Khrushchev's reforms and his political activities. Khrushchev's reforms and their consequences

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Already in the fall of 1953, a program for reforming the national economy was developed, aimed at increasing the production of consumer goods and changing relations with the peasantry. In this regard, it was planned to increase financing for agriculture, reduce taxes, significantly increase wholesale procurement prices, and remove restrictions on personal subsidiary plots.

In 1954, the development of virgin and fallow lands began: 42 million hectares of arable land were put into circulation, where by the end of the 50s up to 40% of all grains were grown, which made it possible to delay the grain crisis, but led to irreversible environmental processes and a lag in grain production. production in other agricultural regions of the country.

At the end of the 50s they continued major economic reforms. So, in May 1957 it was sectoral management of the national economy was liquidated(ministries), and organized territorial- through the National Economy Councils (economic councils). The goals of this reform were the decentralization of management, control over the activities of economic bodies from below, and increasing the independence of production subjects, which ensured its success at the initial stage.

Urgent measures were also taken to boost agriculture: purchase prices for collective and state farm products were increased many times over, funding for the agricultural sector was strengthened, and its material and technical base and human resources were strengthened.

However, in general, the transformations in the national economy did not produce the effect that the reformers had hoped for, since they did not introduce effective economic levers: complete economic independence of enterprises, the interest of producers, and the forms of property management did not change at all. In turn, large-scale restructuring of the management of the national economy, undertaken without preliminary checks and experiments, over time began to negatively affect the efficiency of the economy.

In the mid 50's - early 60's. the development of mechanical engineering and chemical industry, oil and gas production, electric power. It was at this time that the beginning dates back to scientific and technological revolution in USSR. Space exploration, aircraft construction, chemicalization of the national economy, development of electronics, nuclear energy, production of computer equipment, many other important scientific and technical areas were supported by large government programs, thereby laying the foundation for achieving military-strategic parity with the United States in the future.

At the same time, the growth of light and Food Industry, agriculture was insignificant. It was here that the impulsiveness, ill-conceived and even adventurousness of N.S.’s initiatives were especially clearly manifested. Khrushchev. The positive content of measures aimed at boosting agriculture was undermined by such actions as the destruction of the existing structure of sown areas, the limitation of collective farms' private farms, the liquidation of MTS and the transfer of equipment into the ownership of collective farms, etc., as well as the implementation of administrative campaigns that brought few positive results (“corn fever”, “catch up and overtake America” in the production of meat and milk, etc.) The incentives for intensive work among the peasants had already been undermined and, although the standard of living of collective farmers increased significantly, they were not and did not become masters of the land and the results of your work. IN agriculture production rates dropped sharply: in 1953 - 1958. on average per year they amounted to 7.6%, in 1959 - 1964. - only 1.5%. All this together led to the agrarian crisis of the late 50s and early 60s.

The crisis of Khrushchev's reforms. Late 50's - early 60's. became the milestone when the task of building an industrial society was solved in the USSR. This was peculiarly reflected in the documents of that time. So, the XXI Congress of the CPSU (1959) concluded that socialism in the USSR “won a complete and final victory,” and at the XXII Congress (1961) a program for building communism was adopted in a foreseeably short time (by the beginning of the 80s).

The construction of an industrial society in the USSR objectively required the replacement of both the previous economic mechanism and the outdated political system, a radical renewal of social relations for a new round of social progress. Did Khrushchev understand this, was he ready to implement reforms? In any case, the possibility of a final breakdown of the system raised concerns among the party nomenklatura. In addition, Khrushchev’s authority in society began to decline, and it was in 1962-1963. an ideological campaign is unfolding to praise him immoderately. In April 1964, his 70th birthday was magnificently celebrated with the awarding of the next title of Hero of the Soviet Union, and already in October of the same year, the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee relieved Khrushchev of his duties as First Secretary and member of the Presidium. L.I. was elected first secretary. Brezhnev.

In form, the preparation of the Plenum had the character of a political conspiracy, reflecting the transitional state political regime from the authoritarianism of Stalin to the authoritarianism of the “new type”. The success of Khrushchev’s opponents was greatly facilitated by society’s fatigue from the numerous innovations of this politician. The insufficient depth of reforms and the weakness of democratization of society and the economy became the basis for the curtailment of reforms that soon followed.

The period of stay of N.S. Khrushchev's rule in power is characterized by reforms in various spheres of society. The transformations he initiated did not always bring exclusively positive results; his actions were often regarded with disapproval.

Fundamental changes in the national economic management system made during the reign of N. Khrushchev:

Features of the socio-economic policy of the USSR during the leadership of the country by N.S. Khrushchev and L.I. Brezhnev

Conclusions on Khrushchev's reforms

Despite the fact that the period of N.S. Khrushchev in power is called a thaw; assessments of his political actions are increasingly becoming negative. Many historians note that Khrushchev’s economic and social reforms were not brought to their logical conclusion, and his methods of debunking the cult of Stalin undermined the authority of the party. Moreover, some administrative actions carried out by Khrushchev were considered completely illogical, causing indignation among other representatives of the ruling party. Khrushchev's monetary reform was also negatively assessed, which almost led to a default. At the same time, the party leader managed to achieve even greater industrial advancement of the USSR. It was during this period that heavy industry strengthened and active rocket science began. Despite the confusion in domestic policy, Khrushchev is working to strengthen the country's global image. Khrushchev's removal from office occurred in 1964 and became logical, because the reforms Secretary General raised too many questions. Khrushchev's place was taken by L.I. Brezhnev, and soon the thaw gave way to stagnation.

but marked the end of that terrible era in which the country lived under Stalin.

