Abstract: The Mongol invasion of Europe and its consequences for Rus'. Batu's march to the west
Plan
Introduction
1 Background
2 First stage (1236-1237)
3 Second stage (1237-1238)
4 Third stage (1238-1239)
5 Fourth stage (1239-1240)
6 Fifth stage (1240-1242)
6.1 Actions of the northern corps
6.2 Actions of the southern corps
6.3 Return to the East
9 Bibliography
9.1 Sources
Introduction
Western campaign of the Mongols ( Kipchak campaign) - the campaign of the troops of the Mongol Empire in Eastern Europe in 1236-1242. led by Genghisid Batu and military leader Subedei.
1. Background
For the first time, the task of conquering the Kipchaks, as well as the task of reaching the city of Kyiv, was set to Subedei by Genghis Khan in 1221:
After winning the Battle of the Kalka River (over the Mi-chi-sy-lao, that is, the Mstislavs), the Mongols abandoned their plan to march on Kyiv and were defeated by the Volga Bulgars on their way to the east in 1224.
Genghis Khan handed over control to his son Jochi " country of the Kipchaks"(Polovtsians) and instructed him to take care of expanding his possessions, including at the expense of Russian lands. After Jochi's death in 1227, the lands of his ulus passed to his son, Batu. Genghis Khan's son Ogedei became the Great Khan. The Persian historian Rashid al-Din writes that Ogedei " in pursuance of the decree given by Genghis Khan in the name of Jochi, he entrusted the conquest of the Northern countries to members of his house ».
In 1228-1229, having ascended the throne, Ogedei sent two 30,000-strong corps to the west (at the same time, Mongol troops were operating on other fronts). One, led by Chormaghan, south of the Caspian Sea against the last Khorezm Shah Jalal ad-Din (defeated and died in 1231), to Khorasan and Iraq. Another, led by Subedei and Kokoshay, north of the Caspian Sea against the Kipchaks and Volga Bulgars, who were defeated in the battle on the Yaik River already in 1229 (and in 1232 Tatarov arrived and winter did not reach the Great Bulgarian City ).
The “Secret Legend”, in relation to the period 1228-1229, reports that Ogedei
However, in 1231-1234 the Mongols waged a second war with Jin, and the movement to the west of the united forces of all uluses began immediately after the decision of the kurultai of 1235.
Gumilyov L.N. estimates the size of the Mongol army similarly (30-40 thousand people). In modern historical literature, another estimate of the total number of the Mongol army in the western campaign is dominant: 120-140 thousand soldiers, 150 thousand soldiers
Initially, Ogedei himself planned to lead the Kipchak campaign, but Munke dissuaded him. In addition to Batu, the following Genghisids took part in the campaign: the sons of Jochi Orda-Ezhen, Shiban, Tangkut and Berke, the grandson of Chagatai Buri and the son of Chagatai Baydar, the sons of Ogedei Guyuk and Kadan, the sons of Tolui Munke and Buchek, the son of Genghis Khan Kulhan, the grandson of Genghis Khan's brother Argasun.
First stage (1236-1237)
The troops sent to help the Jochids set out on a campaign in the spring of 1236 and in the fall united with Batu within the Volga Bulgaria. The cities of Bulgar, Bilyar, Kernek, Zhukotin, and Suvar scattered in ashes.
The Bulgarian refugees were accepted by Yuri Vsevolodovich Vladimirsky and settled in the Volga cities. Rashid-Ad-Din attributes the encirclement and destruction of the “Bulars” camp by Batu and Shiban near the big river to the events in Volga Bulgaria; this is the basis for the version about the independent conquest of Bulgaria by the Jochids and the movement of Munke’s corps already in 1236 along a more southern route, along the Polovtsian steppes. In Juvaini, "the Kelars and Bashgirds, a numerous people of the Christian confession, who are said to live next to the Franks" opposed the Mongols after Mongol invasion to Rus', presumably we are talking about the battle on the Chajo River in Hungary in the spring of 1241.
After the defeat of Bulgaria, in the spring and summer of 1237, troops led by Batu, Horde, Berke, Guyuk, Kadan, Buri and Kulkan invaded the lands of the Burtases and Mordovians. The Hungarian missionary monk, Dominican Julian, who preached in the Polovtsian steppes, writes about one of the princes “ Mordukans"(Mordovians), which, " Having set out on the same day..., with all his people and family... he submitted to the Tatars" In the annals of Waverley Monastery, under 1239, there is a “Message from the Hungarian Bishop to the Bishop of Paris about the Tartars,” which says: “... On the way ahead of them (the Tatars) are certain tribes called Mordans, who indiscriminately destroy the people they meet.”. Thomas Splitsky also reports about the first replenishment of the Mongol army at the expense of the defeated Cumans and Volga peoples before the campaign against North-Eastern Rus'.
Munke and Buchek moved from Bulgaria south along the Polovtsian steppes on the two banks of the Volga. Polovtsian Khan Kotyan Sutoevich together with 40 thousand of his people went to Hungary. Rashid ad-Din writes about the leader of the Polovtsian resistance captured in the summer of 1237 (in the summer of 1238, according to R.P. Khrapachevsky), captured on one of the Volga islands: “Bachman begged Mengu-kaan [himself] with his blessed hand brought his work to completion; he [Mengu-kaan] ordered his brother Buchek to cut Bachman in two” and speaks of the first clash with the Alans, a North Caucasian people.
Second stage (1237-1238)
Julian reports that in the fall of 1237 the entire Mongol army was divided into four parts, three of which were preparing for the invasion of Rus' in the winter: “Now, being on the borders of Rus', we have closely learned the real truth that the entire army marching to Western countries, divided into four parts. One part near the Etil (Volga) river on the borders of Rus' from the eastern edge approached Suzdal. The other part in the southern direction was already attacking the borders of Ryazan, another Russian principality. The third part stopped opposite the Don River, near the castle Oveheruch, also Russian principalities. They, as the Russians themselves, the Hungarians and the Bulgarians who fled before them verbally conveyed to us, are waiting for the earth, rivers and swamps to freeze with the onset of the coming winter, after which it will be easy for the entire multitude of Tatars to plunder all of Rus', the entire country of the Russians.”
According to Rashid Ad-Din (and the Chinese “History of the Mongols”), Munke took part in the campaign against North-Eastern Rus'. He calls him the later "Kaan" and talks about how he "personally performed heroic feats until he defeated them [the Russians]." The importance the Chingizids attached to the conquest of the Russians is evidenced by Ogedei’s monologue addressed to Guyuk, who was dissatisfied with Batu’s leadership.
