Who proposed the policy of war communism? War communism

February - October 1917:
Democratization of the army
Land question
After October 1917:
Boycott of the government by civil servants
Prodrazvyorstka
Diplomatic isolation of the Soviet government
Civil War in Russia
The collapse of the Russian Empire and the formation of the USSR
War communism

War communism- Name domestic policy Soviet state, held in 1918 - 1921. during the Civil War. Its characteristic features were extreme centralization of economic management, nationalization of large, medium and even small industry (partially), state monopoly on many agricultural products, surplus appropriation, ban on private trade, curtailment of commodity-money relations, equalization in the distribution of material goods, militarization of labor. This policy corresponded to the principles on the basis of which, according to the left communists (a faction in the RSDLP (b)), a communist society should arise [ ] . In historiography, there are different opinions on the reasons for the transition to such a policy - some historians believed that it was an attempt to “introduce communism” using a command method and the Bolsheviks abandoned this idea only after its failure, others presented it as a temporary measure, as reaction of the Bolshevik leadership to the realities of the Civil War. The same contradictory assessments were given to this policy by the leaders of the Bolshevik Party, who led the country during the Civil War. The decision to end war communism and transition to the NEP was made on March 14, 1921 at the X Congress of the RCP(b).

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Basic elements of "war communism"

The basis of war communism was the nationalization of all sectors of the economy. Nationalization began immediately after the Bolsheviks came to power - the nationalization of “land, mineral resources, waters and forests” was announced on the day of the October revolution in Petrograd - November 7, 1917.

Liquidation of private banks and confiscation of deposits

One of the first actions of the Bolsheviks during October revolution there was an armed seizure of the State Bank. The buildings of private banks were also seized. On December 8, 1917, the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars “On the abolition of the Noble land bank and the Peasant land bank” was adopted. By the decree “on the nationalization of banks” of December 14 (27), 1917, banking was declared a state monopoly. The nationalization of banks in December 1917 was supported by confiscation Money population. All gold and silver in coins and bars, paper money, if they exceeded the amount of 5,000 rubles and were acquired “unearnedly,” were confiscated. For small deposits that remained unconfiscated, the norm for receiving money from accounts was set at no more than 500 rubles per month, so that the non-confiscated balance was quickly eaten up by inflation.

Nationalization of industry

Already in June-July 1917, “capital flight” began from Russia. The first to flee were foreign entrepreneurs who were looking for cheap labor in Russia: after the February Revolution, the establishment, the struggle for higher wages, and legalized strikes deprived entrepreneurs of their excess profits. The constantly unstable situation prompted many domestic industrialists to flee. But thoughts about the nationalization of a number of enterprises visited the completely left-wing Minister of Trade and Industry A.I. Konovalov even earlier, in May, and for other reasons: constant conflicts between industrialists and workers, which caused strikes on the one hand and lockouts on the other, disorganized the already economy damaged by the war.

The Bolsheviks faced the same problems after the October Revolution. First decrees Soviet power no transfer of “factories to workers” was envisaged, as eloquently evidenced by the Regulations on Workers’ Control approved by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People’s Commissars on November 14 (27), 1917, which specifically stipulated the rights of entrepreneurs. However, the new government also faced questions: what to do with abandoned enterprises and how to prevent lockouts and other forms of sabotage?

What began as the adoption of ownerless enterprises, nationalization later turned into a measure to combat counter-revolution. Later, at the XI Congress of the RCP(b), L. D. Trotsky recalled:

...In Petrograd, and then in Moscow, where this wave of nationalization rushed, delegations from Ural factories came to us. My heart ached: “What will we do? “We’ll take it, but what will we do?” But from conversations with these delegations it became clear that military measures are absolutely necessary. After all, the director of a factory with all his apparatus, connections, office and correspondence is a real cell at this or that Ural, or St. Petersburg, or Moscow plant - a cell of that very counter-revolution - an economic cell, strong, solid, which is armed in hand is fighting against us. Therefore, this measure was a politically necessary measure of self-preservation. We could move on to a more correct account of what we can organize and begin economic struggle only after we had secured for ourselves not an absolute, but at least a relative possibility of this economic work. From an abstract economic point of view, we can say that our policy was wrong. But if you put it in the world situation and in the situation of our situation, then it was, from the point of view of political and military in the broad sense of the word, absolutely necessary.

The first to be nationalized on November 17 (30), 1917 was the factory of the Likinsky Manufactory Partnership of A. V. Smirnov (Vladimir Province). In total, from November 1917 to March 1918, according to the industrial and professional census of 1918, 836 were nationalized industrial enterprises. On May 2, 1918, the Council of People's Commissars adopted a decree on the Nationalization of the sugar industry, and on June 20 - the oil industry. By the autumn of 1918 in the hands Soviet state 9542 enterprises were concentrated. All large capitalist property in the means of production was nationalized through gratuitous confiscation. By April 1919, almost all large enterprises (with more than 30 employees) were nationalized. By the beginning of 1920, medium-sized industry was also largely nationalized. Strict centralized production management was introduced. It was created to manage the nationalized industry.

Monopoly of foreign trade

At the end of December 1917 international trade was placed under the control of the People's Commissariat of Trade and Industry, and in April 1918 declared a state monopoly. The merchant fleet was nationalized. The decree on the nationalization of the fleet declared shipping enterprises belonging to joint-stock companies, mutual partnerships, trading houses and individual large entrepreneurs owning sea and river vessels of all types to be the national indivisible property of Soviet Russia.