The reforms were greeted with enthusiasm by the inhabitants of the USSR, the population of “friendly countries”, and even the states of the opposite camp - after all Soviet Union demonstrated a transition to a policy of peaceful coexistence.

And this despite the fact that Khrushchev’s reforms were largely inconsistent, liberalization triumphed only partially.

Housing for workers, land for the state

As it is customary to call the complex of reforms and the era of the new leader itself, it took place under the slogan of a return to certain communist origins, in relation to which Stalin committed a significant betrayal.

The government again began to build communism, abandoning the formal Stalinist autocracy with obvious capitalist elements. And these reforms had both positive and negative effects.

• Massive construction of housing for workers began. Cities and urban-type settlements were decorated with complexes of slender five-story buildings, each of which contained a large number of apartments - small, artless, completely identical. Pomposity, artistry and individuality were now outlawed, but the people at that moment did not pay attention to this: owning an apartment was the cherished dream of tens of millions of Soviet citizens, and now it has come true.
• Persecution of peasants' personal subsidiary plots began. They decided to take the land so that people would work better on the collective farm and not waste time on their land, and taxes would increase again. It was proposed to rent or sell livestock at a minimum price to collective and state farms. As a result, by the mid-60s, most rural population degraded to a low level - lower than in the early 1950s. Young people left for the cities or virgin lands. Meat, milk and bread began to disappear from the shelves, there was a shortage of food and the threat of introducing cards loomed. For the first time we bought grain from abroad.
• The regional committees were divided into industrial and agricultural. This administrative reform led, however, to a massive deterioration in harvests.
• The “corn campaign” began, with the goal of introducing this crop, then still outlandish, to the fields of the Soviet Union. The people fell in love with corn and later began to grow it on a large scale, but at that time the results were largely unsuccessful: out of 37 million hectares sown with corn, only 7 million ripened.
• Development of virgin lands. About 300 thousand volunteers went to conquer and cultivate virgin lands (Kazakhstan, Siberia). A large harvest was harvested only once - in 1956. The sun burned the crops, sandstorms blew away the fertile layer, the idea failed.
• Schools were reorganized, resulting in universal labor school became a polytechnic. The reform turned out to be a failure and was canceled with the departure of Khrushchev.

Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev is the Soviet leader who in the mass consciousness is associated with the “thaw” and the “Khrushchevs.” However, not everyone knows that social and political reforms this Soviet leader, in fact, planted a “bomb” under the entire Soviet system and statehood.
The inability of our state and society to cope with the coup d'etat of 1991, Gorbachev's mistakes during the “rebuilt reforms” and the extremely weak capacity of the late Soviet government in principle are the legacy of Nikita Khrushchev.

Even the fact that rather quickly, ten years after coming to power, Khrushchev was overthrown by the method of a “quiet coup” did not help the USSR recover from the “reforms”. They laid such profound changes in society and the system of power.

Khrushchev's team

Having come to power in 1954, Nikita Khrushchev began to form his “team” in a very unique way. No, personnel renewal was necessary from a political point of view. Many in the then nomenklatura had a very negative attitude towards the new Secretary General.

But when selecting “new and loyal personnel,” Nikita Sergeevich, first of all, looked at loyalty, often ignoring such a criterion as professionalism.

This system was once very accurately characterized by the Soviet economist Dmitry Shepilov: “Why was Minister X replaced by Y? Why was such a completely unsuitable person as Z put in this important post?” - followed the answers: “Nikita Sergeevich worked with Igrek in Ukraine... zeta Nikita Sergeevich knows from working together in the MK party."

These relationships and the emphasis on loyalty immediately became characteristic feature the entire political system down to the lowest party and political levels. Moreover, official reforms followed, which essentially neutralized the concept of “political professionalism.”

School reform

We are talking, for example, about the so-called school reform and the law of December 24, 1958 “On strengthening the connection between school and life and on the further development of the public education system in the USSR.”

This law assumed an emphasis on labor education, and after school, graduates were required to work in production for two years and only then could continue their studies. The only problem was that the salary of even an unskilled worker was higher than a student scholarship.

Therefore, the newly minted workers were not eager to continue their education. True, it was from these personnel that, as a result of another reform, the political elites of the Khrushchev period began to form.

Record-breaking milkmaids

On the initiative of Nikita Sergeevich, now the main contenders for social elevators have become people from working-class youth. Roughly speaking, a record-breaking milkmaid who exceeded the milk production norm could easily become the deputy chairman of a collective farm and advance along the party line. And there were millions of such milkmaids, tractor drivers, miners and other young workers in the Land of the Soviets. In general, there was someone to replace the “outdated” party elite, which, in the words of Khrushchev himself, “stayed late at the fair.”