After the defeat of the troops of the Ryazan principality, the Mongols took Ryazan on December 21, 1237, after the battle of Kolomna with the united forces of North-Eastern Rus' in early January 1238, in which Genghis Khan’s son Kulhan died, Kolomna fell. Then the Mongol army was overtaken by a detachment of Evpatiy Kolovrat, who had returned from Chernigov. The most stubborn resistance to the Mongols was provided by Moscow (taken on January 20), Vladimir (February 7), Pereslavl-Zalessky, Tver, Torzhok (March 5), Kozelsk (early May 1238). At the beginning of March 1238, the secondary forces of the Mongols, thanks to the surprise factor, were able to destroy the combined Russian army and kill Grand Duke Yuri Vsevolodovich Vladimirsky in the Battle of the City. Veliky Novgorod was not reached, The largest city northern part of the Volga trade route.
Third stage (1238-1239)
Perhaps in the summer of 1238 (and not in the summer of 1237) the suppression of the Polovtsian uprising and victory over the Alans took place by Munke and Buchek. The next action of Muncke's southern corps (together with Kadan) was to defeat the Circassians (the Alans' western neighbors) and kill their ruler at the end of 1238.
At the turn of 1238-1239, an uprising of the Volga Bulgars and Mordovians began in the Volga region. Rashid-Ad-Din writes about the Bulgars:
There was a new invasion of the lands of North-Eastern Rus' (the environs of Nizhny Novgorod, Gorodets, Gorokhovets, Murom, and Ryazan for the second time were devastated).
Berke, sent to the west against the Polovtsians, captured three Polovtsian military leaders and on March 3, 1239, took Pereyaslavl-Yuzhny - the possession of the Vladimir princes, which during the trip of Daniil of Galitsky to Batu in 1245 was under the direct authority of the Golden Horde. Presumably, the Ryazan principality found itself in the same situation until 1252, until the only (see Ingvar Ingvarevich) survivor of the Ryazan princes during the invasion, Oleg Ingvarevich the Red, was released there, wounded and captured in December 1237.
Fourth stage (1239-1240)
In the fall of 1239, the Mongols launched an attack on the possessions of Mikhail Vsevolodovich of Chernigov and Kyiv. Chernigov was besieged by the Mongols on October 18, 1239 and taken using powerful siege technology. During the siege, an army led by Mstislav Glebovich, Mikhail’s cousin, came to the aid of the city, but was defeated. After the fall of Chernigov, the Mongols did not go north - archaeological research showed that Lyubech (in the north) was not touched, but lands and cities along the Desna and Seim, including Putivl, Glukhov, Vyr and Rylsk, were plundered and devastated. According to one version, the campaign against the Chernigov principality was led by Munke.
At the end of 1239, the troops of Guyuk, Munke, Buri, and Kadan launched an attack on the city of Minkas (M.k.s., Me-tse-sy). According to Rashid ad-Din, the siege of the city lasted one month and 15 days. According to Juvaini, the city was rich and populous, its surroundings were covered with swamps and dense forest, it was taken by the Genghisids together in a few days and became the extreme point of advance of the Mongol troops in Rus'. The Chinese “Yuan-shi” calls Me-tse-sy an Alan city and clarifies that the siege began in late November-early December 1239 and lasted 3 months.
The detachments of Shiban, Buchek and Buri (he is mentioned during the siege of Minkas) took Surozh in the Crimea on December 26, 1239.
Munke approached the Dnieper opposite Kyiv (R.P. Khrapachevsky, a supporter of the version of Munke’s siege of Minkas in the North Caucasus, dates this event in the winter of 6748 no earlier than February-March 1240 and calls it reconnaissance), sent an embassy to the city demanding surrender, but the embassy was destroyed by the people of Kiev. Mikhail Vsevolodovich (together with Mstislav Glebovich) went to Hungary, trying to marry the daughter of the Hungarian king Béla IV Anna to his son Rostislav (unsuccessfully), then to Poland to Konrad of Mazovia.
The head of the Mongol Empire was the son of the “heavenly warrior” Ogedei. For several years the Mongols were busy with wars in Korea and Northern China. In 1234, the North Chinese “Golden Empire” fell. Then the time came to deploy all the military power of the steppes to the West...
In 1235, the great Khan Ogedei convened a kurultai (congress) of the Mongol nobility, at which it was decided to start a new campaign. This enterprise was given special significance: it was about fulfilling the behests of Genghis Khan. First, it was necessary to move from the steppes beyond the Ural River to the Lower Volga region and the Polovtsian steppe, then to Volga Bulgaria and Rus'. In the distant future it was planned to conquer the “land of the Franks” - Western Europe.
Khan Batu
The command of the troops of the western campaign was entrusted to the grandson of Genghis Khan - Batu.
Mongolian name Batu (in Russian pronunciation - Batu) meant “strong”, “solid”, “indestructible”. Batu was a capable, successful commander. It was not for nothing that he was later called Sain Khan, i.e. Happy. He mercilessly and consistently walked towards his goal.
Mongol army
The campaign to the West required the joining of forces of all Mongol clans. Seven grandsons of Chinggis Khan gathered at the headquarters of the commander-in-chief, and each brought with them large military forces. In total, Batu had 100-150 thousand horsemen at his disposal. In addition, when storming cities, the Mongols drove forward countless crowds of prisoners who carried earth, logs and stones to overcome ditches and build embankments in front of the walls. Most of these prisoners died from the arrows of the fortress defenders. But their bodies created a hill, along which the Mongol warriors then climbed the city walls.
Conquest of Volga Bulgaria
In the fall of 1236, the Mongols attacked Volga Bulgaria. The Bulgars repelled the raids of the conquerors three times (in 1223, 1229 and 1232). However, the numerical superiority of the conquerors was too great. After a fierce battle, the capital of the country, the city of Bulgar, was captured and destroyed. In the spring and summer of 1237, Batu’s hordes completed the devastation of Bulgaria; they also marched across the steppes from the Caspian Sea to the Don, destroying the Polovtsy and other nomadic peoples there. Now they stood on the very threshold of Rus'...
The Russian princes, of course, knew about what was happening in the East. Prince Yuri Vsevolodovich of Vladimir settled thousands of refugees from Volga Bulgaria in his border fortresses. Fearing an alliance between the eastern and western enemies of Rus', he intercepted the ambassadors sent by the khan to the Hungarian king and detained Catholic monks sent by the Pope to Rus' for reconnaissance purposes.