Forced labor service

Compulsory labor service was introduced, initially for the “non-labor classes.” Adopted on December 10, 1918, the Labor Code (LC) established labor service for all citizens of the RSFSR. Decrees adopted by the Council of People's Commissars on April 12, 1919 and April 27, 1920 prohibited unauthorized transition to new job and absenteeism, strict labor discipline was established at enterprises. The system of unpaid work on weekends and holidays in the form of “subbotniks” and “Sundays” has also become widespread.

At the beginning of 1920, in conditions when the demobilization of the liberated units of the Red Army seemed premature, some armies were temporarily transformed into labor armies, which retained military organization and discipline, but worked in the national economy. Sent to the Urals to transform the 3rd Army into the 1st Labor Army, L.D. Trotsky returned to Moscow with a proposal to change economic policy: replace the seizure of surpluses with a food tax (a new economic policy will begin with this measure in a year).

However, Trotsky’s proposal to the Central Committee received only 4 votes against 11, the majority led by Lenin was not ready for a change in policy, and the IX Congress of the RCP (b) adopted a course towards “militarization of the economy.”

Food dictatorship

The Bolsheviks continued the grain monopoly proposed by the Provisional Government and the surplus appropriation system introduced by the Tsarist Government. On May 9, 1918, a Decree was issued confirming the state monopoly of grain trade (introduced by the provisional government) and prohibiting private trade in bread. On May 13, 1918, the decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars “On granting the People's Commissar of Food emergency powers to combat the rural bourgeoisie harboring and speculating on grain reserves” established the basic provisions of the food dictatorship. The goal of the food dictatorship was to centralize the procurement and distribution of food, suppress the resistance of the kulaks and combat baggage. The People's Commissariat for Food received unlimited powers in the procurement of food products. Based on the decree of May 13, 1918, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee established per capita consumption standards for peasants - 12 pounds of grain, 1 pood of cereal, etc. - similar to the standards introduced by the Provisional Government in 1917. All grain exceeding these standards was to be transferred to the disposal of the state at prices set by it. In connection with the introduction of the food dictatorship in May-June 1918, the Food Requisition Army of the People's Commissariat of Food of the RSFSR (Prodarmiya) was created, consisting of armed food detachments. To manage the Food Army, on May 20, 1918, the Office of the Chief Commissar and Military Leader of all food detachments was created under the People's Commissariat of Food. To accomplish this task, armed food detachments were created, endowed with emergency powers.

V.I. Lenin explained the existence of surplus appropriation and the reasons for abandoning it:

Tax in kind is one of the forms of transition from a kind of “war communism”, forced by extreme poverty, ruin and war, to correct socialist product exchange. And this latter, in turn, is one of the forms of transition from socialism with features caused by the predominance of the small peasantry in the population to communism. A kind of “war communism” consisted in the fact that we actually took from the peasants all the surplus, and sometimes not even the surplus, but part of the food necessary for the peasant, and took it to cover the costs of the army and the maintenance of the workers. They mostly took it on credit, using paper money. Otherwise, we could not defeat the landowners and capitalists in a ruined small-peasant country... But it is no less necessary to know the real measure of this merit. “War communism” was forced by war and ruin. It was not and could not be a policy that corresponded to the economic tasks of the proletariat. It was a temporary measure. The correct policy of the proletariat, exercising its dictatorship in a small-peasant country, is the exchange of grain for industrial products needed by the peasant. Only such a food policy meets the tasks of the proletariat, only it is capable of strengthening the foundations of socialism and leading to its complete victory.

Tax in kind is a transition to it. We are still so ruined, so oppressed by the oppression of the war (which happened yesterday and could break out thanks to the greed and malice of the capitalists tomorrow) that we cannot give the peasants industrial products for all the grain we need. Knowing this, we introduce a tax in kind, i.e. the minimum necessary (for the army and for workers).

On July 27, 1918, the People's Commissariat for Food adopted a special resolution on the introduction of a universal class food ration, divided into four categories, providing for measures to account for stocks and distribute food. At first, the class ration was valid only in Petrograd, from September 1, 1918 - in Moscow - and then it was extended to the provinces.

Those supplied were divided into 4 categories (later into 3): 1) all workers working in special difficult conditions; breastfeeding mothers up to the 1st year of the child and wet nurses; pregnant women from the 5th month 2) all those working in hard work, but in normal (not harmful) conditions; women - housewives with a family of at least 4 people and children from 3 to 14 years old; disabled people of the 1st category - dependents 3) all workers engaged in light work; women housewives with a family of up to 3 people; children under 3 years old and adolescents 14-17 years old; all students over 14 years of age; unemployed people registered at the labor exchange; pensioners, war and labor invalids and other disabled people of the 1st and 2nd categories as dependents 4) all male and female persons receiving income from the hired labor of others; persons of liberal professions and their families who are not in public service; persons of unspecified occupation and all other population not named above.

The volume of dispensed was correlated across groups as 4:3:2:1. In the first place, products in the first two categories were simultaneously issued, in the second - in the third. The 4th was issued as the demand of the first 3 was met. With the introduction of class cards, any others were abolished (the card system was in effect from mid-1915).

• Prohibition of private entrepreneurship.

• Elimination of commodity-money relations and transition to direct commodity exchange regulated by the state. The withering away of money.

• Paramilitary management of railways.