To increase their political knowledge, they, this new elite, were offered party courses, but not systematic education. And these same “milkmaids” eventually came to power in the USSR. Yes, they were practitioners, but these people had minimal theoretical knowledge and knowledge about politics.

From combine operators to politicians

The most famous and sad example of such career growth was Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev, who was an excellent combine operator and fell under Khrushchev’s personnel and social reforms. And who would argue that he did an excellent job with the combine.

And since it worked out perfectly, both party and career growth began. Just not in his specialty, namely in the political sphere, which ultimately brought Mikhail Sergeevich to power in the USSR, in the country about political structure which he understood very little. Therefore, things somehow didn’t work out for him with her.

Uneducated elites

During the same period, a unique system of “moral priorities” arose in the USSR. Now those same “working, working youth” had an extremely negative attitude towards educated specialists and professionals. Because they were just “theorists,” while the new “elites” became pure practitioners of socialism and communism. They literally built it with their own hands. This, however, had nothing to do with political literacy. However, Nikita Sergeevich was interested in this to a minimal extent.

In fact, it was under Khrushchev that a mechanism was formed for promoting the most arrogant, assertive, but loyal and uneducated to power, which in historiography is usually called “negative selection.”

After Khrushchev's removal from power, the new Secretary General, Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, faced an acute personnel problem. There were a minority of political professionals, truly educated specialists. In addition, Khrushchev's favoritism continued to prevail in Soviet system. And therefore, these very rare specialists formed the Brezhnev gerontocracy, and then the “stagnation”. There simply wasn’t an adequate replacement, and I didn’t really want to let her into power.

But in the end, these same “Khrushchev cadres” got involved in their revenge after the death of Brezhnev, and then Andropov and Chernenko. And we all remember very well how this revenge ended. It was a monumental collapse of the greatest country.

It is worth noting that it was Khrushchev’s generation of “promising cadres” who caused this collapse. After all, both Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin are people who were fully formed in the USSR. They were born, raised, trained and raised only according to Soviet patterns.

Even Brezhnev had three gymnasium classes in Tsarist Russia. And, it must be said, he did not destroy the Soviet Union. It was completely destroyed by Soviet people. And first of all, we can say “thank you” to Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev for this.

1. Introduction

2. Change of political course

3. Changes in the field of agriculture.

a) agricultural production

b) development of virgin lands

c) sale of agricultural equipment to state farms

d) "cult of corn"

e) outflow of the rural population to cities

4. Changes in industry

a) Course on mechanization and automation of production

b) accelerated development of the chemical industry

c) space exploration and nuclear energy

d) reform of national economic management (organization of economic councils)

d) XXI Congress of the Com. parties - to catch up and overtake the developed capitalist

ical countries by production per capita.

f) XXII Congress of the CPSU - new program parties.

5. Changes in foreign policy.

6. Crisis of power. Offset N.S. Khrushchev.

From the second half of 1953 to the end of the 50s, reforms were carried out in the USSR, which had a beneficial effect on both the pace of development of the national economy and the well-being of the people.

The main reason for the success of the reforms was that they revived economic methods of managing the national economy and began with agriculture, and therefore received widespread support among the masses.

The main reason for the failure of the reforms is that they were not supported by the democratization of the political system. Having broken the repressive system, they did not touch its basis - the command-administrative system. Therefore, after five or six years, many reforms began to be curtailed through the efforts of both the reformers themselves and the powerful administrative and managerial apparatus, the nomenklatura.

Where could the country go after Stalin's death? The answer to this question must be sought in the balance of forces in the highest stratum of the party and state leadership. It was possible either a temporary continuation of Stalinism, which created a serious threat to the lives and well-being of millions of people and entire nations, or some softening of it while maintaining the general political course, or a turn to de-Stalinization. De-Stalinization did not mean the elimination of the totalitarian regime. Society as a whole was not yet ready for this. We could only talk about an initial cleansing from the legacy of Stalinism: the liberation of the repressed, a turn to solving the most pressing agrarian problems, and a weakening of the dogmatic pressure in culture. The first option was associated with the prospect of Beria coming to power; Molotov and Bulganin would probably take part in the implementation of the second; in practice, the third option began to be implemented. And N.S. Khrushchev associated himself with him.

The most influential political figures in the leadership were Malenkov, Beria and Khrushchev. The balance was extremely unstable.

The policy of the new leadership in the spring days of 1953. was controversial, reflecting the contradictions in its composition. At Zhukov’s request, a large group of military personnel returned from prison. But the Gulag continued to exist, the same slogans and portraits of Stalin hung everywhere.

Each of the contenders for power sought to seize it in their own way. Beria - through control over state security agencies and troops.