Batya's invasion
Batu's campaign in Europe
Having passed through the Galicia-Volyn principality with fire and sword, Batu moved further to Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland. On April 11, 1241, at the Battle of Chaillot, the Mongols defeated the 60,000-strong army of the Hungarian king Bela IV. And two days earlier, another Mongol detachment operating in southwestern Poland destroyed the united Polish forces at the Battle of Legnica. Material from the site
The path to Western Europe was open. However, in the spring of 1242, Batu suddenly turned his troops back to the East. What made the grandson of Genghis Khan stop the campaign that threatened the existence of the entire European civilization? The answer is obvious. For all the many large and small reasons, the main obstacle that slowed down and stopped the advance of the Mongol army was the heroic resistance of the peoples of Eastern Europe, and in particular the Russian people. Having lost best warriors, Batu simply did not have the strength to move further to conquer populous and powerful countries.
This is exactly what was pointed out A. S. Pushkin: “Russia definitely had a high destiny... Its boundless
Why did the Tatar-Mongols, having conquered vast expanses of Eurasia (from China to Rus'), suddenly stop their campaign “to the last sea” and spare Western Europe? One of the most important mysteries of world history does not yet have a clear explanation. Recently, scientists, relying on chronicle sources and the “archives” of nature itself (tree rings), recreated the microclimate of Eastern Europe and pointed to the decisive role natural factors Mongol strategy. The cold and rainy spring of 1242, the swamping of the Middle Danube Plain, coupled with the plunder of the region, made it difficult to supply the army, and as a result, the Mongols chose not to risk it, returning to the southern Russian steppes. Historians reflected on the relationship between climate, politics and warfare in the 13th century in the pages of the journal Scientific Reports.
Gog and Magog attack
The task of conquering the Polovtsians and reaching Kyiv was set by Genghis Khan (in 1221), but the Mongols began to implement these plans only under his son Ogedei, after the kurultai (congress of khans) in 1235. An army under the command of Batu (Batu), the grandson of Genghis Khan and an experienced military leader Subedei, numbering about 70 thousand people, moved to the west. Details of the trip to the northeastern and southern Rus' are well known to everyone since school. After the burning of Kyiv, Batu captured the cities of southern and western Rus', as far as Galich and Przemysl, where he settled for the winter of 1240/1241.
The Mongols' next target was obvious - Hungary, located on the Middle Danubian Plain, the westernmost part of the great belt of Eurasian steppes. In addition, it was there, to King Bela IV, that the defeated Cumans, longtime enemies of the Tatar-Mongols, migrated. But the army was divided: the 30,000-strong army victoriously passed through Polish lands, defeating the Polish-German army in the Battle of Legnica (April 9). However, the Mongols did not move towards Germany, they turned south and through Moravia ended up in Hungary - where the main forces of the nomads had invaded even earlier.
Image: Nature
Batu's corps moved through the Veretsky Pass in the Carpathians, Kadan's corps - through Moldova and Transylvania, Buchek's detachment - along the southern route, through Wallachia. This formation was planned by Subedei - to force the Hungarians to fragment their forces and defeat them piece by piece. The main forces of Subedei moved more slowly, acting as a reserve. After taking many cities and complex maneuvers, on April 11 the Mongols completely defeated the Hungarian-Croatian army on the Shajo River and began the administrative restructuring of the conquered part of Hungary.
After resting for several months, in the winter of 1242, Batu's army crossed the frozen Danube and began to besiege cities, while Kadan's corps set out to ravage Croatia, where the Hungarian king had hidden. However, the Dalmatian fortress of Klis did not submit to the Mongols. In the spring of 1242, for a still unknown reason, Batu and Subedei turned back and returned to the southern Russian steppes through Bosnia, Serbia and Bulgaria.
The Riddle of Retreat
What made the Mongols stop their victorious invasion deep into Europe and even leave conquered Hungary, where they had already appointed baskaks (tribute collectors) and minted coins? Most often, Batu's retreat is explained by the sudden death of Khan Ogedei in December 1241 - Genghisid wanted to arrive at the kurultai in Mongolia as soon as possible to participate in the elections of the great khan. However, this hypothesis is contradicted by the fact that Batu never reached the kurultai, but remained on the territory of his ulus (the future Golden Horde).
There is an opinion that the Tatar-Mongols did not intend to conquer Europe, but only wanted to punish their Cuman enemies, who had already been defeated at the Kalka River. The Kipchaks were sheltered by the Hungarian king, who ignored the Mongols’ demands to hand them over. This version is supported by Batu’s purposeful hunt for Bela IV, for whose pursuit in the winter of 1242 an entire corps was allocated. However, this version does not explain why the Mongols began to include Hungary in their state and why they later abandoned this project.
Explanations of a military nature are more justified: the difficulty of capturing fortresses in the Transdanubian part of Hungary, large losses in manpower and the poverty of the Pannonian Plain, which was not able to feed the troops, forced the Mongols to turn back. However, none of this stopped the Avars and Hungarians three or four centuries ago.
Dirt, slush and crop failure
The authors of the new study rightly point out that all these explanations are too general. To understand the logic of Batu and Subedei, you need to at least have a clear understanding of the geography, climate and weather of 1240-1242 in the theater of war. Mongol military commanders followed the natural conditions(this is known from a letter from Khan Hulagu to the French king) - and scientists admit that rapid climatic changes influenced both the successful conquest of Hungary and the decision to leave it a year later.
Image: Széchenyi National Library, Budapest
So, in the spring and autumn of 1241, the Mongols quickly moved across the Hungarian lands, capturing one fortress after another. No one offered organized resistance to the invaders, and they freely robbed, killed and captured the local population. The summer was early (the chronicler mentions the heat during the Battle of the Chaillot River - April 11) and warm. The chronicle says that the Mongols did not burn grains in the fields, they took care fruit trees and they did not kill peasants harvesting crops. That is, they did not turn agricultural lands into pastures because their horses did not lack food.
But the cold and snowy winter of 1242 came early. First, she helped the Mongols: the Danube froze, the nomads crossed the river and began to besiege the fortresses of Bela IV (usually the Mongols did not start campaigns in winter). But luck ran out on them: due to an early thaw, they were unable to take Szekesfehervar. “The snow and ice melted, and the marshy area around the city became inaccessible,” writes a Hungarian chronicler. Because of the same impassable mud, Kadan's corps sent to Dalmatia was forced to retreat from the city of Trogir.
Soil scientists know that lowlands in Hungary flood very easily. If the winter is snowy and the spring is rainy, then the vast plains quickly turn into swamps. By the way, the Hungarian steppes “dried up” only in the 19th century, thanks to the drainage projects of the Habsburgs - before that, the spring floods of numerous rivers formed many kilometers of swamps. The swamp and mud negated the effectiveness of siege weapons and reduced the mobility of cavalry.