Since all these measures were taken during the Civil War, in practice they were much less coordinated and coordinated than planned on paper. Large areas of Russia were beyond the control of the Bolsheviks, and the lack of communications meant that even regions formally subordinate to the Soviet government often had to act independently, in the absence of centralized control from Moscow. The question still remains - whether War Communism was an economic policy in the full sense of the word, or just a set of disparate measures taken to win the civil war at any cost.

Results and assessment of war communism

The key economic body of war communism was the Supreme Council of the National Economy, created according to the project of Yuri Larin, as the central administrative planning body of the economy. According to his own memoirs, Larin designed the main directorates (headquarters) of the Supreme Economic Council on the model of the German “Kriegsgesellschaften” (German: Kriegsgesellschaften; centers for regulating industry in wartime).

The Bolsheviks declared “workers’ control” to be the alpha and omega of the new economic order: “the proletariat itself takes matters into its own hands.”

"Workers' control" very soon revealed its true nature. These words always sounded like the beginning of the death of the enterprise. All discipline was immediately destroyed. Power in factories and factories passed to rapidly changing committees, virtually responsible to no one for anything. Knowledgeable, honest workers were expelled and even killed.

Labor productivity decreased in inverse proportion to the increase in wages. The attitude was often expressed in dizzying numbers: fees increased, but productivity dropped by 500-800 percent. Enterprises continued to exist only because either the state, which owned the printing press, took in workers to support it, or the workers sold and ate up the fixed assets of the enterprises. According to Marxist teaching, the socialist revolution will be caused by the fact that the productive forces will outgrow the forms of production and, under new socialist forms, will have the opportunity for further progressive development, etc., etc. Experience has revealed the falsity of these stories. Under “socialist” orders there was an extreme decline in labor productivity. Our productive forces under “socialism” regressed to the times of Peter’s serf factories.

Democratic self-government has completely destroyed our railways. With an income of 1½ billion rubles, the railways had to pay about 8 billion for the maintenance of workers and employees alone.

Wanting to seize the financial power of “bourgeois society” into their own hands, the Bolsheviks “nationalized” all banks in a Red Guard raid. In reality, they only acquired those few measly millions that they managed to seize in the safes. But they destroyed credit and deprived industrial enterprises of all funds. To ensure that hundreds of thousands of workers were not left without income, the Bolsheviks had to open for them the cash desk of the State Bank, which was intensively replenished by the unrestrained printing of paper money.

Instead of the unprecedented growth in labor productivity expected by the architects of war communism, the result was not an increase, but, on the contrary, a sharp decline: in 1920, labor productivity decreased, including due to mass malnutrition, to 18% of the pre-war level. If before the revolution the average worker consumed 3820 calories per day, already in 1919 this figure dropped to 2680, which was no longer enough for heavy physical labor.

By 1921, industrial output had decreased threefold, and the number of industrial workers had halved. At the same time, the staff of the Supreme Council of National Economy increased approximately a hundredfold, from 318 people to 30 thousand; A glaring example was the Gasoline Trust, which was part of this body, which grew to 50 people, despite the fact that this trust had to manage only one plant with 150 workers.

The situation in Petrograd became especially difficult, whose population decreased from 2 million 347 thousand people during the Civil War. to 799 thousand, the number of workers decreased five times.

The decline in agriculture was just as sharp. Due to the complete disinterest of peasants in increasing crops under the conditions of “war communism,” grain production in 1920 fell by half compared to pre-war. According to Richard Pipes,

In such a situation, it was enough for the weather to deteriorate for famine to occur in the country. Under communist rule, there was no surplus in agriculture, so if there was a crop failure, there would be nothing to deal with its consequences.

To organize the food appropriation system, the Bolsheviks organized another greatly expanded body - the People's Commissariat for Food, headed by A. D. Tsyuryupa. Despite the state's efforts to establish food supplies, a massive famine began in 1921-1922, during which up to 5 million people died. The policy of “war communism” (especially the surplus appropriation system) caused discontent among broad sections of the population, especially the peasantry (uprising in the Tambov region, Western Siberia, Kronstadt and others). By the end of 1920, an almost continuous belt appeared in Russia peasant uprisings(“green flood”), aggravated by huge masses of deserters and the beginning of mass demobilization of the Red Army.

The difficult situation in industry and agriculture was aggravated by the final collapse of transport. The share of so-called “sick” steam locomotives went from pre-war 13% to 61% in 1921; transport was approaching the threshold, after which there would only be enough capacity to service its own needs. In addition, firewood was used as fuel for steam locomotives, which was extremely reluctantly collected by peasants as laborers.

The experiment to organize labor armies in 1920-1921 also completely failed. The first labor army demonstrated, in the words of the chairman of its council (President of the Labor Army - 1) L. D. Trotsky, “monstrous” (monstrously low) labor productivity. Only 10 - 25% of its personnel were engaged in labor activity as such, and 14%, due to torn clothes and lack of shoes, did not leave the barracks at all. Mass desertion from the labor armies was widespread, which in the spring of 1921 was completely out of control.

In March 1921, at the X Congress of the RCP(b), the objectives of the policy of “war communism” were recognized by the country’s leadership as completed and a new economic policy was introduced. V.I. Lenin gave dual explanations about the causes and results of war communism. In one case he wrote: “War Communism was forced by war and ruin. It was not and could not be a policy that corresponded to the economic tasks of the proletariat. It was a temporary measure." In another: “Our previous economic policy“If you can’t say: I was counting on it (in that situation we didn’t count on much at all), then to a certain extent I assumed, one might say, without calculation, that there would be a direct transition of the old Russian economy to state production and distribution on a communist basis.” Lenin also argued that “war communism” should be given to the Bolsheviks not as a fault, but as a merit, but at the same time it is necessary to know the extent of this merit.