Malenkov - declaring his desire to pursue a popular policy of increasing the well-being of the people, “to take care of the maximum satisfaction of their material needs,” calling for “in 2-3 years to achieve the creation in our country of an abundance of food for the population and raw materials for light industry.” But Beria and Malenkov did not have connections among senior military leaders, who did not trust them. The main thing was in the mood of the party apparatus, which wanted to preserve the regime, but without reprisals against the apparatus. Objectively, the situation turned out favorably for Khrushchev. Khrushchev showed extraordinary activity these days. In September 1953, N.S. Khrushchev was elected First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. Articles about the dangers of the cult of personality began to appear in the press. What was paradoxical was that their authors referred to the works of Stalin, declaring that he was an opponent of the cult. A review of the "Leningrad Case" and the "Doctors' Case" began. Party and economic leaders and doctors convicted in these cases were rehabilitated. But at the same time, at the end of 1953, prisoner strikes were brutally suppressed in the mines of Vorkuta, which were under the jurisdiction of the still existing Gulag.

After Stalin's death, certain hopes arose among Gulag prisoners related to amnesty and rehabilitation. These sentiments played the role of a detonator of unrest. A year later, rehabilitation began based on the political processes of the 1930s. People began to return from exile and prison. Now we can evaluate that first step in different ways: from the height of the past years, everything is clearer and more obvious. But one thing still cannot be denied: despite all the costs and omissions, it was a step from permanent civil war to civil peace.

There has been a turn in real politics. And this turn had to be supported by decisions of an economic nature. In August 1953 At a session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Malenkov for the first time raised the question of turning the economy towards people, of the state's priority attention to the well-being of the people through the accelerated development of agriculture and the production of consumer goods. "Now at the base achieved successes in the development of heavy industry, we have all the conditions to organize a steep rise in the production of consumer goods." It was planned to sharply change the investment policy, significantly increase the financial "feeding" of non-material production sectors focused on the production of goods for the people, Special attention for agriculture, to involve machine-building plants and heavy industry enterprises in the production of consumer goods. Thus, a course was set for a social reorientation of the economy, which quickly began to be translated into concrete goods, money, and housing.

Choosing a new political path required a change in economic guidelines. However, at that time no one in the country's political leadership questioned the principles of the command-administrative system. It was about overcoming its extremes, such as the almost complete absence of material incentives for workers, the lag in the mass introduction of scientific and technological achievements into production. Rejection of the market and commodity-money relations continued to prevail, and the advantages of socialism were considered as something given once and for all, capable of in itself ensuring development and prosperity.

Agricultural production took first place among the national economic problems. Khrushchev, we must give him his due, in terms of origin and interests, was always closer to the needs of the peasants than any of the other top political leaders. At the Plenum of the Central Committee, Khrushchev made a series of proposals for the development of agriculture that were important for that time. From today's perspective they may seem insufficient, but back then they were of considerable importance. Purchase prices for agricultural products were increased, advance payment for the labor of collective farmers was introduced (before this, payments to them were made only once a year), etc.

Khrushchev condemned the practice of the existence of weak farms by transferring funds from strong ones to them, criticized the bloated administrative apparatus, and insufficient assistance from the city to agriculture. Peasants began to be somewhat encouraged to raise poultry and small livestock. Many farms now have cows, which was unthinkable for a collective farmer just a year ago.

The ideas expressed and the decisions adopted could give effect only a few years later. And grain farming needed to be improved immediately. A solution was found in the development of virgin and fallow lands. This was a clearly expressed extensive development option. Suitable lands were located in Kazakhstan, Southern Siberia, the Volga region, the Urals, and the North Caucasus. Among them, Kazakhstan, the Urals and Siberia looked the most promising. The very idea of ​​developing these lands was not new. Thoughts about the possibility of their use were expressed at the beginning of the century. A feature of the mid-50s was the revival of mass enthusiasm, especially among young people. Changes were slowly but steadily taking place in the country, arousing in millions of young people a sincere desire to make their personal contribution to strengthening the material foundations of Soviet society. Enthusiasm lived in the souls of people, and not just in slogans, calls and marches. A favorable moment had been created, from a socio-psychological point of view, when mass enthusiasm, supported by material incentives and attention to social and everyday problems, could have a long-term economic and political effect. However, the outburst of youth enthusiasm was perceived by the leadership as constant, unchanging and always in the future

controlled force.

By the spring of 1954 Over 120 state farms were organized in the virgin lands of Kazakhstan. The pioneers of the virgin lands had to live in tents, in conditions of no roads, alternating between severe cold and sweltering heat. Round-the-clock work during the sowing and harvesting period was replaced by a period of relatively short rest with construction work. The first results of the virgin lands epic could not but inspire optimism. In 1954 Virgin lands accounted for over 40 percent of the gross grain harvest. The production of meat and milk has increased.

All this made it possible to somewhat improve the food supply of the population. However, there were successes only in the first years. The yield of grain crops on newly developed lands remained low; land development took place in the absence of a scientifically based farming system. Traditional mismanagement also had its effect. The granaries were not built on time, and reserves of equipment and fuel were not created.

It was necessary to transfer equipment from all over the country, which increased the cost of grain, and consequently, meat, milk, etc.