Image: Nature
A cold, rainy spring, the late appearance of grass and swamping of the plains sharply reduced the area of pastures - the Mongolian horses, already weakened by the heavy winter, did not have enough food. The Mongols realized that they could not expect a big harvest in 1242. And so it happened: in the fall, a terrible famine broke out in Hungary.
So the Mongols' decision to retreat seems quite reasonable. Weather conditions also influenced the choice of route to return to the southern Russian steppes - through Serbia and Bulgaria. Batu's army preferred the drier and higher mountainous areas along the foothills of the Carpathians to the swampy plains.
Is history driven by climate anomalies?
“In my opinion, it is rather reckless to explain the stop of the Mongol advance into Europe by a two-year weather anomaly. For decades, the Mongols waged wars of conquest in extremely unfavorable climatic conditions, their troops operated in areas poorly or completely unsuitable for cavalry operations (South China, Afghanistan, Burma, Kashmir), and even organized naval expeditions (the failed invasion of Java).
Historian Alexey Kupriyanov specially for Lenta.ru: It is worth noting that the Mongols won victories in these campaigns with the help of local allies and auxiliary units recruited from local natives, using the conquered territories as a base for further expeditions. During the invasion of Europe, the Mongols had no one to rely on: behind them lay the devastated southern Russian steppes and burned cities (one of the few exceptions was the Bolokhov land, the princes of which entered into an alliance with the Mongols in exchange for supplies of fodder), the army was exhausted by a long campaign, while while in front of them was Western Europe, densely populated with fortified cities and castles, with a warlike population. At the same time, a struggle for power began in the Mongol Empire, and under these conditions, Batu Khan, naturally, chose to return to the banks of the Volga and begin organizing his ulus. Therefore, from my point of view, it is too early to abandon the traditional theory in favor of the “climate” hypothesis.”
When recreating the “weather history” of the Western campaign, the authors of the article did not limit themselves to random facts from medieval chronicles. Tree-ring data from northern Scandinavia, the Central Eastern Alps, the Romanian Carpathians, and the Russian Altai helped determine summer temperatures in Europe for 1230–1250. Judging by the mountains closest to Hungary, in 1238-1241 the summer was long and hot - this, in particular, could attract the Mongols there. However, the years 1242-1244 are characterized by colder summers. Moreover, in 1242, abnormal amounts of rain fell in the Czech Republic, southern Poland, western Slovakia, northwestern Hungary and eastern Austria - and only there, in the conflict area.
Scientists emphasize that the influence of climate on history is not total and static, but random and dynamic. Thus, the fleeting anomaly of 1242 (cold spring plus a lot of precipitation) played a sufficiently serious role that the Mongols - who were always distinguished by the flexibility of their goals and objectives - decided not to go ahead, but to retreat, saving people and horses. Similarly, typhoons (“kamikaze”, divine wind) that twice scattered the Mongol fleet off the coast of Japan saved this country from conquest at the end of the 13th century.
One way or another, the Tatar-Mongols limited themselves in the West to the southern Russian steppes. Scientists are careful to note that it is not yet possible to definitively establish whether the nomads retreated due to political factors (the death of Ogedei) or having decided that the Hungarian lands, too vulnerable to weather fluctuations, were not suitable for them as a springboard (and rear base). It is worth more carefully studying the environment of the 13th century: for example, excavating fortresses besieged by the Mongols (and the dirt near their walls), understanding the state of the rivers and swamps of the Pannonian Plain - and other regions of Eurasia, which the Mongols walked through (including Rus').
First to the North
The first western campaign of the Mongols was carried out during the lifetime of Genghis Khan. It is crowned by the victory over the united Russian-Polovtsian army at the Battle of Kalka in 1223. But the subsequent defeat of the weakened Mongol army from the Volga Bulgaria postponed the expansion of the empire to the West for some time. In 1227, the Great Khan dies, but his work continues to live. From the Persian historian Rashid ad-Din we find the following words: “in pursuance of the decree given by Genghis Khan in the name of Jochi (eldest son), he entrusted the conquest of the Northern countries to members of his house.” Since 1234, the third son of Genghis Khan, Ogedei, has been carefully planning a new campaign, and in 1236 a huge army, some estimates reaching 150 thousand people, moves to the West. It is headed by Batu (Batu), but the real command is entrusted to one of the best Mongol commanders - Subedei. As soon as the rivers are frozen in ice, the Mongol cavalry begins its movement towards Russian cities. One after another, Ryazan, Suzdal, Rostov, Moscow, Yaroslavl capitulate. Kozelsk holds out longer than others, but it is also destined to fall under the onslaught of countless Asian hordes.
To Europe via Kyiv
Genghis Khan planned to take one of the richest and most beautiful cities of Rus' back in 1223. What the Great Khan failed, his sons succeeded. Kyiv was besieged in September 1240, but only in December did the city’s defenders falter. After the conquest Principality of Kyiv nothing could stop the Mongol army from invading Europe. The formal goal of the campaign in Europe was Hungary, and the task was the destruction of the Polovtsian Khan Kotyan, hiding there with his horde. According to the chronicler, Batu “for the thirtieth time” proposed to the Hungarian king Bela IV to expel the Polovtsians defeated by the Mongols from his lands, but each time the desperate monarch ignored this proposal. According to some modern historians, the pursuit of the Polovtsian khan pushed Batu and Subedey to the decision to conquer Europe, or at least some part of it. However, the medieval chronicler Yvon of Narbonne attributed much more extensive plans to the Mongols: “They imagine that they are leaving their homeland in order to bring to themselves the king-magi, whose relics Cologne is famous for; then to put a limit to the greed and pride of the Romans, who oppressed them in ancient times; then, to conquer only the barbarian and Hyperborean peoples; sometimes out of fear of the Teutons, in order to humble them; then to learn military science from the Gauls; then to seize fertile lands that can feed their multitudes; then because of the pilgrimage to St. James, the final destination of which is Galicia.”
"Devils from the Underworld"
The main attacks of the Horde troops in Europe fell on Poland and Hungary. During Palm Week in 1241, “devils from the underworld” (as Europeans called the Mongols) almost simultaneously found themselves at the walls of Krakow and Budapest. Interestingly, the tactics successfully tested in the Battle of Kalka helped the Mongols defeat strong European armies. The retreating Mongol troops gradually lured the attacking side deep into the rear, stretching it and dividing it into parts. As soon as the right moment came, the main Mongol forces destroyed the scattered detachments. An important role in the victories of the Horde was played by the “despicable bow,” so underestimated by European armies. Thus, the 100,000-strong Hungarian-Croatian army was almost completely destroyed, and the flower of the Polish-German chivalry was also partially exterminated. Now it seemed that nothing could save Europe from the Mongol conquest.