In culture

• Life in Petrograd during the times of war communism is described in the novel

Prodrazverstka.

Artist I.A.Vladimirov (1869-1947)

War communism - this is the policy pursued by the Bolsheviks during the civil war in 1918-1921, which included a set of emergency political and economic measures to win the civil war and protect Soviet power. It is no coincidence that this policy received this name: "communism" - equal rights for everyone, "military" -the policy was carried out through force.

Start The policy of war communism began in the summer of 1918, when two government documents appeared on the requisition (seizure) of grain and the nationalization of industry. In September 1918, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee adopted a resolution to transform the republic into a single military camp, the slogan - “Everything for the front! Everything for victory!”

Reasons for adopting the policy of war communism

The need to protect the country from internal and external enemies

Defense and final assertion of Soviet power

The country's recovery from the economic crisis

Goals:

Maximum concentration of labor and material resources to repel external and internal enemies.

Building communism by violent means (“cavalry attack on capitalism”)

Features of War Communism

Centralization economic management, system VSNKh (Supreme Council of the National Economy), central administrations.

Nationalization industry, banks and land, liquidation of private property. The process of nationalization of property during the civil war was called "expropriation".

Ban hired labor and land rental

Food dictatorship. Introduction surplus appropriation(decree of the Council of People's Commissars January 1919) - food allocation. These are state measures to implement agricultural procurement plans: mandatory delivery to the state of an established (“detailed”) standard of products (bread, etc.) at state prices. Peasants could leave only a minimum of products for consumption and household needs.

Creation in the village "committees of the poor" (committees of the poor), who were engaged in food appropriation. In the cities, armed forces were created from workers food detachments to confiscate grain from peasants.

An attempt to introduce collective farms (collective farms, communes).

Prohibition of private trade

Curtailment of commodity-money relations, supply of products was carried out by the People's Commissariat for Food, abolition of payments for housing, heating, etc., that is, free public utilities. Cancellation of money.

Equalizing principle in the distribution of material goods (rations were issued), naturalization of wages, card system.

Militarization of labor (that is, its focus on military purposes, defense of the country). Universal labor conscription(since 1920) Slogan: "Who does not work shall not eat!". Mobilization of the population to carry out work of national importance: logging, road, construction and other work. Labor mobilization was carried out from 15 to 50 years of age and was equated to military mobilization.

Decision on ending the policy of war communism accepted on 10th Congress of the RCP(B) in March 1921 year in which the course towards the transition to NEP.

Results of the policy of war communism

Mobilization of all resources in the fight against anti-Bolshevik forces, which made it possible to win the civil war.

Nationalization of oil, large and small industries, railway transport, banks,

Massive discontent of the population

Peasant protests

Increasing economic devastation

The policy of war communism was based on the task of destroying market and commodity-money relations (i.e. private property), replacing them with centralized production and distribution.

To carry out this plan, a system was needed that was capable of bringing the will of the center to the most remote corners of the huge power. In this system, everything must be registered and put under control (flows of raw materials and resources, finished products). Lenin believed that “war communism” would be the last step before socialism.

On September 2, 1918, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee announced the introduction of martial law; leadership of the country passed to the Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defense, headed by V.I. Lenin. The fronts were commanded by the Revolutionary Military Council, headed by L.D. Trotsky.

The difficult situation on the fronts and in the country's economy prompted the authorities to introduce a number of emergency measures, defined as war communism.

In the Soviet version, it included surplus appropriation (private trade in grain was prohibited, surpluses and reserves were forcibly confiscated), the beginning of the creation of collective and state farms, the nationalization of industry, the prohibition of private trade, the introduction of universal labor service, and the centralization of management.

By February 1918, enterprises belonging to royal family, the Russian treasury and private traders. Subsequently, a chaotic nationalization of small industrial enterprises and then entire industries was carried out.

Although in Tsarist Russia the share of state (state) property has always been traditionally large, the centralization of production and distribution was quite painful.

The peasants and a significant part of the workers were opposed to the Bolsheviks. And from 1917 to 1921. they adopted anti-Bolshevik resolutions and actively participated in armed anti-government protests.

The Bolsheviks had to create a political-economic system that could give workers minimal opportunities for living and at the same time would make them strictly dependent on the authorities and administration. It was for this purpose that the policy of over-centralization of the economy was pursued. Subsequently, communism was identified with centralization.

Despite the “Decree on Land” (the land was transferred to the peasants), the land received by the peasants during the Stolypin reform was nationalized.

The actual nationalization of land and the introduction of equalized land use, the ban on renting and buying land and expanding arable land led to a terrifying drop in the level of agricultural production. The result was a famine that caused the death of thousands of people.

During the period of “war communism”, after the suppression of the anti-Bolshevik speech of the left Socialist Revolutionaries, a transition to a one-party system was carried out.

Scientific justification by the Bolsheviks historical process how the irreconcilable class struggle led to the policy of “Red Teppopa”, the reason for the introduction of which was a series of assassination attempts on party leaders.

Its essence lay in consistent destruction according to the principle “those who are not with us are against us.” The list included the intelligentsia, officers, nobles, priests, and wealthy peasants.