The development of virgin lands delayed the revival of the old arable agricultural regions of Russia. And yet, the initial stage of the development of virgin lands will remain in history as a true epic of labor, as a real surge of enthusiasm, as a striking feature of the time when the country was moving towards the historical turn made by the 20th Party Congress.

The country lived with renewal. Numerous meetings were held with the participation of industry, construction, and transport workers. This phenomenon in itself was new - after all, previously all the most important decisions were made in a narrow circle, behind closed doors. At the meetings, the need for change and the use of global technical experience were openly discussed.

But despite the novelty of a number of approaches, persistent stereotypes of the old were also observed. The reasons for the lags were seen in the fact that “weak leadership” was being exercised “on the part of ministers and leaders,” and it was proposed to create new departments to introduce new technology. But the principle of a planned, centralized, command-bureaucratic system was not questioned.

1956 - the year of the 20th Congress - turned out to be very favorable for the country's agriculture. It was this year that there was great success in the virgin lands - the harvest was a record one. The chronic difficulties with grain procurements in previous years seemed to be becoming a thing of the past. And in the central regions of the country, collective farmers, freed from the most oppressive shackles of the Stalinist system, which often resembled state serfdom, received new incentives to work, and the share of monetary compensation for their labor increased. Under these conditions, at the end of 1958. On the initiative of N.S. Khrushchev, a decision was made to sell agricultural equipment to collective farms. The fact is that before this, the equipment was in the hands of machine and tractor stations (MTS). Collective farms had the right to buy only trucks. Such a system developed since the late 20s and was a consequence of deep distrust of the peasantry as a whole, which was not allowed to own agricultural machinery. For the use of equipment, collective farms had to pay MTS in kind.

The sale of equipment to collective farms did not immediately have a positive impact on agricultural production. Most of them were unable to buy them immediately and paid the money in installments. This initially worsened the financial situation of a significant part of the collective farms and gave rise to a certain discontent. Another negative consequence was the actual loss of machine operators and repairmen. previously concentrated in the MTS. By law, they had to move to collective farms, but for many of them this meant a decrease in living standards, and they found work in regional centers and cities. Attitudes towards technology worsened, since collective farms, as a rule, did not have parks and shelters for storing them in winter time, and the general level of technical culture of collective farmers was still low.

Traditional shortcomings in prices for agricultural products, which were extremely low and did not cover costs, also had an impact.

But the main thing was not discussed - the need to provide the peasantry with freedom to choose forms of management. There was an unshakable confidence in the absolute perfection of the collective and state farm system, which was under the close supervision of party and state bodies.

But some solution had to be found. While on a visit to the USA in 1959. Khrushchev visited the fields of an American farmer who grew hybrid corn. Khrushchev was literally captivated by her. He came to the conclusion that it is possible to raise the “virgin meat land” only by solving the problem of feed production, and that, in turn, is based on the structure of sown areas. Instead of grass fields, we need to switch to widespread and widespread crops of corn, which provides both grain and green mass for silage. Where corn does not grow, decisively replace leaders who “have dried up and are drying the corn.” Khrushchev began to introduce corn into Soviet agriculture with great zeal. It was promoted all the way to the Arkhangelsk region. This was an outrage not only against the centuries-old experience and traditions of peasant agriculture, but also against common sense. At the same time, the purchase hybrid varieties corn, an attempt to introduce American technology for its cultivation in those areas where it could give full growth, contributed to the increase in grain and feed for livestock, and really helped to cope with the problems of agriculture.

Agriculture, as before, was pressured by stereotypes of report mania, the desire of bureaucratic workers to achieve significant indicators through human, even illegal, means, without awareness of the negative consequences.

Agriculture was on the verge of crisis. The increase in cash incomes of the population in cities began to outpace the growth of agricultural production. And again, a way out seemed to be found, but not in economic ways, but in new endless reorganizational rearrangements. In 1961 The USSR Ministry of Agriculture was reorganized and turned into an advisory body. Khrushchev himself traveled around dozens of regions, giving personal instructions on how to conduct agriculture. But all his efforts were in vain. The desired breakthrough never happened. Many collective farmers' faith in the possibility of change was undermined. The outflow of the rural population to cities increased; seeing no prospects, young people began to leave the village. Since 1959 persecution of personal plots resumed. It was forbidden for townspeople to have livestock, which helped supply the residents of small towns. Then farms and rural residents were persecuted. Over the course of four years, the number of livestock in a private farmstead has halved. This was a real defeat of the peasantry, which had just begun to recover from Stalinism. Slogans were heard again that the main thing was public, not private, economy, and that the main enemy were “speculators and parasites” trading in the markets. Collective farmers were expelled from the markets, and real speculators began to inflate prices.

However, the miracle did not come, and in 1962. The government decided to stimulate livestock farming by increasing meat prices by one and a half times. The new prices did not increase the quantity of meat, but caused unrest in the cities. The largest of them in Novocherkassk was suppressed by force of arms. There were casualties.

There were also strong, prosperous farms in the country, headed by skilled leaders who knew how to get along with both their superiors and their subordinates. But they existed rather in spite of the current situation. Difficulties in the agricultural sector grew.