Dwindling strength
The Kiev thousand-man Dmitra, who was captured by Batu, warned the khan about crossing the Galician-Volyn lands: “don’t stay in this land for long, it’s time for you to go against the Ugrians. If you hesitate, the mighty land will gather against you and will not let you into their land.” Batu’s troops managed to cross the Carpathians almost painlessly, but the captive governor was right in another way. The Mongols, who were gradually losing their strength, had to act extremely quickly in lands so distant and alien to them. According to the Russian historian S. Smirnov, Rus' could field up to 600 thousand militias and professional warriors during Batu’s western campaign. But each of the principalities opposing the invasion fell, having decided to fight alone. The same applied to the European armies, which, many times superior in numbers to Batu’s troops, were unable to consolidate at the right time. But by the summer of 1241, Europe began to wake up. The King of Germany and Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II in his encyclical called to “open your spiritual and physical eyes” and “become a stronghold of Christianity against a fierce enemy.” However, the Germans themselves were in no hurry to confront the Mongols, since at that time Frederick II, who was in conflict with the papacy, led his army to Rome. Nevertheless, the appeal of the German king was heard. By the fall, the Mongols repeatedly tried to overcome the bridgehead on the southern bank of the Danube and transfer military operations to the territory of the Holy Roman Empire, but everything was unsuccessful. 8 miles from Vienna, meeting with a combined Czech-Austrian army, they were forced to retreat back.
Harsh lands
According to most domestic historians, the Mongol army fundamentally weakened its resources during the seizure of Russian lands: its ranks thinned by about a third, and therefore it was not ready for the conquest of Western Europe. But there were other factors as well. At the beginning of 1238, when trying to capture Veliky Novgorod, Batu’s troops were stopped on the approaches to the city not by a strong enemy, but by the spring thaw - the Mongol cavalry was thoroughly bogged down in swampy areas. But nature saved not only the merchant capital of Rus', but also many cities in Eastern Europe. Impenetrable forests, wide rivers and mountain ranges often put the Mongols in a difficult position, forcing them to make tedious, many-kilometer-long detour maneuvers. Where did the unprecedented speed of movement on the steppe impassability go? People and horses were seriously tired, and moreover, they were starving, not receiving enough food for a long time.
Death after death
Despite serious problems, with the onset of December frosts, the Mongol army was seriously planning to advance deeper into Europe. But the unexpected happened: on December 11, 1241, Khan Ogedei died, which opened a direct path to the Horde throne for Guyuk, Batu’s implacable enemy. The commander turned the main forces home. A struggle for power begins between Batu and Guyuk, ending with the death (or death) of the latter in 1248. Batu did not rule for long, having died in 1255, and Sartak and Ulagchi also quickly passed away (probably poisoned). In these troubled times, the new Khan Berke is more concerned about the stability of power and peace within the empire. The day before, Europe was overwhelmed by the “Black Death” - a plague that reached the Golden Horde along the caravan routes. The Mongols will not have time for Europe for a long time. Their later western campaigns will no longer have the same scope as they acquired under Batu.
Mongol army at the walls of Legnica
Europe at the beginning of the 13th century was in many ways simply unaware of the new threat approaching it from the East. Information, slowly arriving with caravans and travelers, spread slowly. Europe itself, mired in chronic, cruel feudal strife, had little interest in what was happening somewhere in distant lands - it would like to restore order in its own. The first data, very vague, about events in the distant steppes of Asia began to reach the courts of monarchs in the 20s. XIII century, when the armies of Jebe and Subedei invaded Polovtsian steppes. Having reached the borders of Rus', suffering from princely strife, the troops of the Mongol Empire in 1223 defeated Russian troops at the Kalka River and, having taken large booty, migrated back to Central Asia.
The first of the European powers that be to worry was the Hungarian king Bela IV. He sent the Dominican monk Julian with several representatives of other monastic orders on a reconnaissance mission to the Volga region to understand the situation on the ground. For three years from 1235 to 1238, Julian collected information, with which he successfully returned. The scout monk's stories about the hordes of steppe cavalry were so impressive and eloquent that they chose not to believe them. While in Europe they lazily brushed aside Julian’s warning speeches, in the East it again became, to put it mildly, alarming. Batu’s huge army invaded Rus', and strange embassies began to appear at the courts of the rulers. Delegates dressed in strange clothes with slanted eyes and faces weathered by the steppe winds presented certificates to local authorities. From these messages it followed that a certain person calling himself the Great Khan demanded obedience and submission from kings and other rulers. Somewhere they were surprised at such impudence, somewhere they laughed - in other places they even treated the ambassadors discourteously, violating diplomatic etiquette, for the Mongols accused the same Belo IV of the fact that several embassies did not return from Hungary.
But after the ambassadors, refugees came from the east - and they began to be surprised less often, and stopped laughing altogether. In 1239, the Polovtsian Khan Kotyan turned to the Hungarian king with a request outlined in a letter. Its essence boiled down to Bela accepting on his territory the Polovtsians fleeing the invasion, in exchange for their acceptance of Catholicism. Before this, the Polovtsians professed a certain mixture of Orthodoxy and the worship of the Turkic deity Tengri. In the fall of 1239, Bela IV met Kotyan with almost 40 thousand fellow tribesmen on the border of his state and gave them permission to settle in Hungary. However, the local feudal nobility was afraid of too much strengthening of royal power (before the absolutist “state is me” there were still more than four centuries) and conspired. On the eve of the Mongol invasion of Europe in 1241, Kotyan, who converted to Catholicism, and members of his family were treacherously killed in Pest. The Polovtsians renounced Catholicism and migrated to the Balkans.
The union with the Hungarian kingdom of the Russian principalities did not take place either. This union was persistently sought by the Galician-Volyn prince Daniil Romanovich and the Chernigov prince Mikhail Vsevolodovich. King Bela IV, under a variety of pretexts, avoided any agreements. Other European states also showed no interest in joint preventive curbing of the aggressor. The German Emperor Frederick II Staufen, an exquisite connoisseur of languages and strategic intrigues, publicly laughed off Mongol messages demanding submission - he modestly asked the Great Khan to appoint him court falconer. In fact, according to some accounts, he entered into a secret correspondence with the Khan, intending to use this power in the increasingly widening conflict with the Pope. Pontiff Gregory IX himself was obviously well aware of the threat from the East, for the Catholic Church at that time had, perhaps, the best agents in Europe. The Pope had his own views on the Mongolian military machine, hoping to use it in an anti-Arab direction as an instrument of indirect action in Middle Eastern politics. In the north, he had an impressive military force Livonian Order was preparing for an armed version of preaching Catholicism in the Baltic states and northeast Rus' and, focusing on realizing his ambitions, showed no interest in confronting any Mongols. Neglect of the impending danger, which could not in its significance outweigh the traditional small-town feudal squabbles, cost the Europeans dearly.