The main method of the “Red Terror” was extrajudicial executions, authorized and carried out by the Cheka. The policy of “red terror” allowed the Bolsheviks to strengthen their power and destroy opponents and those who showed dissatisfaction.

The policy of war communism aggravated economic devastation and led to the unjustified death of a huge number of innocent people.

How the policy of war communism was carried out: briefly about the reasons, goals and results. Many people know about this only in general terms.

But what exactly were the first transformations of the Bolsheviks?

The essence of the policy of war communism

The policy of war communism is measures taken in the period 1918-1920 and aimed at restructuring in politics, economics and the social sphere.

What was the essence of this policy:

1. Providing the army and population with food.
2. General strict labor conscription.
3. Issuance of goods by cards.
4. Food procurement.
5. Curtailment of commodity-money relations. Introduction of natural exchange.

The Bolsheviks also pursued the goal of making power as centralized as possible and managing the national economy.

Reasons for the introduction of War Communism

The main reason was state of emergency during war and popular unrest. The military situation in the country is always characterized by special development.

Production decreases and consumption increases, a significant part of the budget goes to military needs. This situation requires taking drastic measures.

Other reasons:

• non-acceptance of Soviet power by part of the country, requiring punitive measures;
• based on the previous point, the need to consolidate power;
• the need to overcome the economic crisis.

One of the main reasons was the desire of the Bolsheviks to create a communist state in which the principle of distribution would be used and there would be no place for commodity-money relations and private property.

The methods used for this were quite harsh. The changes took place quickly and decisively. Many Bolsheviks wanted immediate change.

Key provisions and activities

The policy of war communism was carried out in the following provisions:

1. On June 28, 1918, decrees on nationalization in the industrial sector were adopted.
2. Distribution of products took place at the state level. All surpluses were confiscated and distributed equally between regions.
3. Trade in any goods was strictly prohibited.
4. For peasants, the minimum necessary only to maintain life and work capacity was determined.
5. It was assumed that all citizens from 18 to 60 years old must work in industry or agriculture.
6. Since November 1918, mobility in the country was significantly reduced. This refers to the introduction of martial law on transport.
7. Cancellation of payments for transport, utilities; introduction of other free services.

In general, the events were aimed at transferring the economy to a war footing.

Results, consequences and significance of war communism

The policy of war communism created all the conditions for the victory of the Reds in the civil war. The main element was supplying the Red Army with the necessary products, transport, and ammunition.

But the Bolsheviks were unable to solve the economic problem of overcoming the crisis. The country's economy fell into complete decline.

National income fell by more than half. In agriculture, crop sowing and harvesting have significantly decreased. Industrial production was on the verge of collapse.

As for power, the policy of war communism laid the foundations for the further state structure of Soviet Russia.

Pros and cons of war communism

The policy pursued had both advantages and disadvantages.

Reasons for abandoning War Communism

As a result, the measures introduced were not only ineffective in overcoming the economic crisis, but also provoked a new, even deeper one. Industrial and Agriculture fell into complete decline, and famine set in.

It was necessary to take new measures in the economy. War communism was replaced by.

The policy of "war communism".

The politics of War Communism in brief- this is widespread centralization with the aim of destroying market relations, as well as the concept of private property. Instead, centralized production and distribution were cultivated. This measure was introduced due to the need to subsequently introduce a system of equal rights for any resident of the future country of the Soviets. Lenin believed that the policy of war communism was a necessity. Quite naturally, having come to power, it was necessary to act actively and without the slightest delay in order to consolidate and implement the new regime. The last stage before the final transition to socialism.

The main stages in the development of the policy of war communism, briefly:

1. Nationalization of the economy. With the introduction of a new government strategy, factories, lands, factories and other property in the hands of private owners were unilaterally and forcefully transferred into state ownership. The ideal goal is for subsequent equal distribution among everyone. According to the ideology of communism.

2. Surplus appropriation. According to the policy of war communism, peasants and food producers were entrusted with the function of obligatory delivery of certain volumes of products to the state in order to centrally maintain a stable situation in the food sector. In fact, surplus appropriation turned into robberies of the middle class of peasants and total famine throughout Russia.

The result of the policy at this stage of development of the new Soviet state was a severe drop in the rate of production development (for example, steel production decreased by 90-95%). The surplus appropriation deprived the peasants of their reserves, causing a terrible famine in the Volga region. However, from a management point of view, the goal was achieved 100%. The economy came under state control, and with it, the country’s residents became dependent on the “distribution body.”

In 1921 policy of war communism was quite quietly replaced by the New Economic Policy. Now the time has come to return to the issue of increasing the pace and development of industrial and production capacity, however, under the auspices of Soviet power.

The essence of the policy of “war communism”. The policy of “war communism” included a set of measures that affected the economic and socio-political spheres. The basis of “war communism” was emergency measures in supplying cities and the army with food, the curtailment of commodity-money relations, the nationalization of all industry, including small industry, surplus appropriation, supplying the population with food and industrial goods on ration cards, universal labor service and maximum centralization of management of the national economy and the country generally.

Chronologically, “war communism” falls on the period of the Civil War, but individual elements of the policy began to emerge at the end of 1917 - beginning of 1918. This applies primarily nationalization of industry, banks and transport. The “Red Guard attack on capital,” which began after the decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on the introduction of workers’ control (November 14, 1917), was temporarily suspended in the spring of 1918. In June 1918, its pace accelerated and all large and medium-sized enterprises became state property. In November 1920, small enterprises were confiscated. Thus it happened destruction of private property. Characteristic feature"war communism" is extreme centralization of economic management.