The following year there were shortages not only of meat, milk and butter, but also of bread. Long lines lined up outside bread stores overnight. Anti-government sentiments grew. And then it was decided to get out of the crisis by purchasing American grain. This temporary measure has become an organic part public policy until the death of the USSR. The Soviet Union's gold reserves were used to support, strengthen and develop American farms, while the farms of its own peasants were persecuted. But the organizers of this “exchange” received a new and seemingly inexhaustible source of personal enrichment.

The seven-year plan for the development of the national economy (1959-1965) in terms of the development of agricultural production was failed. Instead of the planned 70 percent, the increase was only 15 percent.

The USSR turned into a powerful industrial power. The emphasis continued to be placed on production, which by the beginning of the 60s amounted to a general rise in industrial production. The building materials industry, mechanical engineering, metalworking, chemistry, petrochemicals, and electric power developed especially quickly. Their production volume has increased 4-5 times.

Group B enterprises (primarily the light, food, woodworking, and pulp and paper industries) developed much more slowly. However, their growth was twofold. In general, the average annual rate of industrial production in the USSR exceeded 10 percent. Such high rates could only be achieved by actively using the harsh methods of administrative economics. The leaders of the USSR were confident that the rate of industrial growth of the country would not only be high, but also increasing. The conclusions of Western economists about the inevitable “decay” of the pace as the economic potential of the USSR increased were rejected as attempts to judge socialism by analogy with capitalism. The thesis about the accelerating development of the national economy in the USSR (primarily industry) has become firmly established in political propaganda and social sciences.

Despite the introduction of a machine base for the national economy, its scientific and technical level began to lag behind the needs of the time.

Was tall specific gravity workers and peasants engaged in heavy manual and unskilled labor (in industry - 40 percent, in agriculture - 75 percent). These problems were discussed at the plenum of the Central Committee in 1955, at which the course towards mechanization and automation of production was determined. A few years later, the main link was named, by seizing on which they hoped to extend the entire chain of the scientific and technological revolution - chemistry. The accelerated development of the chemical industry was justified by the strengthening of its role in creating the material and technical base of communism.

However, the symbol of scientific and technological progress of the USSR was the assault on space. In October 1957 The first artificial Earth satellite was launched. Then space rockets They carried animals into space and flew around the Moon. And in April 1961 a man stepped into space, the first man on the planet, a Soviet man - Yuri Gagarin.

The conquest of space required enormous funds. They didn't care about the price. This was not only scientific, but also military interest. They believed that the time was not far off when Soviet cosmonauts, like hospitable hosts, would greet envoys from other countries, including the United States, in deep space. It seemed that the Soviet Union had finally and firmly become the leader of scientific and technological progress of mankind.

Impressive for Soviet people, for the whole world were the commissioning of the first nuclear icebreaker "Lenin" and the opening of the Institute of Nuclear Research. Of course, these were major events. But nothing was said then about the dangers posed by the massive development of nuclear energy, about the need for the strictest adherence to technological discipline, and increasing the level of safety at nuclear facilities. The Soviet people also did not know about the accident in the city of Kyshtym near Chelyabinsk, as a result of which the territory of a number of regions was contaminated with radioactive substances. Hundreds of people were irradiated, over ten thousand villagers were resettled from the radioactive zone, although tens of thousands of villagers continued to live there for many decades.

In 1957, attempts were made to reform the management of the national economy. The existing over-centralized sectoral ministries, in Khrushchev's opinion, were unable to ensure the rapid growth of industrial production. Instead, territorial administrations were established - councils of the national economy. The very idea of ​​decentralizing economic management for such a huge country initially met with positive responses. However, in the spirit characteristic of the administrative-command system, this reform was presented by its authors as a miraculous one-time act capable of radically changing the economic situation in the country: destroying the departmental monopoly, bringing management closer to the localities, raising their initiative, balancing the economic development of the republics and regions, strengthening the internal their economic ties will ultimately accelerate economic development. Management of the defense sector of the economy remained centralized. Any doubts regarding the reform were not expressed, since it came from Khrushchev himself.

It should be said that the organization of economic councils had some effect. Senseless counter transportation of goods was reduced, hundreds of small production enterprises of different ministries that duplicated each other were closed. The freed up space was used for the production of new products. The process of technical reconstruction of many enterprises accelerated: in 1956-1960, three times more new types of machines, units, and devices were put into operation than in the previous five-year period. There was a significant reduction in administrative and management personnel in production.

However, there were no fundamental changes in economic development.

Enterprises, instead of the petty tutelage of ministries, received the petty tutelage of economic councils. The reform did not reach the enterprise, the workplace, and could not reach it, since it was not even focused on this. The senior economic leaders of the ministries in the capital were also dissatisfied, as they were losing a considerable part of their now familiar power. But the provincial bureaucracy supported these steps of Khrushchev.

