 people, 34 tanks, 133 guns and mortars, 334 vehicles and transporters, 1,550 horses and about 1,000 tons of ammunition and other cargo were landed and unloaded in the Feodosia area.

In order to clarify the situation, let us once again touch upon the fate of the 2,000-strong landing party, which Group “B” from the ships of the Black Sea Fleet was supposed to land at Mount Opuk. Due to the disorganization and vicissitudes of the weather, the landing, but at Kamysh-Burun, was carried out only on December 28.

As a result of the heroic efforts of the soldiers of the Transcaucasian Front and the sailors of the Black Sea Fleet, as well as a carefully organized and well-executed landing in Feodosia, Soviet troops gained a foothold on the Kerch Peninsula and created a threat of encirclement and destruction of the entire Kerch enemy group. The commander of the 11th German Army, General Manstein, assessed the situation that developed after the Soviet landing: “It was a mortal danger for the army at a time when all its forces, with the exception of one German division and two Romanian brigades, were fighting for Sevastopol.” To prevent encirclement, the German command was forced to hastily withdraw its troops from Kerch and at the same time strengthen them in the Feodosia direction. At the beginning of January, in addition to the 46th Infantry Division, units of the 73rd Infantry Division and the Romanian Mountain Infantry Corps operated here. The 132nd and 170th infantry divisions, transferred from near Sevastopol, were also approaching this area.

With these forces, the enemy managed to organize a strong defense in the Feodosia region. Meanwhile, our 44th Army, which could have played a decisive role in cutting off the Kerch group of Germans, advanced only 10–15 km, which allowed the main enemy forces to slip out of the Kerch Peninsula. This was also facilitated by the indecisive actions of the command of the 51st Army, which did not use the previously landed units of the 224th Infantry Division and the 83rd Marine Brigade to immediately pursue the retreating enemy.

There were other serious reasons that did not allow the enemy to cut off the escape route. One of them is the failed attempt to land an amphibious assault in the Ak-Monaya area on January 1, 1942. The winter was cold, and ships with landing forces, trapped by ice, were unable to reach the landing area. The airborne assault on the Arabat Spit did not reach its target either, as it was launched late and away from the enemy’s main escape routes.

During the fighting, the 44th Army managed, overcoming desperate enemy resistance, to expand the bridgehead in the northern and western directions. By January 2, the front of its actions ran along the line Kulepa-Mosque, Karagoz, Koktebel. To the north - at the Kiet, St. Asan line - units of the 302nd Infantry Division of the 51st Army reached the line.

The largest landing operation in the history of the Great Patriotic War was carried out at a high price. Irreversible losses amounted to 32,453 people, of which the Transcaucasian Front had 30,547 dead, and the Black Sea Fleet and Azov Military Flotilla - 1,906 people.