At first, the management system was built on the principles of collegiality and self-government, but over time the inconsistency of these principles becomes obvious. Factory committees lacked the competence and experience to manage them. The leaders of Bolshevism realized that they had previously exaggerated the degree of revolutionary consciousness of the working class, which was not ready to govern. The emphasis is placed on state management of economic life.

On December 2, 1917, the Supreme Council of the National Economy (VSNKh) was created. Its first chairman was N. Osinsky (V.A. Obolensky). The tasks of the Supreme Economic Council included the nationalization of large industry, management of transport, finance, establishment of trade exchange, etc.

By the summer of 1918, local (provincial, district) economic councils, subordinate to the Supreme Economic Council, emerged. The Council of People's Commissars, and then the Defense Council, determined the main directions of work of the Supreme Economic Council, its headquarters and centers, each representing a kind of state monopoly in the corresponding branch of production.

By the summer of 1920, almost 50 central administrations had been created to manage large nationalized enterprises. The name of the departments speaks for itself: Glavmetal, Glavtextile, Glavsugar, Glavtorf, Glavstarch, Glavryba, Tsentrokhladoboynya, etc.

The centralized management system dictated the need for an orderly leadership style. One of the features of the policy of “war communism” was system emergency authorities, whose task was to subordinate the entire economy to the needs of the front. The Defense Council appointed its commissioners with emergency powers. Thus, A.I. Rykov was appointed extraordinary commissioner of the Defense Council for the supply of the Red Army (Chusosnabarm). He was endowed with the rights to use any apparatus, remove and arrest officials, reorganize and reassign institutions, confiscate and requisition goods from warehouses and from the population under the pretext of “military urgency.” All factories working for defense were transferred to the jurisdiction of Chusosnabarm. To manage them, the Industrial Military Council was formed, whose regulations were also mandatory for all enterprises.

One of the main features of the policy of “war communism” is curtailment of commodity-money relations. This was evident primarily in introduction of unequal natural exchange between city and countryside. In conditions of galloping inflation, peasants did not want to sell bread for depreciated money. In February - March 1918, the consuming regions of the country received only 12.3% of the planned amount of bread. The rationed bread quota in industrial centers was reduced to 50-100 grams. in a day. According to the terms Treaty of Brest-Litovsk Russia lost grain-rich areas, which aggravated food crisis. Famine was approaching. It should also be remembered that the Bolsheviks had a twofold attitude towards the peasantry. On the one hand, he was viewed as an ally of the proletariat, and on the other (especially the middle peasants and kulaks) - as a support for the counter-revolution. They looked at the peasant, even a low-power middle peasant, with suspicion.

Under these conditions, the Bolsheviks headed for establishment of a grain monopoly. In May 1918, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee adopted the decrees “On granting the People’s Commissariat of Food emergency powers to combat the rural bourgeoisie hiding grain reserves and speculating on them” and “On the reorganization of the People’s Commissariat of Food and local food authorities.” In conditions of impending famine, the People's Commissariat for Food was provided with emergency powers, a food dictatorship was established in the country: a monopoly on the trade in bread and fixed prices was introduced. After the adoption of the decree on the grain monopoly (May 13, 1918), trade was actually prohibited. To seize food from the peasantry, they began to form food squads. The food detachments acted according to the principle formulated by the People's Commissar of Food Tsuryupa: “if you cannot take grain from the village bourgeoisie by ordinary means, then you must take it by force.” To help them, on the basis of the decrees of the Central Committee of June 11, 1918, committees of the poor(combat committees ) . These measures of the Soviet government forced the peasantry to take up arms.

On January 11, 1919, in order to streamline the exchange between city and countryside, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee was introduced by decree surplus appropriation It was prescribed to confiscate surpluses from peasants, which were initially determined by “the needs of the peasant family, limited by the established norm.” However, soon the surpluses began to be determined by the needs of the state and the army. The state announced in advance the figures for its needs for bread, and then they were divided by provinces, districts and volosts. In 1920, instructions sent to places from above explained that “the allocation given to the volost is in itself a definition of surplus.” And although the peasants were left with only a minimum of grain according to the surplus appropriation system, the initial set of deliveries introduced certainty, and the peasants considered the surplus appropriation system as a benefit compared to food detachments.

The collapse of commodity-money relations was also facilitated by prohibition in the fall of 1918 in most provinces of Russia wholesale and private trade. However, the Bolsheviks still failed to completely destroy the market. And although they were supposed to destroy money, the latter were still in use. The unified monetary system collapsed. In Central Russia alone there were 21 banknote, money was printed in many regions. During 1919, the ruble exchange rate fell 3,136 times. Under these conditions, the state was forced to switch to wages in kind.

Established economic system did not stimulate productive work, the productivity of which was steadily falling. Output per worker in 1920 was less than one-third of the pre-war level. In the fall of 1919, the earnings of a highly skilled worker exceeded the earnings of a general worker by only 9%. Material incentives to work disappeared, and along with them the desire to work itself disappeared. At many enterprises, absenteeism amounted to up to 50% of working days. To strengthen discipline, mainly administrative measures were taken. Forced labor grew out of leveling, from the lack of economic incentives, from the poor living conditions of workers, and also from a catastrophic shortage of labor. Hopes for the class consciousness of the proletariat were also not realized. In the spring of 1918 V.I. Lenin writes that “revolution... requires unquestioning obedience masses common will leaders of the labor process." The method of the policy of “war communism” becomes militarization of labor. At first it covered workers and employees of defense industries, but by the end of 1919 all industries and railway transport were transferred to martial law.