East vs West
Heavily armed Mongol warrior and his equipment
The military power of the Mongols was to some extent weakened by the stubborn resistance of the Russian principalities, but it represented a significant force. At Mongol khans there were a sufficient number of scientists and geographers, so that the command of the nomads was aware of the lands lying to the west of Rus', to a much greater extent than the Europeans knew about the newcomers from the east. Since the main blow was delivered to Hungary, it can be assumed that Batu planned to use the Hungarian valley as an operational and feeding base in the center of Europe. Presumably, the general concept and plan for the raid on Eastern Europe was developed by Subedei, one of the best commanders of the Mongol Empire. It envisaged an invasion of Hungary from several directions in order to force the enemy to fragment its forces, thereby reducing the level of resistance.
Three tumens (the main Mongolian tactical unit of 10 thousand soldiers) remained as an occupation contingent on the territory of Rus'. Two tumens under the command of Genghis Khan’s grandsons Baydar and Kadan were supposed to carry out a reconnaissance and sabotage raid in the north-west direction towards Poland. It was only supposed to test the Poles' strength, find out how capable the local troops were of defense, and then turn south to the main forces. Batu's younger brother Shiban, with one tumen, had to sneak along the northern edge of the Carpathian Mountains and enter Hungary from the north. Batu himself, with an army consisting of no less than four tumens, struck through Transylvania, diverting attention to himself, and the author of the plan, Subedei, moving along the banks of the Danube, with the main forces was preparing to invade the kingdom from the south. Some researchers believe that the onslaught on Europe was concentrated on Hungary, since Batu allegedly intended to limit himself to it only. Another version is that the defeat of Bela IV was only a stage on the path of further expansion. If the Christian army tried to march towards Batu or Subedei, it would in any case expose its rear to attack. The operation was well thought out.
The problem for the Europeans was also that practically no one knew anything about the methods and methods of warfare used by the Mongols. Of course, the term “Mongols” is clearly a collective one, since the army that appeared at the walls of Europe at the beginning of 1241 was a real international cocktail, including representatives of a wide variety of peoples and nationalities. The avalanche, bursting out of the endless steppes of Mongolia, like a sponge, absorbed entire layers of different cultures. Along with them, knowledge and skills were acquired. Those that turned out to be useful were reworked and put into practice by the conquerors. European chivalry will have to face a completely unknown enemy, experienced, skilled, skillful and courageous. This was not a shapeless, hooting crowd of savages scattering when faced with a serious obstacle. A well-organized, trained and, most importantly, experienced army was approaching Eastern Europe. She was bound by iron discipline, abundantly shed blood and the ruthless will of the khans. Countless victories with rare defeats contributed to the proper level of morale.
The bulk of the Mongol army consisted of cavalry - light and heavy. There were also elite units from the immediate guard of the commander, keshikten, a kind of guard. The main thing of the Mongol warrior was a composite bow made of yak horns and wood, 130–150 cm long. The weapon had great power and range: arrows 90–95 cm long could hit targets at a distance of about 300 meters, and at a closer distance they could pierce armor. Each warrior carried with him several bows and quivers for them - the entire shooting set was called saadak. Heavy cavalry with warriors in armor, armed with swords, maces and shields, entered the battle at the decisive moment, when the light cavalry had already exhausted the enemy, bringing him to the appropriate condition. The army personnel were divided according to the decimal system: ten, hundred, thousand and the largest tactical unit - tumen, consisting of ten thousand. The army was staffed at the rate of one warrior per ten people. This rule initially applied to the original Mongol lands, and then, as we progress, to some of the conquered ones. The recruit came to duty with his weapons and several horses. The Mongols were famous for their skill in waging sieges and had a sufficient amount of equipment used in storming fortresses and cities.
Onslaught
At the very beginning of 1241, the Mongol army invaded Poland according to the original plan. In January they broke through to the Vistula, where Lublin and Zawichost were captured and plundered. An attempt by a hastily assembled local militia and knighthood to resist ended in defeat on February 13 near Tursk. It was here that the Europeans first experienced the unprecedented tactics of the Mongols. The initial onslaught of the Poles was strong, and the light cavalry of the supposedly disorganized and savage enemy began to retreat in complete disorder. Carried away by the chase, the pursuers, without noticing it themselves, turned into game surrounded on all sides and were killed. On March 10, Baydar crossed the Vistula at Sandomierz, after which, separating from his forces a detachment led by Kadan, he sent it to devastate the region, and he himself set out for Krakow. The natural desire of the Poles to cover the Krakow direction led to a new, larger-scale battle on March 18 near Chmielnik. This time Baidar was opposed by the Krakow voivode Wladimir Klemens and the Sandomierz contingent under the command of Pakoslav. The Polish troops were demoralized even before the battle began by the virtual desertion of the Krakow prince Boleslaw the Shy along with his mother, the Russian princess Gremislava Ingvarovna, and family. The prudent prince went to Hungary out of harm's way.
And again the Mongols showed themselves to be the most skilled warriors. Since Polish troops were concentrating in Krakow, it was decided to lure them out of there. A mobile group of light cavalry burst into the outskirts and carried out looting and destruction. The enraged Poles, seeing that there were few enemies, could not resist the temptation to give chase. The Mongolian detachment allowed itself to be chased for several tens of kilometers, skillfully not breaking the distance. After which the pursuers were surrounded by horse archers and exterminated. Many Lesser Poland knights and both governors died. The remnants of the army scattered, some of them ran to the city, causing disorganizing confusion. Panic began to spread throughout the area. Krakow, left without defenders and almost without inhabitants, was captured on March 22 and was already subject to thorough devastation.