Instead of searching for the material interest of each worker in the results of his work, changes were made in rationing and payment. The result of this was a significant reduction in workers who worked on a piece-rate basis and an increase in the number of time workers. And without that, the low material incentives to work began to decline sharply. Promises, repeatedly repeated from high tribunes, about wage growth led to the fact that workers en masse began to make statements that “wages should be increased for everyone, without exception, as Khrushchev said.” The “deduction” began to spread ", i.e. adjusting wages to a certain level.

Moral incentives began to play an increasingly active role. A new movement - brigades of communist labor - emerged. Members of these brigades, as well as members of the DIP ("catch up and overtake") brigades in the early 30s, tried to introduce communist methods into their daily lives, spend free time together, and improve their general educational, technical and professional level. However, the idealism of the founders of the movement for communist labor faded away quite quickly, faced both with the “rough” needs of everyday life, and with the fact that the initiative was quickly made by the party, trade union, and Komsomol bureaucracy, which made it just another column in the “socialist competition table.”

The civil sector of the economy had the greatest success in the area of ​​housing construction. In the USSR there was no mass housing construction; in other periods they simply did not build housing. The war deprived millions of families of shelter; people lived in dugouts, barracks, and communal apartments. For many, getting a separate, comfortable apartment was almost an impossible dream. Our country did not know the pace at which housing construction was carried out in the first half of the 60s, either before or after this period.

hold on high level Not everyone could handle it. This movement could not be massive. But trade union organizations, in pursuit of numbers, tried to involve as many people as possible in it. more people. In the end, everything was formalized. The love for ringing phrases, slogans, the haste of conclusions and decisions were characteristic features of that time, where genuine innovations and concern for the common people were intricately intertwined with spotlighting, idle talk, and sometimes even elementary social ignorance.

The 21st Congress is another attempt at radical acceleration. The reform and the changes made led to confusion in the administrative apparatus and failures in the implementation of the sixth five-year plan. However, the country's leadership did not recognize this and make the necessary adjustments. Another solution was found: to replace the five-year plan for 1956-1960 with a seven-year plan for 1959-1965. Then the “shortage” of the first years of the five-year plan will be covered by new plans. The justification for this measure was the scale of the economy and the need to establish a long-term perspective of economic planning.

Although the seven-year plan spoke about the need to make a decisive breakthrough in providing the people with housing and consumer products, its main ideas, as before, boiled down to the constant rapid development of capital-intensive industries of group “A”. Clearly unrealistic goals were set for the complete mechanization of the construction industry.

It was this congress that marked the starting point of an inaccurate, exaggeratedly optimistic forecast of the development of the USSR for the next decade. He solemnly proclaimed that the country had entered the “period of extensive construction of a communist society.”

The task was set to as soon as possible to catch up and surpass the most developed capitalist countries in terms of production per capita. Looking into the future, Khrushchev estimated that this would happen around 1970. Khrushchev also touched upon some theoretical issues in his report. He concluded about the complete and final victory of socialism in our country. Thus, in his opinion, the question of the possibility of building socialism in one country was resolved.

The most important internal political event of the period under study was the XXII Congress of the CPSU. It adopted a new party program. The XXII Congress of the CPSU was both a triumph of all politics associated with the name of N.S. Khrushchev, and the beginning of his end. The course of his work and decisions reflected all the contradictions of the era: real achievements of the de-Stalinization process, certain successes in economic development and fantastic, utopian plans, steps towards democratization of internal party life, a sharp strengthening of the cult of personality of Khrushchev himself. The main line to decentralize management of the national economy was lost.

To build communism, it was supposed to solve a threefold problem:

in the economic field - to build the material and technical base of communism (i.e., to take first place in the world in production per capita; to achieve the highest labor productivity in the world; to ensure the highest standard of living of the people in the world); in the socio-political field - move to communist self-government; in the field of spiritual and ideological - to educate a new, comprehensively developed person. The historical framework of the CPSU program was mainly limited to twenty years.

In the early 60s, the image of communism in the mass consciousness was associated with specific large social programs. Social program obligations were as follows:

firstly, to solve the food issue by fully providing the people with high-quality products of rational and uninterrupted nutrition;

secondly, to fully satisfy the demand for consumer goods;

thirdly, to solve the housing problem by providing each family with a separate comfortable apartment;

finally, eliminate the unskilled and heavy labor manual labor in the national economy.

There was nothing utopian in these tasks. They became such after the USSR got involved in a new round of an unprecedented arms race, which decided their material base.

Had a great influence on international relations" cold war"After the end of World War II, the trust of allies in the anti-Hitler coalition in each other began to melt inexorably. The growing influence of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe and the formation of governments there led by communists, the victory of the Chinese revolution, the growth of the anti-colonial liberation movement in Southeast Asia led to a new the balance of power on the world stage, leading to a gradual confrontation between yesterday's allies. The most acute clash between the two forces in the early 50s was the Korean conflict. It showed how easily the Cold War could escalate into an armed conflict.

The new leadership of our country has demonstrated a desire for dynamism in foreign policy. It undertook a number of trips abroad in order to establish personal contacts with the leaders of friendly countries.