On November 14, 1919, the Council of People's Commissars adopted the “Regulations on workers' disciplinary comradely courts.” It provided for such punishments as sending persistent violators of discipline to heavy public Works, and in case of “stubborn refusal to submit to comradely discipline”, subject “as a non-labor element to dismissal from enterprises and transfer to a concentration camp.”

In the spring of 1920, it was believed that the civil war had already ended (in fact, it was only a peaceful respite). At this time, the IX Congress of the RCP(b) wrote in its resolution on the transition to a militarized economic system, the essence of which “should consist in bringing the army closer to the production process in every possible way, so that the living human power of certain economic regions is at the same time the living human power of certain military units." In December 1920, the VIII Congress of Soviets declared farming to be a state duty.

Under the conditions of “war communism” there was universal labor conscription for persons from 16 to 50 years old. On January 15, 1920, the Council of People's Commissars issued a decree on the first revolutionary army of labor, thereby legalizing the use of army units in economic work. On January 20, 1920, the Council of People's Commissars adopted a resolution on the procedure for carrying out labor service, according to which the population, regardless of permanent job was involved in performing labor duties (fuel, road, horse-drawn, etc.). Redistribution of labor and labor mobilizations were widely practiced. Were introduced work books. To control the implementation of universal labor service, a special committee was created headed by F.E. Dzerzhinsky. Persons who evade social useful works, were severely punished and deprived of food cards. On November 14, 1919, the Council of People's Commissars adopted the above-mentioned "Regulations on workers' disciplinary comradely courts."

The system of military-communist measures included the abolition of fees for urban and railway transport, for fuel, fodder, food, consumer goods, medical services, housing, etc. (December 1920). Approved egalitarian class principle of distribution

. Since June 1918, card supply in 4 categories has been introduced.

The third category supplied directors, managers and engineers of industrial enterprises, most of the intelligentsia and clergy, and the fourth category included persons using hired labor and living on income from capital, as well as shopkeepers and peddlers.

Pregnant and lactating women belonged to the first category. Children under three years old received an additional milk card, and children under 12 years old received products in the second category. In 1918 in Petrograd, the monthly ration in the first category was 25 pounds of bread (1 pound = 409 grams), 0.5 pounds. sugar, 0.5 lb. salt, 4 lbs. meat or fish, 0.5 lb. vegetable oil

, 0.25 f. coffee surrogates.

In Moscow in 1919, a worker on ration cards received a calorie ration of 336 kcal, while the daily physiological norm was 3600 kcal. Workers in provincial cities received food below the physiological minimum (in the spring of 1919 - 52%, in July - 67%, in December - 27%). “War communism” was considered by the Bolsheviks not only as a policy aimed at the survival of Soviet power, but also as the beginning of the construction of socialism. Based on the fact that every revolution is violence, they widely used revolutionary coercion . A popular poster from 1918 read: “With an iron hand we will drive humanity to happiness!” Revolutionary coercion was used especially widely against peasants. After the All-Russian Central Executive Committee adopted the Resolution of February 14, 1919 “On Socialist Land Management and Measures for the Transition to Socialist Agriculture,” propaganda was launched in defense. In a number of places, authorities adopted resolutions on the mandatory transition in the spring of 1919 to collective cultivation of the land. But it soon became clear that the peasantry would not agree to socialist experiments, and attempts to impose collective forms of farming would completely alienate the peasants from Soviet power, so at the VIII Congress of the RCP (b) in March 1919, delegates voted for an alliance of the state with the middle peasants.

The inconsistency of the Bolsheviks' peasant policy can also be observed in their attitude to cooperation. In an effort to introduce socialist production and distribution, they eliminated such a collective form of initiative of the population in the economic field as cooperation. The Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of March 16, 1919 “On Consumer Communes” placed cooperation in the position of an appendage state power. All local consumer societies were forcibly merged into cooperatives - “consumer communes”, which were united into provincial unions, and they, in turn, into the Central Union. The state entrusted consumer communes with the distribution of food and consumer goods in the country. Cooperation as an independent organization of the population ceased to exist. The name “consumer communes” aroused hostility among the peasants, since they identified them with the total socialization of property, including personal property.

During the civil war, the political system of the Soviet state underwent serious changes. The RCP(b) becomes its central unit. By the end of 1920, there were about 700 thousand people in the RCP (b), half of them were at the front.

In party life, the role of the apparatus that practiced military methods of work grew. Instead of elected collectives, narrowly composed operational bodies most often acted at the local level. Democratic centralism - the basis of party building - was replaced by a system of appointment. The norms of collective leadership of party life were replaced by authoritarianism.

The years of war communism became the time of establishment political dictatorship of the Bolsheviks. Although representatives of other socialist parties took part in the activities of the Soviets after the temporary ban, the communists still constituted an overwhelming majority in all government institutions, at congresses of Soviets and in executive bodies. The process of merging party and government agencies. Provincial and district party committees often determined the composition of executive committees and issued orders for them.

The communists, welded together by strict discipline, voluntarily or unwittingly transferred the order that developed within the party to the organizations where they worked. Under the influence of the civil war, a military dictatorship took shape in the country, which entailed the concentration of control not in elected bodies, but in executive institutions, strengthening of unity of command, the formation of an bureaucratic hierarchy with a huge number of employees, a reduction in the role of the masses in state building and their removal from power.