Having finished with Krakow, Baydar moved on - the Oder was waiting ahead of him, which still had to be crossed - the bridges and crossings were destroyed in advance. The construction and search for boats, rafts and other watercraft somewhat delayed the Mongol army. By the time the Mongol vanguard appeared near Wroclaw, its inhabitants had already prepared for defense. The city itself was abandoned and partially burned, and the inhabitants, along with the garrison, took refuge in a well-fortified fortress. Provisions were also concentrated there in case of a siege. The attempt to capture Wroclaw on the move failed - the defenders repulsed the enemy's onslaught with heavy losses. Having failed in the rapid attack, the Mongols retreated to Baydar's main forces to regroup. By this time, the sabotage campaign of this northern group had already attracted too much attention. Local authorities, who quite recently listened with obvious skepticism to stories about hordes of nomads sweeping away everything in their path and perceived them as stories about the mythical kingdom of John the Prester, are now faced with this disaster face to face. The enemy was no longer somewhere in the distance—he was ravaging the country. And the reaction, although belated, followed.
Battle of Legnica
Jan Matejko. Henry the Pious
Prince Henry the Pious, recognizing the threat as very significant, began to assemble a large army. Troops were moving towards him from different places. The brother of the deceased Krakow governor Sulislaw arrived with a detachment from the southern part of Poland. The contingent from Upper Silesia was commanded by Mieszko. Henry himself stood at the head of the Lower Silesian troops. The foreign formations in the combined army were under the command of Boleslav, son of the Moravian Margrave Diepold. By the way, members of the Templar Order were included there. In any case, Grand Master Ponce d'Aubon, in a letter to the French King Louis IX, reported that in the battle of Legnica the order lost about 500 people, including 6 knights. There was also a small detachment of knights of the Teutonic Order. The fact is that the father of Henry the Pious, Henry I the Bearded, transferred a certain plot of land under the control of this order in exchange for help. Prince Henry turned to his neighbor, the Czech king Wenceslas I, for help, and he promised to send an army. Henry decided to try his luck in a field battle - his army, mostly infantry, included a large number of experienced warriors. A big bet was traditionally placed on the strike of heavy knightly cavalry - in European customs of warfare this was one of the main axioms of victory. The difficulty of the situation was that it was not Europeans who fought against Henry. He led his army to Legnica, a city in Silesia, where Wenceslas I was moving, who decided to personally lead the army.
Baydar was only one day's march from the city. Having learned about Henry's approach and having received information from well-placed intelligence about the threat of his unification with the Czechs, the Mongol commander advanced to meet the enemy with the goal of forcing a battle on him and preventing the merger of the two armies. He notified Batu and Kadan, who continued to wreak havoc in Mazovia, about his decision by letters.
Knight of the Teutonic Order
Powers warring parties generally comparable in quantity, but different in composition. According to some reports, Baydar had 1 thousand skirmishers to harass and lure the enemy, 11 thousand horse archers and 8 thousand heavy cavalry. In total, his army is estimated at almost 20 thousand people. Henry and his allies could oppose this with 8 thousand heavy cavalry, 3 thousand light cavalry, 14 thousand infantry. Apparently, the Europeans planned to repel enemy attacks with their light cavalry, bleed him dry, and then deal a crushing blow with heavy knightly cavalry.
The opponents met on April 9, 1241 near Legnica. Baydar positioned his skirmishers from the “luring group” in the center, with horse archers on the flanks. The heavy cavalry was stationed at some distance in the rear. Henry placed his light cavalry in front, followed by heavily armed horsemen in a second echelon. The infantry formed the third line. The battle began with an exchange of ridicule and insults, which was soon supplemented by mutual archery fire. The allies began to suffer more, so their light cavalry rushed at the already quite annoying skirmishers. However, successful at first, the attack began to spread out - the enemy on his short horses rode off to some distance and again continued shelling, all the time keeping a distance from the allies. Then Henry ordered the heavy cavalry to join the battle, which was immediately carried out.
The emboldened vanguard, having regrouped, resumed the onslaught, and the Mongols, seeing the situation changing, began to rapidly retreat, spreading along the flank directions. The allies began pursuing the enemy, who seemed to be running away as fast as he could. And then the Mongols used one of their many non-standard techniques for Europeans: they created a smoke screen from pre-prepared bundles of wood, grass and brushwood. Plumes of smoke began to cover the retreating skirmishers, and the entire Allied cavalry armada rushed straight through the clouds of smoke, unable to see anything around them.
Scheme of the Battle of Legnica
At this time, the horse archers on the flanks began to surround the enemy cavalry, generously showering them with arrows. When the inertia of the attacking knights was extinguished, they, exhausted by the shelling and poorly oriented in the situation, were attacked by completely fresh Mongolian heavy cavalry, which had been in reserve until then. Unable to withstand the onslaught, one of the Polish detachments tried to escape, but only weakened the formation.
The attack of the Mongols recently put the still frantically advancing Europeans to flight. The infantry, unable to see anything because of the clouds of smoke and essentially playing the role of extras, did not even suspect the ever-growing defeat. Finally, from behind the smoke, the fleeing knights and the Mongols tirelessly chasing them appeared. This turned out to be a complete surprise - the fleeing horsemen crashed into the dense ranks of their infantry, and a fight began, which quickly gave rise to panic. The formation crumbled, and the Allied army fled, no longer representing an organized force. The real massacre began - the Mongols did not really need prisoners. The defeat was complete. The initiator of the campaign, Henry the Pious, died in battle. Vaclav, who was literally a day late to the battle site, upon learning of the defeat of his ally, chose to urgently retreat. Baydar's warriors cut off the ears of the dead and put them in large bags, of which there were nine. The body of Prince Henry was beheaded, and his head was impaled on a pike. With all these attributes of intimidation, the Mongols approached Legnica, demanding to surrender the city, but the residents, rightly deciding that it was better not to count on the mercy of such visitors, put up serious resistance and repelled several attacks. Having ravaged the surrounding area, the steppe inhabitants left.
Hungary. Battle of Chaillot
The information obtained by the monk Julian, of course, caused some skepticism, but the Hungarian king took certain measures to increase the country's defense capability. Some fortresses were reconstructed, and stocks of weapons were accumulated. When the Polovtsian Khan Kotyan came to emigrate along with his fellow tribesmen - and not at all because of a passion for travel, but because he was expelled from his native nomads by the Mongols - Hungary became seriously alarmed. The situation was complicated by the numerous and ambitious feudal nobility, who constantly intrigued against the royal power and stubbornly did not want to strengthen the center, which resulted in the treacherous murder of Kotyan.
The court received the first information about the appearance of the Mongols on the eastern outskirts in January. King Bela IV, who was then in Pest, instructed Palatine (the highest official in Hungary after the king until 1853) Dionysius to set up outposts in the Carpathians. On March 10, 1241, news arrived of a large-scale invasion of a large Mongol army through the so-called “Russian Gate” (Veretsky Pass). It was Batu with a whole staff of experienced military leaders - his army numbered tens of thousands of people. The conflict with the nobility, who dreamed that the royal army would not exceed the number of palace guards, did not allow reinforcements to be moved to the border in time. On March 12, Dionysius' limited forces were scattered, and the highly mobile enemy began to spread across the country in a stream. Already on March 15, Batu's vanguard, under the command of his younger brother Shiban, reached the Pest region, where the king was frantically gathering an army.