An important milestone in strengthening relations between socialist states was the creation of the Warsaw Treaty Organization - a Union that declared its goal to pursue a defense policy. The thaw also affected our country’s relations with Western countries. A treaty on collective security in Europe was concluded with the participation of the United States. The peak between East and West was the Cuban Missile Crisis, caused by the Soviet Union's deployment of nuclear missiles in Cuba. The crisis that brought the world to the brink of nuclear disaster was resolved through negotiations and the compromises reached there. After this culmination of the Cold War, a slow process of improving relations between East and West began. The Thaw in international relations was real and allowed people of many countries to look at each other differently.

In the development of culture in the late 50s - early 60s, contradictory trends appeared. The general approach to the cultural environment was distinguished by the previous desire to place it at the service of the administrative-command ideology. But the process of renewal itself could not but cause a revival of cultural life. At the same time, Khrushchev quite sensitively felt the need to carry out reforms in one of the main links of culture - at school: the period of study in high school was increased to 11 years, and from the ninth grade, students had to master industrial specialties. Neither the material base nor the teaching staff existed for this. An important role in spiritual life was played by some emancipation in historical science. There was also an undoubted revival in artistic culture. New literary and artistic magazines emerged: “Youth”, “Young Guard”. Opened in Moscow new theater“Contemporary”, which attracted attention not only with its current productions, but also with the performances of many actors. Television was part of people's lives. However, the inconsistency of cultural policy made itself felt in the fact that some works were received with hostility by Khrushchev and a number of cultural figures. The political leadership of the country in the early 60s sought to keep culture within strict limits. But still, bold, highly artistic works, imbued with truth and citizenship, made their way through. Documentary stories and memoirs were published that revealed the horrors of illegal repressions and the inhumane life of Stalin's camps.

1962-1964 remained in the memory of many people as years of internal turmoil and growing tension. The food supply to the growing urban population has deteriorated. Prices turned out to be frozen. The reason for this was a sharp increase in purchase prices, which began to overtake retail prices.

The sympathy of ordinary people for Khrushchev began to weaken. In the fall of 1963, a new crisis broke out. Bread has disappeared from stores because... virgin soil gave nothing. Bread coupons appeared.

The rise in prices and the emergence of new deficits were a reflection of the growing crisis in the country's economy as a whole. The rate of industrial growth began to slow down. Technological progress has slowed down. Khrushchev and his entourage tried to correct the discovered disruptions in the work of industry by drifting towards the recreation of a centralized bureaucratic command-administrative system of the Stalinist type. Khrushchev, on the one hand, sought to improve the situation in the economy by reshuffling the party apparatus, and on the other, to push the two parts of the party apparatus into conflict in order to protect himself with the “divide and conquer” policy. The party apparatus has grown sharply. Regional committees, Komsomol and trade union organizations began to divide. The entire reform boiled down to inflating the apparatus of party and government bodies. The collapse of power was obvious.

Khrushchev's loss of personal popularity, support from the party and economic apparatus, a break with a considerable part of the intelligentsia, and the lack of visible changes in the standard of living of the majority of workers played a fatal role in the implementation of anti-bureaucratic reforms. And attempts at reforms took place at the top, in anti-democratic ways. Most of the people did not participate in them. Real decisions were made by a very limited circle of senior political leaders. Naturally, in case of failure, all political responsibility fell on the person who held the first post in the party and government. Khrushchev was doomed to resign. In 1964 he tried to intensify reform activities by ordering the start of preparation of a draft of a new Constitution of the USSR.

The turbulent consequences of the transformation into the USSR, inconsistent and contradictory, nevertheless managed to pull the country out of the torpor of the previous era.

The party-state nomenklatura achieved strengthening of its positions, but dissatisfaction with the restless leader in its ranks grew. The disappointment of the intelligentsia with the strictly dosed nomenklatura “thaw” grew. Workers and peasants are tired of the noisy struggle for a “bright future” while their current life is deteriorating.

All this helped the party-state nomenklatura to get rid of N.S. Khrushchev without any social upheaval. He was accused of "valentarism", removed from all posts and sent into retirement. L.I. Brezhnev became the first secretary of the Central Committee.

The new government decides to begin new economic reforms. The first steps of the reform in 1965 gave hope. Economic growth accelerated. The Eighth Five-Year Plan, which coincided in time with the implementation of the reform, turned out to be fulfilled in a number of important economic indicators. But by the beginning of the 70s. the essence of the reform turned out to be so distorted that it actually ceased to operate. The main reasons that led to the failure of the reform were the reluctance of the majority of leaders of the administrative-command economy to abandon the usual methods of management, which was accompanied by the curtailment of timid reforms in the political sphere.

LITERATURE.

1. "History of the Fatherland" Textbook for 11th grade Wednesday. school V.P.

Ostrovsky, V.I. Startsev, B.A. Starkov, G.M. Smirnov. Moscow, Publishing house Enlightenment, 1992

2. Light and shadows of the “great decade” N.S. Khrushchev and his time 1989.

3. Agrarian policy of the CPSU in the 50s - 60s. Magazine N9 "Questions of the History of the CPSU" I.V. Rusinov, Moscow, 1988.