Bureaucracy for a long time it becomes a chronic disease of the Soviet state. Its reasons were the low cultural level of the bulk of the population. The new state inherited much from the previous state apparatus. The old bureaucracy soon received places in the Soviet state apparatus, because it was impossible to do without people who knew managerial work. Lenin believed that it was possible to cope with bureaucracy only when the entire population (“every cook”) would participate in governing the state. But later the utopian nature of these views became obvious.

The war had a huge impact on state building. The concentration of forces, so necessary for military success, required strict centralization of control. The ruling party placed its main emphasis not on the initiative and self-government of the masses, but on the state and party apparatus, capable of implementing by force the policies necessary to defeat the enemies of the revolution. Gradually, the executive bodies (apparatus) completely subordinated the representative bodies (Councils). The reason for the swelling of the Soviet state apparatus was the total nationalization of industry. The state, having become the owner of the main means of production, was forced to manage hundreds of factories and factories, create huge management structures, engaged in economic and distribution activities in the center and in the regions, and the role of central bodies increased. Management was built “from top to bottom” on strict directive and command principles, which limited local initiative.

In June 1918 L.I. Lenin wrote about the need to encourage “the energy and mass character of popular terror.” The decree of July 6, 1918 (revolt of the left Socialist Revolutionaries) restored death penalty. True, executions became widespread in September 1918. On September 3, 500 hostages and “suspicious persons” were shot in Petrograd. In September 1918, the local Cheka received an order from Dzerzhinsky, which stated that they were completely independent in searches, arrests and executions, but after they have been carried out security officers must report to the Council of People's Commissars. There was no need to account for single executions. In the fall of 1918, the punitive measures of the emergency authorities almost got out of control. This forced the VI Congress of Soviets to limit terror to the framework of “revolutionary legality.” However, the changes that had taken place by this time both in the state and in the psychology of society did not make it possible to really limit arbitrariness. Speaking about the Red Terror, it should be remembered that in the territories occupied by the whites, no less atrocities were committed. The white armies included special punitive detachments, reconnaissance and counterintelligence units. They resorted to mass and individual terror against the population, hunting down communists and representatives of the Soviets, participating in the burning and execution of entire villages. In the face of declining morality, terror quickly gained momentum. Due to the fault of both sides, tens of thousands of innocent people died.

The state sought to establish total control not only over the behavior, but also over the thoughts of its subjects, into whose heads the elementary and primitive basics of communism were introduced. Marxism becomes the state ideology.

The task was set to create a special proletarian culture. Cultural values ​​and achievements of the past were denied. There was a search for new images and ideals. A revolutionary avant-garde was formed in literature and art. Special attention paid to the media of mass propaganda and agitation. Art has become completely politicized.

Revolutionary fortitude and fanaticism, selfless courage, sacrifice in the name of a bright future, class hatred and ruthlessness towards enemies were preached. This work was supervised by the People's Commissariat of Education (Narkompros), headed by A.V. Lunacharsky. He launched active activities Proletkult- Union of proletarian cultural and educational societies. Proletkultists were especially active in calling for a revolutionary overthrow of old forms in art, a violent onslaught of new ideas, and the primitivization of culture. The ideologists of the latter are considered to be such prominent Bolsheviks as A.A. Bogdanov, V.F. Pletnev and others. In 1919, more than 400 thousand people took part in the proletkult movement. The spread of their ideas inevitably led to the loss of traditions and the lack of spirituality of society, which was unsafe for the authorities in war conditions. The leftist speeches of the Proletkultists forced the People's Commissariat for Education to pull them back from time to time, and in the early 1920s to completely dissolve these organizations.

The consequences of “war communism” cannot be separated from the consequences of the civil war. At the cost of enormous efforts, the Bolsheviks, using methods of agitation, strict centralization, coercion and terror, managed to turn the republic into a “military camp” and win. But the policy of “war communism” did not and could not lead to socialism. By the end of the war, the inadmissibility of running ahead and the danger of forcing socio-economic changes and escalating violence became obvious. Instead of creating a state of the dictatorship of the proletariat, a dictatorship of one party arose in the country, to maintain which revolutionary terror and violence were widely used.

The national economy was paralyzed by the crisis. In 1919, due to the lack of cotton, the textile industry almost completely stopped. It provided only 4.7% of pre-war production. The flax industry produced only 29% of the pre-war level.

Heavy industry was collapsing. In 1919, all blast furnaces in the country went out. Soviet Russia did not produce metal, but lived on reserves inherited from the tsarist regime. At the beginning of 1920, 15 blast furnaces were launched, and they produced about 3% of the metal smelted in Tsarist Russia on the eve of the war. The catastrophe in metallurgy affected the metalworking industry: hundreds of enterprises were closed, and those that were working were periodically idle due to difficulties with raw materials and fuel. Soviet Russia, cut off from the Donbass mines and Baku oil, experienced a fuel shortage. The main type of fuel was firewood and peat.

Industry and transport lacked not only raw materials and fuel, but also workers. By the end of the Civil War, less than 50% of the proletariat in 1913 was employed in industry. The composition of the working class had changed significantly. Now its backbone consisted not of regular workers, but of people from the non-proletarian strata of the urban population, as well as peasants mobilized from the villages.

Life forced the Bolsheviks to reconsider the foundations of “war communism”, therefore, at the Tenth Party Congress, military-communist economic methods based on coercion were declared obsolete.