Batu approached and set up camp about 20 km from the main forces of the Hungarians. The nomads constantly kept the enemy in suspense with their presence, and in the meantime the flying detachments ravaged the surrounding area, collecting rich booty, provisions and forage. On March 15, they captured the city of Vac, a little later Eger. Meanwhile, Bela’s forces increased - significant reinforcements approached him in the form of the army of the Croatian Duke Koloman, and now their total number reached, according to various estimates, at least 60 thousand people. Opinions on what to do next have been controversial. Part of the leadership, led by Koloch Archbishop Ugolin, demanded the most active actions. The zeal of the humble church minister was so great that he personally, without the approval of the king, made a sabotage attack on the Mongol camp with a couple of thousand soldiers. There the bishop, of course, was ambushed and returned with only a few men. He got away with this initiative, since not everything was going smoothly at the headquarters of the Christian army: Bela’s vassal, the Austrian Duke Friedrich Babenberg, had a fight with his overlord and left for his homeland. Realizing that further inaction only weakens the army, and being confident in his superiority - now the king had 60 thousand against Batu's 30 thousand - in early April Bela ordered the united army to move out from Pest. Not wanting to accept a battle on unfavorable terms, the Mongols retreated. Overloaded with a convoy and a large proportion of infantry, the Hungarian-Croatian army slowly trudged along. A few days later, the main forces under the command of Subedei approached Batu - the Mongols had excellent communication through the messenger system, which made it possible to quickly assemble a strike fist at the right time in the right place.
After a week of pursuit, Bela camped near the Chaillot River. The camp was surrounded by a palisade and wagons. There was a bridge on the left flank of the position. For some reason, the king decided that the enemy would not be able to cross the river, and left him with only one thousand soldiers to cover him. Batu decided to surround the enemy and destroy him. He separated Subedei's corps, which was ordered to secretly cross the river to the south at night and bypass the enemy camp. The khan himself spent the entire day of April 9 in activities disturbing the allies. On the one hand, he did not allow them to rest and kept them in suspense, on the other, the enemy saw that there were significantly fewer Mongols and became cheerful, lowering their vigilance. April 10 passed in preparation for the operation.
Scheme of the Battle of the Chaillot River
On the night of April 10-11, Subedei secretly crossed Chaillot according to plan and actually entered the allied army's flank and rear. In the morning, making extensive use of stone-throwing guns, Batu successfully knocked down the barrier from the bridge and captured it. Soon the Mongol cavalry poured through it to the other side. The news of the enemy's appearance took the Hungarians and Croats by surprise. While the alarm was sounded, the steppe inhabitants took up convenient positions on the heights, showering those in the camp with a shower of arrows. Soon stone throwers were also brought there. By two o'clock in the afternoon, according to a contemporary of the events, the historian Archdeacon Thomas of Split, the camp was tightly blocked by the Mongols, who massively used lighted arrows. Resistance began to weaken, and panic began to seize the army. The flight of individual feudal lords and detachments began, which soon developed into complete chaos. Batu wisely did not completely surround the enemy, leaving him a small loophole - otherwise the allies could start fighting to the death, and then his army would have suffered completely unnecessary losses.
The Mongols were masters not only of tactical retreat, but also knew how to competently and persistently pursue the enemy. The crowd, just a few hours ago former army, having lost everything - from fighting spirit to banners and convoys - was now driven towards Pest, from where it had recently set out. On the shoulders of the fleeing Mongols burst into Pest. The city was plundered and burned. The defeat was complete. The losses of the Hungarians and Croats are estimated at more than 50 thousand people. The kingdom lost not only its army, but also its king. Béla IV found no other way out than to flee to his vassal, the Austrian Duke Friedrich Babenberg. The demoralized king gave him almost the entire treasury (10 thousand marks) and three counties for his help in the fight against the invasion and, probably, for providing refuge. The seriously wounded Duke Coloman with the remnants of his detachment retreated to Croatia.
Unfinished hike
The Mongol troops, encountering almost no resistance, continued to devastate the country unhindered. The greatest advance of the Mongols to the west was recorded in the spring of 1242, when the tumen of Kadana, capturing cities and fortresses along the way, reached the Adriatic. Batu himself, with Baydar who approached him from Poland, set about ruining the Czech Republic. And then the steppe inhabitants took and plundered many cities. Bela IV, who found himself in forced emigration, tried to raise awareness due to the extremely disastrous situation of his state, and indeed of the whole of Eastern Europe. He sent letters asking for help to two of the most powerful figures of the time: German Emperor Frederick Staufen and Pope Gregory IX. Naturally, absorbed in sorting out the relationship among themselves, these politicians had nothing to do with the lamentations of the Hungarian king. The Emperor sympathetically responded that the Mongols were very bad, and the Pope referred to concerns, limiting himself to words of support and consolation. The hospitality of the Austrians soon also dried up, and Bela was forced to flee to Dalmatia. It is unknown how events would have happened further if, at the end of 1241, Batu had not received an emergency message about the death of the Great Khan Ogedei. Now the highest Mongolian nobility had to gather for a kurultai in order to elect a new ruler of the colossal empire. The activity of the Mongols in Europe is gradually decreasing. Despite the activities of individual, even large, detachments, a gradual retreat to the East begins. There are several versions of the termination of the campaign to the West, and one of them is that the death of Ogedei was only a reason for the retreat of the battle-weary and big losses suffered in the fight against the Russian principalities and in Eastern Europe, army. Perhaps there were plans to repeat such a campaign in the future, but in light of the increasingly widespread Mongol Empire After civil strife, this plan was not realized.
King Bela IV, soon after the departure of the aggressors, safely returned to the performance of his state duties and did a lot to strengthen royal power. Already in 1242, he marched with an army against the Duke of Austria, forcing him to give up the counties that were actually taken from the Hungarians. Batu, or Batu Khan, settled in the capital of his ulus, Sarai-Batu, actively participating in political life Mongolian state. He made no further military campaigns in the West and died in 1255 or 1256. Europe, frozen in a fit of horror before the hordes of fast-moving steppe nomads, after their departure took a breath and took up the usual routine feudal squabbles. The vast lands of Rus' stretching to the east faced difficult times full of tragedy, the blood-covered grass of the Kulikovo field and the frozen banks of the Ugra River.
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